Harvard Study: The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy
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John J. Mearsheimer and
Stephen M. Walt
John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University
March 2006
U.S. foreign policy shapes events in every corner of the globe. Nowhere is
this truer than in the Middle East, a region of recurring instability and
enormous strategic importance. Most recently, the Bush Administration.s
attempt to transform the region into a community of democracies has helped
produce a resilient insurency in Iraq, a sharp rise in world oil prices,
and terrorist bombings in Madrid, London, and Amman. With so much at stake
for so many, all countries need to understand the forces that drive U.S.
Middle East policy.
The U.S. national interest should be the primary object of American
foreign policy. For the past several decades, however, and especially
since the Six Day War in 1967, the centerpiece of U.S. Middle East policy
has been its relationship with Israel. The combination of unwavering U.S.
support for Israel and the related effort to spread democracy throughout
the region has inflamed Arab and Islamic opinion and eopardized U.S.
security.
This situation has no equal in American political history. Why has the
United States been willing to set aside its own security in order to
advance the interests of another state? One might assume that the bond
between the two countries is based on shared strategic interests or
compelling moral imperativs. As we show below, however, neither of those
explanations can account for the remarkable level of material and
diplomatic support that the United States povides to Israel.
Instead, the overall thrust of U.S. policy in the region is due almost
entirely to U.S. domestic politics, and especially to the activities of
the .Israel Lobby.. Other special interest groups have managed to skew
U.S. foreign policy in directions they favored, but no lobby has managed
to divert U.S. foreign policy as far from what the American national
interest would otherwise suggest, while simultaneously convincing
Americans that U.S. and Israeli interests are essentially identical.1
In the pages that follow, we describe how the Lobby has accomplished this
feat, and how its activities have shaped America.s actions in this
critical region. Given the strategic importance of the Middle East and its
potential impact on others, both Americans and non.Americans need to
understand and address the Lobby.s influence on U.S. policy. 1
Some readers will find this analysis disturbing, but the facts recounted
here are not in serious dispute among scholars. Indeed, our account relies
heavily on the work of Israeli scholars and journalists, who deserve great
credit for shedding light on these issues. We also rely on evidence
provided by respected Israeli and international human rights
organizations. Similarly, our claims about the Lobby.s impact rely on
testimony from the Lobby.s own members, as well as testimony from
politicians who have worked with them. Readers may reject our conclusions,
of course, but the evidence on which they rest is not controversial.
THE GREAT BENEFACTOR
Since the October War in 1973, Washington has provided Israel with a level
of support dwarfing the amounts provided to any other state. It has been
the largest annual recipient of direct U.S. economic and military
assistance since 1976 and the largest total recipient since World War II.
Total direct U.S. aid to Israel amounts to well over $140 billion in 2003
dollars.2 Israel receives about $3 billion in direct foreign assistance
each year, which is roughly one.fifth of America.s foreign aid budget. In
per capita terms, the United States gives each Israeli a direct subsidy
worth about $500 per year.3 This largesse is especially striking when one
realizes that Israel is now a wealthy industrial state with a per capita
incom roughly equal to South Korea or Spain.4
Israel also gets other special deals from Washington.5 Other aid
recipients get their money in quarterly installments, but Israel receives
its entire appropriation at the beginning of each fiscal year and thus
earns extra interest. Most recipients of American military assistance are
required to spend all of it in the United States, but Israel can use
roughly twenty.five percent of its aid allotment to subsidize its own
defense industry. Israel is the only recipient that does not have to
account for how the aid is spent, an exemption that makes it virtually
impossible to prevent the money from being used for purposes the United
States opposes, like building settlements in the West Bank.
Moreover, the United States has provided Israel with nearly $3 billion to
develop weapons systems like the Lavi aircraft that the Pentagon did not
want or need, while giving Israel access to top.drawer U.S. weaponry like
Blackhawk helicopters and F.16 jets. Finally, the United States gives
Israel access to intelligence that it denies its NATO allies and has
turned a blind eye towards Israels acquisition of nuclear weapons.6
2 In addition, Washington provides Israel with consistent diplomatic
support. Since 1982, the United States has vetoed 32 United Nations
Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel, a number
greater than the combined total of vetoes cast by all the other Security
Council members.7 It also blocks Arab states. efforts to put Israel.s
nuclear arsenal on the International Atomic Energy Agency.s agenda.8
The United States also comes to Israel.s rescue in wartime and takes its
side when negotiating peace. The Nixon Administration re.supplied Israel
during the October War and protected Israel from the threat of Soviet
intervention. Washington was deeply involved in the negotiations that
ended that war as well as the lengthy .step.by.step. process that
followed, just as it played a key role in the negotiations that preceded
and followed the 1993 Oslo Accords.9 There were occasional frictions
between U.S. and Israeli officials in both cases, but the United States
coordinated its positions closely with Israel and consistently backed the
Israeli approach to the negotitions. Indeed, one American participant at
Camp David (2000) later said, .far too often, we functioned . . . as
Israel.s lawyer..10
As discussed below, Washington has given Israel wide latitude in dealing
with the occupied territories (the West Bank and Gaza Strip), even when
its actions were at odds with stated U.S. policy. Moreover, the Bush
Administration.s ambitious strategy to transform the Middle East.beginning
with the invasion of Iraq.is at least partly intended to improve Israel.s
strategic situation. Apart from wartime alliances, it is hard to think of
another instance where one country has provided another with a similar
level of material and diplomaticsupport for such an extended period.
America.s support for Israel is, in short, unique.
This extraordinary generosity might be understandable if Israel were a
vital strategic asset or if there were a compelling mora case for
sustained U.S. backing. But neither rationale is convincing.
A STRATEGIC LIABILITY
According to the American.Israel Public Affairs Committee.s (AIPAC)
website, .the United States and Israel have formed a unique partnership to
meet the growing strategic threats in the Middle East . . . . This
cooperative effort provides significant benefits for both the United
States and Israel..11 This claim is an article of faith among Israel.s
supporters and is routinely invoked by Israeli politicians and pro.Israel
Americans.
3 Israel may have been a strategic asset during the Cold War.12 By serving
as America.s proxy after the Six Day War (1967), Israel helped contain
Soviet expansion in the region and inflicted humiliating defeats on Soviet
clients like Egypt and Syria. Israel occasionally helped protect other
U.S. allies (like Jordan.s King Hussein) and its military prowess forced
Moscow to spend more backing its losing clients. Israel also gave the
United States useful intelligence about Soviet capabilities.
Israel.s strategic value during this period should not be overstated,
however.13 Backing Israel was not cheap, and it complicated America.s
relations with the Arab world. For example, the U.S. decision to give
Israel $2.2 billion in emergency military aid during the October War
triggered an OPEC oil embargo that inflicted considerable damage o Western
economies. Moreover, Israel.s military could not protect U.S. interests in
the region. For example, the United States could not rely on Israel when
the Iranian Revolution in 1979 raised concerns about the security of
Persian Glf oil supplies, and had to create its own .Rapid Deployment
Force. instead.
Even if Israel was a strategic asset during the Cold War, the first Gulf
War (1990.91) revealed that Israel was becoming a strategic burden. The
United States could not use Israeli bases during the war without rupturing
the anti.Iraq coalition, and it had to divert resources (e.g., Patriot
missile batteries) to keep Tel Aviv from doing anything that might
fracture the alliance against Saddam. History repeated itself in 2003:
although Israel was eager for the United States to attack Saddam,
President Bush could not ask it to help without triggering Arab
opposition. So Israel stayed on the sidelines again.14
Beginning in the 1990s, and especially after 9/11, U.S. support for Israel
has been justified by the claim that both states are threatened by
terrorist groups originating in the Arabor Muslim world, and by a set of
.rogue states. that back these groups and seek WMD. This rationale implies
that Washington should give Israel a free hand in dealing with the
Palestinians and not press Israel t make concessions until all Palestinian
terrorists are imprisoned or dead. It also implies that the United States
should go after countries like the Islamic Republic of Iran, Saddam
Hussein.s Iraq, and Bashar al.Assad.s Syria. Israel is thus seen as a
crucial ally in the war on terror, because its enemies are America.s
enemies.
This new rationale seems persuasive, but Israel is in fact a liability in
the war on terror and the broader effort to deal with rogue states.
4 To begin with, .terrorism. is a tactic employed by a wide array of
political groups; it is not a single unified adversary. The terrorist
organizations that threaten Israel (e.g., Hamas or Hezbollah) do not
threaten the United States, except when it intervenes against them (as in
Lebanon in 1982). Moreover, Palestinian terrorism is not random violence
directed against Israel or .the West.; it is largely a response to
Israel.s prolonged campaign to colonize the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
More importantly, saying that Israel and the United States are united by a
shared terrorist threat has the causal relationship backwards: rather, the
United States has a terrorism problem in good part because it is so
closely allied with Israel, not the other way around. U.S. support for
Israel is not the only source of anti.American terrorism, but it is an
important one, and it makes winning the war on terror more difficult.15
There is no question, for example, that many al Qaeda leaders, including
bin Laden, are motivated by Israel.s presence in Jerusalem and the plight
of the Palestinians. According to the U.S. 9/11 Commission, bin Laden
explicitly sought to punish the United States for its policies in the
Middle East, including its support for Israel, and he even tried to time
the attacks to highlight this issue.16
Equally important, unconditional U.S. support for Israel makes it easier
for extremists like bin Laden to rally popular support and to attract
recruits. Public opinion polls confirm that Arab populations are deeply
hostile to American support for Israel, and the U.S. State Department.s
Advisory Group on Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim world found
that .citizens in these countries are genuinely distressed at the plight
of the Palestinians and at the role they perceive the UnitedStates to be
playing..17
As for so.called rogue states in the Middle East, they are not a dire
threat to vital U.S. interests, apart from the U.S. commitment to Israel
itself. Although the United States does have a number of disagreements
with these regimes, Washington would not be nearly as worried about Iran,
Ba.thist Iraq, or Syria were it not so closely tied to Israel. Even if
these states acquire nuclear weapons.which is obviously not desirable.it
would not be a strategic disaster for the United States. Neither America
nor Israel could be blackmailed by a nuclear.armed rogue, because the
blackmailer could not carry out the threat without receiving overwhelming
retaliation. The danger of a .nuclear handoff. to terrorists is equally
remote, because a rogue state could not be sure the transfer would be
undetected or that it would not be blamed and punished afterward. 5
Furthermore, the U.S. relationship with Israel actually makes it harder to
deal with these states. Israel.s nuclear arsenal is one reason why some of
its neighbors want nuclear weapons, and threatening these states with
regime change merely increases that desire. Yet Israel is not much of an
asset when the United States contemplates using force against these
regimes, because it cannot participate in the fight.
In short, treating Israel as America.s most important ally in the campaign
against terrorism and assorted Middle East dictatorships bothexaggerates
Israel.s ability to help on these issues and ignores the ways that
Israel.s policies make U.S. efforts more difficult.
Unquestioned support for Israel also weakens the U.S. position outside the
Middle East. Foreign elites consistently view the United States as too
supportive of Israel, and think its tolerance of Israeli repression in the
occupied territories is morally obtuse and a handicap in the war on
terroism.18 In April 2004, for example, 52 former British diplomats sent
Prime Minister Tony Blair a letter saying that the Israel.Palestine
conflict had .poisoned relations between the West and the Arab and Islamic
worlds,. and warning that the policies of Bush and Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon were .one.sided and illegal..19
A final reason to question Israel.s strategic value is that it does not
act like a loyal ally. Israeli officials frequently ignore U.S. requests
and renege on promises made to top U.S. leaders (including past pledges to
halt settlement construction and to refrain from .targeted assassinations.
of Palestinian leaders).20 Moreover, Israel has provided sensitive U.S.
military technology to potential U.S. rivals like China, in what the U.S.
State Department Inspector.General called .a systematic and growing
pattern of unauthorized transfers..21 According to the U.S. General
Accounting Office, Israel also .conducts the most aggressive espionage
operations against the U.S. of any ally..22 In addition to the case of
Jonathan Pollard, who gave Israel large quantities of classified material
in the early 1980s (which Israel reportedly passed onto the Soviet Union
to gain more exit visas for Soviet Jews), a new controversy erupted in
2004 when it was revealed that a key Pentagon official (Larry Franklin)
had passed classified information to an Israeli diplomat, allegedly aided
by two AIPAC officials.23 Israel is hardly the only country that spies on
the United States, but its willingness to spy on its principal patron
casts further doubt on its strategic value.
6 A DWINDLING MORAL CASE
Apart from its alleged strategic value, Israel.s backers also argue that
it deserves unqualified U.S. support because 1) it is weak and surrounded
by enemies, 2) it is a democracy, which is a morally preferable form of
government; 3) the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and
therefore deserve special treatment, and 4) Israel.s conduct has been
morally superior to its adversaries. behavior.
On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive.
There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel.s existence, but that
is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, Israel.s past and present conduct
offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.
Backing the Underdog?
Israel is often portrayed as weak and besieged, a Jewish David surrounded
by a hostile Arab Goliath. This image has been carefully nurtured by
Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers, but the opposite image is closer
to the truth. Contrary to popular belief, the Zionists had larger,
better.equipped, and better.led forces during the 1947.49 War of
Independence and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won quick and easy
victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in
1967.before large.scale U.S. aid began flowing to Israel.24 These
victories offer eloquent evidence of Israeli patriotism, organizational
ability, and military prowess, but they also reveal that Israel was far
from helpless even in its earliest years.
Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its
conventional forces are far superior to its neighbors and it is the only
state in the region with nuclear weapons. Egypt and Jordan signed peace
treaties with Israel and Saudi Arabia has offered to do so as well. Syria
has lost its Soviet patron, Iraq has been decimated by three disastrous
wars, and Iran is hundreds of miles away. The Palestinians barely have
effective police, let alone a military that could threaten Israel.
According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University.s prestigious Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, .the strategic balance decidedly favors
Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own
military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neghbors..25 If
backing the underdog were a compelling rationale, the United States would
be supporting Israel.s opponents.
7 Aiding a Fellow Democracy?
American backing is often justified by the claim that Israel is a
fellow.democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships. This rationale
sounds convincing, but it cannot account for the current level of U.S.
support. After all, there are many democracies around the world, but none
receives the lavish support that Israel does. The United States has
overthrown democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when
this was thought to advance .S. interests, and it has good relations with
a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic neither justifies
nor explains America.s support for Israel.
The .shared democracy. rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli
democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is
a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are
supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded
as a Jewish state and citizenship is based on the principle of blood
kinship.26 Given this conception of citizenship, it is not surprising that
Israel.s 1.3 million Arabs are treated as second.class citizens, or that a
recent Israeli government commission found that Israel behaves in a
.neglectful and discriminatory. manner towards them.27
Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens
to become citizens themselves, and does not give these spouses the right
to live in Israel. The Israeli human rights organization B.tselem called
this restriction .a racist law that determines who can live here according
to racist criteria..28 Such laws may be understandable given Israel.s
founding principles, but they are not consistent with America.s image of
democracy.
Israel.s democratic status is also undermined by its refusal to grant the
Palestinians a viable state of their own. Israel controls the lives of
about 3.8 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, while colonizing
lands on which the Palestinians have long dwelt. Israel is formally
democratic, but the millions of Palestinians that it controls are denied
full political rights and the .shared democracy. rationale is
correspondingly weakened.
Compensation for Past Crimes
A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the
Christian West, especially the tragic episode of the Holocaust. Because
Jews were persecuted for 8 centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish
homeland, many believe that Israel deserves special treatment from the
United States.
There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy
of anti.Semitism, and that Israel.s creation was an appropriate response
to a long record of crimes. This history, as noted, provides a strong
moral case for supporting Israel.s existence. But the creation of Israel
involved additional crimes against a largely innocent third party: the
Palestinians.
The history of these events is well.understood. When political Zionism
began in earnest in the late 19th century, there were only about 15,000
Jews in Palestine.29 In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95
percent of the population, and though under Ottoman control, they had been
in continuous possession of this territory for 1300 years.30 Even when
Israel was founded, Jews were only about 35 percent of Palestine.s
population and owned 7 percent of the land.31
The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a
bi.national state or accepting a permanent partition of Palestine. The
Zionist leadership was sometimes willing to accept partition as a first
step, but this was a tactical maneuver and not their real objective. As
David Ben.Gurion put it in the late 1930s, .After the formation of a large
army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we shall abolish
partition and expand to the whole of Palestine..32
To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs
from the territory that would eventually become Israel. There was simply
no other way to accomplish their objective. Ben.Gurion saw the problem
clearly, writing in 1941 that .it is impossible to imagine general
evacuation [of the Arab population] without compulsion, and brutal
compulsion..33 Or as Israeli historian Benny Morris puts it, .the idea of
transfer is as old as modern Zionism and has accompanied its evolution and
praxis during the past century..34
This opportunity came in 1947.48, when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000
Palestinians into exile.35 Israeli officials have long claimed that the
Arabs fled because their leaders told them to, but careful scholarship
(much of it by Israeli historians like Morris) have demolished this myth.
In fact, most Arab leaders urged the Palestinian population to stay home,
but fear of violent death at the hands of Zionist forces led most of them
to flee.36 After the war, Israel barred the return of the Palestinian
exiles.
9 The fact that the creation of Israel entailed a moral crime against the
Palestinian people was well understood by Israel.s leadrs. As Ben.Gurion
told Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, .If I were an
Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have
taken their country. . . . We come from Israel, but two thousand years
ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti.Semitism, the Nazis,
Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we
have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?.37
Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the
Palestinians. national ambitions.38 Prime Minister Golda Meir famously
remarked that .there was no such thing as a Palestinian,. and even Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, nonetheless
opposed creating a full.fledged Palestinian state.39 Pressure from
extremist violence and the growing Palestinian population has forced
subsequent Israeli leaders to disengage rom some of the occupied
territories and to explore territorial compromise, but no Israeli
government has been willing to offer the Palestinians a viable state of
their own. Even Prime Minister Ehud Barak.s purportedly generous offer at
Camp David in July 2000 would only have given the Palestiniansa disarmed
and dismembered set of .Bantustans. under de facto Israeli control.40
Europe.s crimes against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for
Israel.s right to exist. But Israel.s survival is not in doubt.even if
some Islamic extremists make outrageous and unrealistic references to
.wiping it off the map..and the tragic history of the Jewish people does
not obligate the United States to help Israel no matter what it does
today.
.Virtuous Israelis. versus .Evil Arabs.
The final moral argument portrays Israel as a country that has sought
peace at every turn and showed great restraint even when rovoked. The
Arabs, by contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. This
narrative.which is endlessly repeated by Israeli leaders and American
apologists such as Alan Dershowitz.is yet another myth.41 In terms of
actual behavior, Israel.s conduct is not morally distinguishable from the
actions of its opponents.
Israeli scholarship shows that the early Zionists were far from benevolent
towards the Palestinian Arabs.42 The Arab inhabitants did resist the
Zionists. encroachments, which is hardly surprising given that the
Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab lands. The Zionists
responded vigorously, and 10 neither side owns the moral high ground
during this period. This same scholarship also reveals that the creation
of Israel in 1947.48 involved explicit acts of ethnic cleansing, including
executions, massacres, and rapes by Jews.43
Furthermore, Israel.s subsequent conduct towards its Arab adversaries and
its Palestinian subjects has often been brutal, belying any claim to
morally superior conduct. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli
security forces killed between 2,700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the
overwhelming majority of them unarmed.44 The IDF conducted numerous
cross.border raids against its neighbors in the early 1950s, and though
these actions were portrayed as defensive responses, they were actually
part of a broader effort to expand Israel.s borders. Israel.s expansionist
ambitions also led it to join Britain and France in attacking Egypt in
1956, and Israel withdrew from the lands it had conquered only in the face
of intense U.S. pressure. 45
The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners.of.war in both the
1956 and 1967 wars.46 In 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000
Palestinians from the newly.conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians
from the Golan Heights.47 It was also complicit in the massacre of 700
innocent Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps following its
invsion of Lebanon in 1982, and an Israeli investigatory commission found
then.Defence Minister Sharon .personally responsible. for these
atrocities.48
Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners,
systematically humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and
used force indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the
First Intifida (1987.1991), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to
its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian
protestors. The Swedish .Save the Children. organization estimated that
.23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating
injuries in the first two years of the intifida,. with nearly one.third
sustaining broken bones. Nearly one.third of the beaten children were aged
ten and under..49
Israel.s response to the Second Intifida (2000.2005) has been even more
violent, leading Ha.aretz to declare that .the IDF . is turning into a
killing machine whose efficiency is awe.inspiring, yet shocking..50 The
IDF fired one million bullets in the first days of the uprising, which is
far from a measured response.51 Since then, Israel has killed 3.4
Palestinians for every Israeli lost, the majority of whom have been
innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children killed
is even higher (5.7 to 1).52 Israeli forces have also killed several
foreign 11 peace activists, including a 23 year.old American woman crushed
by an Israeli bulldozer in March 2003.53
These facts about Israel.s conduct have been amply documented by numerous
human rights organizations.including prominent Israeli groups.and are not
disputed by fair.minded observers. And that is why four former officials
of Shin Bet (the Israeli domestic security organization) condemned
Israel.s conduct during the Second Intifada in November 2003. One of them
declared .we are behaving disgracefully,. and another termed Israel.s
conduct .patently immoral..54
But isn.t Israel entitled to do whatever it takes to protect its citizens?
Doesn.t the unique evil of terrorism justify continued U.S. support, even
if Israel often responds harshly?
In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either.
Palestinians have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and
their willingness to attack innocent civilians is wrong. This behavior is
not surprising, however, because the Palestinians believe they have no
other way to force Israeli concessions. As former Prime Minister Barak
once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he .would have joined a
terrorist organization..55
Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used terrorism when they
were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their on state.
Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist
bombings to drive the British from Palestine, and took the lives of many
innocent civilians along the way.56 Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N.
mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, because they opposed his proposal
to internationalize Jerusalem.57 Nor were the perpetrators of these acts
isolated extremists: the leaders of the murder plot were eventually
granted amnesty by the Israeli government and one of them was elected to
the Knsset. Another terrorist leader, who approved the murder but was not
tried, was future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, Shamir openly
argued that .neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify
terrorism as a means of combat.. Rather, terrorism had .a great part to
play . in our war against the occupier [Britain]..58 If the Palestinians.
use of terrorism is morally reprehensible today, so was Israel.s reliance
upon it in the past, and thus one cannot justify U.S. support for Israel
on the grounds that its past conduct was morally superior.59
12 Israel may not have acted worse than many other countries, but it
clearly has not acted any better. And if neither strategic nor moral
arguments can account for America.s support for Israel, how are we to
explain it?
THE ISRAEL LOBBY
The explanation lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were it
not for the Lobby.s ability to manipulate the American political system,
the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less
intimate than it is today.
What Is The Lobby?
We use .the Lobby.as a convenient short.hand term for the loose coalition
of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape U.S. foreign
policy in a pro.Israel direction. Our use of this term is not meant to
suggest that .the Lobby.is a unified movement with a central leadership,
or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues
The core of the Lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant
effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it
advances Israel.s interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for
candidates who are pro.Israel to include letter.writing, financial
contributions, and supporting pro.Israel organizations. But not all
Jewish.Americans are part of the Lobby, because Israel is not a salient
issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly 36 percent
of Jewish.Americans said they were either .not very. or .not at all.
emotionally attached to Israel.60
Jewish.Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key
organizations in the Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of
Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally
supported the expansionist policies of Israel.s Likud Party, including its
hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other
hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the
Palestinians, and a few groups.such as Jewish Voice for Peace.strongly
advocate such steps.61 Despite these differences, moderates and hardliners
both support steadfast U.S. support for Israel.
Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli
officials, so that the former can maximize their influence in the United
States. As one activist with a major Jewish organization wrote, .it is
routine for us to say: .This is our 13 policy on a certain issue, but we
must check what the Israelis think.. We as a community do it all the
time..62 There is also a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy,
and Jewish.American leaders rarely support putting pressure on Israel.
Thus, Edgar Bronfman Sr., the president of the World Jewish Congress, was
accused of .perfidy. when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid.2003
urging Bush to pressure Israel to curb construction of its controversial
.security fence..63 Critics declared that, .It would be obscene at any
time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the president
of the United States to rsist policies being promoted by the government of
Israel..
Similarly, when Israel Policy Forum president Seymour Reich advised
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pressure Israel to reopen a crtical
border crossing in the Gaza Strip in November 2005, critics denounced his
action as .irresponsible behavior,. and declared that, .There is
absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing
against the security.related policies . . . of Israel..64 Recoiling from
these attacks, Reich proclaimed that .the word pressure is not in my
vocabulary when it comes to Israel..
Jewish.Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to
influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and
well.known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their
staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington.65 AIPAC was ranked
second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP), but ahead
of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL.CIO and the National Rifle
Association. A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar
conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in the
Washington.s .muscle rankings..66
The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer,
Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and
Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They
believe Israel.s rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its
expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is contrary to God.s
will.67 In addition, the Lobby.s membership includes neoconservative
gentiles such as John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert
Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former U.N.
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and columnist George Will. 14
Sources of Power
The United States has a divided government that offers many ways to
influence the policy process. As a result, interest groups can shape
policy in many different ways.by lobbying elected representatives and
members of the executive branch, making campaign contributions, voting in
elections, molding public opinion, etc.
Furthermore, special interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when
they are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the populaton is
indifferent. Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about
the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the
rest of the population will not penalize them.
The Israel Lobby.s power flows from its unmatched ability to play this
game of interest group politics. In its basic operations, it is no
different from interest groups like the Farm Lobby, steel and textile
workers, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel Lobby apart is its
extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American
Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway U.S. policy towards
Israel. The Lobby.s activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in
anti.Semitic tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the most
part, the individuals and groups that comprise the Lobby are doing what
other special interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro.Arab
interest groups are weak to non.existent, which makes the Lobby.s task
even easier.68
Strategies for Success
The Lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel.
First, it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both
Congress and the Executive branch to support Israel down the line.
Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker.s own views, the Lobby
tries to make supporting Israel the .smart. political choice.
Second, the Lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel
portrays it in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its
founding and by publicizing Israel.s side in the policy debates of the
day. The goal is to prevent critical commentary about Israel from getting
a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential
to guaranteeing U.S. support, because a 15 candid discussion of
U.S..Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy.
Influencing Congress
A key pillar of the Lobby.s effectiveness is its influence in the U.S.
Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This is in
itself a remarkable situation, because Congress almost never shies away
from contentious issues. Whether the issue is abortion, affirmative
action, health care, or welfare, there is certain to be a lively debate on
Capitol Hill. Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall
silent and there is hardly any debate at all.
One reason for the Lobby.s success with Congress is that some key members
are Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002 that
.My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel..69 One would
think that the number 1 priority for any congressman would be to .protect
America,. but that is not what Armey said. There are also Jewish senators
and congressmen who work to make U.S. foreign policy support Israel.s
interests.
Pro.Israel congressional staffers are another source of the Lobby.s power.
As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once admitted, .There are a lot
of guys at the working level up here [on Capitol Hill] . who happen to be
Jewish, who are willing . to look at certain issues in terms of their
Jewishness .. These are all guys who are in a position to make the
decision in these areas for those senators .. You can get an awful lot
done just at the staff level..70
It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the Lobby.s influence
in Congress. AIPAC.s success is due to its ability to reward legislators
and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those
who challenge it. Money is critical to U.S. elections (as the recent
scandal over lobbyist Jack Abramoff.s various shady dealings reminds us),
and AIPAC makes sure that its friends get strong financial support from
the myriad pro.Israel political action committees. Those seen as hostile
to Israel, on the other hand, can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign
contributions to their political opponents. AIPAC also organizes
letter.writing campaigns and encourages newspaper editors to endorse
pro.Israel candidates.
There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one
example, in 1984 AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois,
who, according to one prominent Lobby figure, had .displayed insensitivity
and even hostility to 16 our concerns.. Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at
the time, explained what happened: .All the Jews in America, from coast to
coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians ..those who
hold public positions now, and those who aspire ..got the message..71
AIPAC prizes its reputation as a formidable adversary, of course, because
it discourages anyone from questioning its agenda.
AIPAC.s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further, however. According to
Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, .It is common for members
of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need
information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional
Research Service, committee staff or administration experts..72 More
importantly, he notes that AIPAC is .often called upon to draft speeches,
work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect
co.sponsors and marshal votes..
The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a foreign
government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress.73 Open debate about
U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy
has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three
main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting
Israel. As former Senator Ernest Hollings (D.SC) noted as he was leaving
office, .You can.t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you
around here..74 Small wonder that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once
told an American audience. .When people ask me how they can help Israel, I
tell them.Help AIPAC..75
Influencing the Executive
The Lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch. That
power derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on
presidential elections. Despite their small numbers in the population
(less than 3 percent), they make large campaign donations to candidates
from both parties. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic
presidential candidates .depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as
60 percent of the money..76 Furthermore, Jewish voters have high turn.out
rates and are concentrated in key states like California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania. Because they matter in close
elections, Presidential candidates go to great lengths not to antagonize
Jewish voters.
Key organizations in the Lobby also directly target the administration in
power. For example, pro.Israel forces make sure that critics of the Jewish
state do not get important foreign.policy appointments. Jimmy Carter
wanted to make George 17 Ball his first secretary of state, but he knew
that Ball was perceived as critical of Israel and that the Lobby would
oppose the appointment.77 This litmus test forces any aspiring policymaker
to become an overt supporter of Israel, which is why public critics of
Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the U.S. foreign
policy establishment.
These constraints still operate today. When 2004 presidential candidate
Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more .even.handed role.
in the Arab.Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of
selling Israel down the river and said his statement was
.irresponsible..78 Virtually all of the top Democrats in the House signed
a hard.hitting letter to Dean criticizing his comments, and the Chicago
Jewish Star reported that .anonymous attackers . are clogging the e.mail
inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning ..without much
evidence ..that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel..79
This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on
Israel.80 His campaign co.chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean
said his own views on the Middle East more closely reflected those of
AIPAC than the more moderate Americans for Peac Now. Dean had merely
suggested that to .bring the sides together,. Washington should act as an
honest broker. This is hardly a radical idea, but it is anathema to the
Lobby, which does not tolerate the idea of even.handedness when it comes
to the Arab.Israeli conflict.
The Lobby.s goals are also served when pro.Israel individuals occupy
important positions in the executive branch. During the Clinton
Administration, for example, Middle East policy was largely shaped by
officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro.Israel
organizations.including Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of
research at AIPAC and co.founder of the pro.Israel Washington Institute
for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving
government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often
visits there.81
These men were among President Clinton.s closest advisors at the Camp
David summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace
process and favored creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only
within the limits of what would be acceptable to Israel.82 In particular,
the American delegation took its cues from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak, coordinated negotiating positions in advance, and did not offer its
own independent proposals for settling the conflict. Not surprisingly,
Palestinian negotiators complained that they were 18 .negotiating with two
Israeli teams ..one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American
flag..83
The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush Administration, whose
ranks include fervently pro.Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John
Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis (.Scooter.) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials
consistently pushed for policies favored by Israel and backed by
organizations in the Lobby.
Manipulating the Media
In addition to influencing government policy directly, the Lobby strives
to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not
want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate
might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently
provide. Accordingly, pro.Israel organizations work hard to influence the
media, think tanks, and academia, because these institutions are critical
in shaping popular opinion.
The Lobby.s perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream
media in good part because most American commentators ae pro.Israel. The
debate among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is
.dominated by people who cannot imagine criticizing Israel..84 He lists 61
.columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel
reflexively and without qualification.. Conversely, Alterman found just
five pundits who consistently criticize Israeli behavior or endorse
pro.Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op.eds
challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favors the
other side.
This pro.Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers.
Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked
that, .Shamir, Sharon, Bibi . whatever those guys want is pretty much fine
by me..85 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent
newspapers like The Chicago Sun.Times and The Washington Times regularly
run editorials that are strongly pro.Israel. Magazines like Commentary,
the New Republic, and the Weekly Standard also zealously defend Israel at
every turn.
Editorial bias is also found in papers like the New York Times. The Times
occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes concedes that the
Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even.handed. In his
memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel
acknowledged 19 the impact his own pro.Israel attitude had on his
editorial choices. In his words: .I was much more deeply devoted to Israel
than I dared to assert.. He goes on: .Fortified by my knowledge of Israel
and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East
commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them
from a pro.Israel perspective.. 86
The media.s reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more
even.handed than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive
to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the
occupied territories without acknowledging Israel.s actual behavior. To
discourage unfavorable reporting on Israel, the Lobby organizes letter
writing campaigns, demonstrations, and boycotts against news outlets whose
content it considers anti.Israel. One CNN executive has said that he
sometimes gets 6,000 e.mail messages in a single day complaining that a
story is anti.Israel.87 Similarly, the pro.Israel Committee for Accurate
Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organized demonstrations outside
National Public Radio stations in 33 cities in May 2003, and it also tried
to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle
East coverage became more sympatheticto Israel.88 Boston.s NPR station,
WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of
these efforts. Pressure on NPR has also come from Israel.s friends in
Congress, who have asked NPR for an internal audit as well as more
oversight of its Middle East coverage.
These factors help explain why the American media contains few criticisms
of Israeli policy, rarely questions Washington.s relationship with Israel,
and only occasionally discusses the Lobby.s profound influence on U.S.
policy.
Think Tanks That Think One Way
Pro.Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important
role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The Lobby created
its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped found WINEP.89
Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel and claims instead that it
provides a .balanced and realistic. perspective on Middle East issues,
this is not the case.90 In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals
who are deeply committed to advancing Israel.s agenda.
The Lobby.s influence in the think tank world extends well beyond WINEP.
Over the past 25 years, pro.Israel forces have established a commanding
presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution,
the 20 Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute,
the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro.Israel, and include few, if
any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.
A good indicator of the Lobby.s influence in the think tank world is the
evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert
on Middle East issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and
former NSC official with a well.deserved reputation for evenhandedness
regarding the Arab.Israeli conflict. Today, however, Brookings.s work on
these issues is conducted through its Saban Center for Middle East
Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, a wealthy Israeli.American
businessman and ardent Zionist.91 The director of the Saban Center is the
ubiquitous Martin Indyk. Thus, what was once a non.partisan policy
institute on Middle East matters is now part of the chorus of largely
pro.Israel think tanks.
Policing Academia
The Lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about Israel on
college campuses, because academic freedom is a core value and because
tenured professors are hard to threaten or silence. Even so, there was
only mild criticism of Israel in the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process
was underway. Criticism rose after that process collapsed and Ariel Sharon
came to power in early 2001, and it became especially intense when the IDF
re.occupied the West Bank in spring 2002 and employed massive force
against the Second Intifada.
The Lobby moved aggressively to .take back the campuses.. New groups
sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers
to U.S. colleges.92 Established groups like the Jewish Council for Public
Affairs and Hillel jumped into the fray, and a new group.the Israel on
Campus Coalition.was formed to coordinate the many groups that now sought
to make Israel.s case on campus. Finally, AIPAC more than tripled its
spending for programs to monitor university activities and to train young
advocates for Israel, in order to .vastly expand the number of students
involved on campus . . . in the national pro.Israel effort..93
The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September
2002, for example, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately
pro.Israel neoconservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that
posted dossiers on 21 suspect academics and encouraged students to report
comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel.94 This
transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted a harsh
reaction and Pipes and Kramer later removed he dossiers, but the website
still invites students to report alleged anti.Israel behavior at U.S.
colleges.
Groups in the Lobby also direct their fire at particular professors and
the universities that hire them. Columbia University, which had the late
Palestinian scholar Edward Said on its faculty, has been a frequent target
of pro.Israel forces. Jonathan Cole, the former Columbia provost, reported
that, .One can be sure that any public statement in support of the
Palestinian people by the preeminent literary critic Edward Said wil
elicit hundreds of e.mails, letters, and journalistic accounts that call
on us to denounce Said and to either sanction or fire him..95 When
Columbia recruited historian Rashid Khalidi from the University of
Chicago, Cole says that .the complaints started flowing in from people who
disagreed with the content of his political views.. Princeton faced the
same problem a few years later when it considered wooing Khalidi away from
Columbia.96
A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late
2004, when the .David Project. produced a propaganda film alleging that
faculty in Columbia University.s Middle East studies program were
anti.Semitic and were intimidating Jewish students who defended Israel.97
Columbia was raked over the coals in pro.Israel circles, but a faculty
committee assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of
anti.Semitism and the only incident worth noting was the possibility that
one professor had .responded heatedly. to a student.s question.98 The
committee also discovered that the accused professors had been the target
of an overt intimidation campaign.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this campaign to eliminate criticism
of Israel from college campuses is the effort by Jewsh groups to push
Congress to establish mechanisms that monitor what professors say about
Israel.99 Schools judged to have an anti.Israel bias would be denied
Federal funding. This effort to get the U.S. government to police campuses
have not yet succeeded, but the attempt illustrates the importance
pro.Israel groups place on controlling debate on these issues.
Finally, a number of Jewish philanthropists have established Israel
studies programs (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programs
that already exist) so as to increase the number of Israel.friendly
scholars on campus.100 NYU 22 announced the establishment of the Taub
Center for Israel Studies on May 1, 2003, and similar programs have been
established at other schools like Berkeley, Brandeis, and Emory. Academic
administrators emphasize the pedagogical value of these programs, but the
truth is that they are intended in good part to promote Israel.s image on
campus. Fred Laffer, the head of the Taub Foundation, makes clear that his
foundation funded the NYU center to help counter the .Arabic [sic] point
of view. that he thinks is prevalent in NYU.s Middle East programs.101
In sum, the Lobby has gone to considerable lengths to insulate Israel from
criticism on college campuses. It has not been as successful in academia
as it has been on Capitol Hill, but it has worked hard to stifle criticism
of Israel by professors and students and there is much less of it on
campuses today102
The Great Silencer
No discussion of how the Lobby operates would be complete without
examining one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of anti.Semitism.
Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro.Israel groups have
significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy.an influence that AIPAC
celebrates.stands a good chance of getting labeled an anti.Semite. In
fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel Lobby runs the risk of being
charged with anti.Semitism, even though the Israeli media themselves refer
to America.s .Jewish Lobby.. In effect, the Lobby boasts of its own power
and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it. This tactic is very
effective, because anti.Semitism is loathsome and no responsible person
wants to be accused of it.
Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticize Israeli
policy in recent years, which some attribute to a resurgence of
anti.Semitism in Europe. We are .getting to a point,. the U.S. Ambassador
to the European Union said in early 2004, .where it is as bad as it was in
the 1930s..103 Measuring anti.Semitism is a complicated matter, but the
weight of evidence points in the opposite direction. For example, in the
spring of 2004, when accusations of European anti.Semitism filled the air
in America, separate surveys of European public opinion conducted by the
Anti.Defamation League and the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press showed that it was actually declining.104
Consider France, which pro.Israel forces often portray as the most
anti.Semitic state in Europe. A poll of French citizens in 2002 found
that: 89 percent could envisage living with a Jew; 97 percent believe
making anti.Semitic graffiti is a 23 serious crime; 87 percent think
attacks on French synagogues are scandalous; and 85 percent of practicing
French Catholics reject the charge that Jews have too much influence in
business and finance.105 It is unsurprising that the head of the French
Jewish community declared in the summer of 2003 that .France is not more
anti.Semitic than America..106 According to a recent article in Ha.aretz,
the French police report that anti.Semitic incidents in France declined by
almost 50 per cent in 2005; and this despite the fact that France has the
largest Muslim population of any country in Europe.107
Finally, when a French Jew was brutally murdered last month by a Muslim
gang, tens of thousands of French demonstrators poured into the streets to
condemn anti.Semitism. Moreover, President Jacques Chirac and Prime
Minister Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim.s memorial service
in a public showof solidarity with French Jewry.108 It is also worth
noting that in 2002 more Jews immigrated to Germany than Israel, making it
.the fastest growing Jewish community in the world,. according to an
article in the Jewish newspaper Forward.109 If Europe were really heading
back to the 1930s, it is hard to imagine that Jews would be moving there
in large numbers.
We recognize, however, that Europe is not free of the scourge of
anti.Semitism. No one would deny that there are still some virulent
autochthonous anti.Semites in Europe (as there are in the United States)
but their numbers are small and their extreme views are rejected by the
vast majority of Europeans. Nor would one deny that there is anti.Semitism
among European Muslims, some of it provoked by Israel.s behavior towards
the Palestinians and some of it straightforwardly racist. 110 This problem
is worrisome, but it is hardly out of control. Muslims constitute less
than five percent of Europe.s total population, and European governments
are working hard to combat the problem. Why? Because most Europeans reject
such hateful views.111 In short, when it comes to anti.Semitism, Europe
today bears hardly any resemblance to Europe in the 1930s.
This is why pro.Israel forces, when pressed to go beyond assertion, claim
that there is a .new anti.Semitism., which they equate with criticism of
Israel.112 In other words criticize Israeli policy and you are by
definition an anti.Semite. When the synod of the Church of England
recently voted to divest from Caterpillar Inc on the grounds that
Caterpillar manufacures the bulldozers used to demolish Palestinian homes,
the Chief Rabbi complained that it would .have the most adverse
repercussions on ... Jewish.Christian relations in Britain., while Rabbi
Tony Bayfield, the head of the Reform movement, said: ..There is a clear
problem of anti.Zionist .verging on anti.Semitic .attitudes emerging in
the grass 24 roots, and even in the middle ranks of the Church..113
However, the Church was neither guilty of anti.Zionism nor anti.Semitism;
it was merely protesting Israeli policy.114
Critics are also accused of holding Israel to an unfair standard or
questioning its right to exist. But these are bogus charges too. Western
critics of Israel hardly ever question its right to exist. Instead, they
question its behavior towards the Palestinians, which is a legitimate
criticism: Israelis question it themselves. Nor is Israel being judged
unfairly. Rather, Israeli treatment of the Palestinians elicits criticism
because it is contrary to widely.accepted human rights norms and
international law, as well as the principle of national
self.determination. And it is hardly the only state that has faced sharp
criticism on these grounds.
In sum, other ethnic lobbies can only dream of having the political muscle
that pro.Israel organizations possess. The question, therefore, is what
effect does the Lobby have on U.S. foreign policy?
THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG
If the Lobby.s impact were confined to U.S. economic aid to Israel, its
influence might not be that worrisome. Foreign aid is valuable, but not as
useful as having the world.s only superpower bring its vast capabilities
to bear on Israel.s behalf. Accordingly, the Lobby has also sought to
shape the core elements of U.S. Middle East policy. In particular, it has
worked successfully to convince American leaders to back Israel.s
continued repression of the Palestinians and to take aim at Israel.s
primary regional adversaries: Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
Demonizing the Palestinians
It is now largely forgotten, but in the fall of 2001, and especially in
the spring of 2002, the Bush Administration tried to reduce anti.American
sentiment in the Arab world and undermine support for terrorist groups
like al Qaeda, by halting Israel.s expansionist policies in the occupied
territories and advocating the creation of a Palestinian state.
Bush had enormous potential leverage at his disposal. He could have
threatened to reduce U.S. economic and diplomatic support for Israel, and
the American people would almost certainly have supported him. A May 2003
poll reported that over 60 percent of Americans were willing to withhold
aid to Israel if it resisted U.S. pressure to settle the conflict, and
that number rose to 70 percent 25 among .politically active. Americans.115
Indeed, 73 percent said that United States should not favor either side.
Yet the Bush Administration failed to change Israel.s policies, and
Washington ended up backing Israel.s hard.line approach instead. Over
time, the Administration also adopted Israel.s justifications for this
approach, so that U.S. and Israeli rhetoric became similar. By February
2003, a Washington Post headline summarized the situation: .Bush and
Sharon Nearly Identical on Mideast Policy..116 The main reason for this
switch is the Lobby.
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Pourquoi l'Amérique ne changera pas c'est politique étrangère de MiddleEast
Automatically translated into French thanks to WorldLingo
Étude de Harvard : L'entrée de l'Israel et les États-Unis La page imprimable
de politique étrangère
s'est reposée, 2006-03-18 14:34 - admin
John J. Mearsheimer et
Stephen M. Walt
John F. École de Kennedy d'université de Harvard de gouvernement
le mars 2006
États-Unis la politique étrangère forme des événements dans chaque coin du globe. Nulle part est
ceci plus vraie que dans le Moyen-Orient, une région d'instabilité se reproduisante et
d'énorme importance stratégique. Le plus récemment, la tentative de Bush
Administration.s de transformer la région en communauté des démocraties a aidé
le produit un insurency résilient en Irak, une élévation pointue des prix du pétrole du monde,
et des bombardements de terroriste à Madrid, à Londres, et à Amman. Avec tellement en jeu
pour tellement beaucoup, tous les pays doivent comprendre les forces qui conduisent les États-Unis
Politique de Moyen-Orient.
Les États-Unis l'intérêt national devrait être l'objet primaire de la politique
étrangère américaine. Pour le passé plusieurs décennies, cependant, et particulièrement
depuis la guerre de six jours en 1967, la pièce maîtresse des États-Unis La politique de Moyen-Orient
a été son rapport avec l'Israel. La combinaison des États-Unis constants
le soutien de l'Israel et de l'effort relatif d'écarter la démocratie dans toute
la région a enflamé l'opinion arabe et islamique et eopardized les États-Unis
sécurité.
Cette situation n'a aucune égale dans l'histoire politique américaine. Pourquoi
les Etats-Unis ont-ils été disposés à mettre de côté sa propre sécurité afin d'
avancer les intérêts d'un autre état ? L'on a pourrait supposer que le lien
entre les deux pays est basé sur des intérêts stratégiques partagés ou
des imperativs moraux contraignants. Comme nous montrons ci-dessous, cependant, ni l'un ni l'autre de ces
explications ne peuvent expliquer le niveau remarquable de l'appui matériel
et diplomatique ce les povides des Etats-Unis en Israel.
Au lieu de cela, la poussée globale des États-Unis la politique dans la région est due presque
entièrement des États-Unis la politique domestique, et particulièrement aux activités
du. Entrée de l'Israel. D'autres groupes d'intérêt sont parvenus à biaiser
les États-Unis politique étrangère dans les directions qu'ils ont favorisées, mais aucune entrée n'est parvenue
à détourner les États-Unis politique étrangère comme loin de ce que l'intérêt national
américain suggérerait autrement, tout en simultanément convainquant
les Américains qui les États-Unis et les intérêts israéliens sont essentiellement identical.1
dans les pages qui suivent, nous décrivent comment l'entrée a accompli cet
exploit, et comment ses activités ont formé des actions d'America.s dans cette
région critique. Etant donné l'importance stratégique de le Moyen-Orient et de son
impact potentiel sur d'autres, les deux Américains et non. Les Américains doivent
comprendre et adresser l'influence de Lobby.s sur les États-Unis politique. 1
quelques lecteurs trouvera cette analyse déranger, mais les faits racontés
ici ne sont pas dans le conflit sérieux parmi des disciples. En effet, notre compte se fonde
fortement sur le travail des disciples et des journalistes israéliens, qui méritent le grand
crédit pour la lumière de perte sur ces questions. Nous comptons également sur l'évidence
fournie par des organismes israéliens et internationaux respectés de droits de l'homme
. De même, nos réclamations au sujet de l'impact de Lobby.s se fondent sur
le témoignage du Lobby.s possèdent des membres, aussi bien que le témoignage
des politiciens qui ont travaillé avec eux. Les lecteurs peuvent rejeter nos conclusions,
naturellement, mais l'évidence sur lesquelles elles se reposent n'est pas controversé.
Le GRAND BIENFAITEUR
depuis la guerre d'octobre en 1973, Washington a fourni à l'Israel un niveau
d'appui rapetissant les montants fournis à n'importe quel autre état. C'a été
le plus grand destinataire annuel des États-Unis directs aide économique et
militaire depuis 1976 et le plus grand destinataire total depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale.
Total États-Unis directs l'aide aux quantités de l'Israel à bien plus de $140 milliards dans 2003
dollars.2 Israel reçoit environ $3 milliards dans l'aide étrangère directe
tous les ans, qui est rudement one.fifth de budget d'aide étrangère d'America.s. En
par habitant termes, les Etats-Unis donnent à chacun israélien une valeur directe
de subvention environ $500 par year.3 que ce largesse heurte particulièrement quand on
se rend compte que l'Israel est maintenant un état industriel riche avec par habitant
un incom rudement égal en Corée du Sud ou Spain.4
Israel obtient également à d'autres affaires spéciales de Washington.5 l'autre aide
les destinataires obtiennent leur argent dans des acomptes trimestriels, mais l'Israel reçoit
son appropriation entière au début de chaque exercice budgétaire et gagne
ainsi l'intérêt supplémentaire. La plupart des destinataires d'aide militaire américaine
sont requis de dépenser tout le lui aux Etats-Unis, mais l'Israel peut employer
rudement des pour cent de twenty.five de son attribution d'aide pour subventionner sa propre
industrie de la défense. L'Israel est le seul destinataire qui ne doit pas
expliquer comment l'aide est dépensée, une exemption à la laquelle les marques il pratiquement
impossible d'empêcher l'argent d'être employé pour des buts les états
unis s'oppose, comme des règlements de bâtiment en Cisjordanie.
D'ailleurs, les Etats-Unis ont fourni à l'Israel presque $3 milliards
pour développer des systèmes d'armes comme l'avion de Lavi du lequel le Pentagone
n'a pas voulu ou n'a pas eu besoin, tout en donnant l'accès de l'Israel à top.drawer États-Unis les armements comme
des hélicoptères de Blackhawk et F.16 voyagent en jet. En conclusion, les Etats-Unis donnent
l'accès de l'Israel à l'intelligence qu'ils nient ses alliés de l'OTAN et
ont tourné un oeil aveugle vers l'acquisition d'Israels de weapons.6 nucléaire
2 en outre, Washington fournissent à l'Israel à appui diplomatique
conformé. Depuis 1982, les Etats-Unis ont mis un veto 32 résolutions
du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies qui critiquaient l'Israel, un nombre
plus grand que le total combiné de mettent un veto la fonte par tout autre Conseil
de sécurité members.7 qu'elle bloque également les états arabes. les efforts de mettre l'arsenal
nucléaire d'Israel.s sur l'énergie atomique internationale Agency.s agenda.8
les Etats-Unis également vient à la délivrance d'Israel.s en temps de guerre et prend son
côté en négociant la paix. L'administration de Nixon re.supplied Israel
pendant la guerre d'octobre et Israel protégé de la menace de l'intervention
soviétique. Washington a été profondément impliqué dans les négociations qui
ont fini cette guerre aussi bien que le .step.by.step prolongé. traitez cela
suivi, juste comme il jouait un rôle principal dans les négociations qui ont précédé
et ont suivi Oslo 1993 Accords.9 là étaient des frottements occasionnels
entre les États-Unis et les fonctionnaires israéliens dans les deux cas, mais les Etats-Unis
ont coordonné ses positions étroitement avec l'Israel et ont uniformément soutenu
l'approche israélienne aux negotitions. En effet, un participant américain
au camp David (2000) plus tard a dit, .far trop souvent, nous avons fonctionné. . . comme
Israel.s lawyer..10
comme discuté ci-dessous, Washington a donné à l'Israel la latitude large en traitant
les territoires occupés (la bande de la Cisjordanie et de Gaza), même lorsque
ses actions étaient en désaccord avec les États-Unis indiqués politique. D'ailleurs, la stratégie
ambitieuse de Bush Administration.s pour transformer le Moyen-Orient .beginning
avec l'invasion d'Iraq.is au moins a en partie prévu pour améliorer la situation
stratégique d'Israel.s. Indépendamment des alliances de temps de guerre, il est difficile de penser
à un autre exemple où un pays a fourni à des autres un niveau
semblable de matériel et de diplomaticsupport pendant une période si prolongée.
Le soutien d'America.s de l'Israel est, en bref, unique.
Cette générosité extraordinaire pourrait être compréhensible si l'Israel étaient
des capitaux stratégiques essentiels ou s'il y avait une raison contraignante de mora pour
les États-Unis soutenus support. Mais ni l'un ni l'autre raisonnement ne convainc.
UNE RESPONSABILITÉ STRATÉGIQUE
selon le site Web des affaires publiques Committee.s (AIPAC)
d'American.Israel, .the Etats-Unis et l'Israel ont formé une association unique
pour rencontrer les menaces stratégiques croissantes dans le Moyen-Orient. . . . Cet
effort coopératif fournit les avantages significatifs pour les les deux les états
unis et cette réclamation Israel..11 est un article de la foi parmi des défenseurs
d'Israel.s et est par habitude appelée par les politiciens israéliens et pro. Américains
de l'Israel.
3 Israel ont pu avoir été des capitaux stratégiques pendant le War.12 froid en servant
de procuration d'America.s après War de six jours (1967), l'Israel aidé à contenir
l'expansion soviétique dans la région et ont infligé des défaites humiliantes sur les clients
soviétiques comme l'Egypte et la Syrie. L'Israel de temps en temps aidé à protéger d'autres
États-Unis les alliés (comme le Roi Hussein de Jordan.s) et sa prouesse militaire ont forcé
Moscou pour dépenser plus de support ses clients perdants. L'Israel a également donné
aux Etats-Unis l'intelligence utile au sujet des possibilités soviétiques.
La valeur stratégique d'Israel.s pendant cette période ne devrait pas être exagérée,
however.13 le support Israel n'était pas bon marché, et il a compliqué des relations
d'America.s avec le monde arabe. Par exemple, les États-Unis la décision pour donner
à l'Israel $2.2 milliards dans l'aide militaire de secours pendant la guerre d'octobre
a déclenché un embargo d'huile de l'OPEP qui a infligé des économies occidentales considérables des dommages
o. D'ailleurs, les militaires d'Israel.s ne pourraient pas protéger les États-Unis intérêts dans
la région. Par exemple, les Etats-Unis n'ont pas pu compter sur l'Israel quand
la révolution iranienne dans 1979 inquiétudes soulevées concernant la sécurité
des approvisionnements de pétrole persans de Glf, et ont dû créer ses propres. Force rapide
de déploiement. au lieu de cela.
Même si l'Israel était des capitaux stratégiques pendant la guerre froide, la première guerre du Golfe
(1990.91) a indiqué que l'Israel devenait un fardeau stratégique.
Les Etats-Unis n'ont pas pu employer les bases israéliennes pendant la guerre sans se rompre
anti. La coalition de l'Irak, et eux ont dû détourner des ressources (par exemple, batteries
de missile de patriote) pour garder Tel Aviv de faire tout ce qui pourrait
rompre l'alliance contre Saddam. L'histoire s'est répétée en 2003 :
bien que l'Israel ait été désireux pour que les Etats-Unis attaquent Saddam,
le Président Bush ne pourrait pas le demander pour aider sans déclencher l'opposition
arabe. Ainsi l'Israel est resté sur les lignes de touche again.14
commençant dans les années 90, et particulièrement après 9/11, États-Unis le soutien de l'Israel
a été justifié par la réclamation que les deux états sont menacés par
des groupes de terroriste provenant du monde musulman d'Arabor, et par un ensemble
d'états de .rogue. qu'arrière ces groupes et recherche WMD. Ce raisonnement implique
que Washington devrait donner à l'Israel une main libre en faisant face
aux Palestiniens et pas la pression Israel t font des concessions jusqu'à ce que tous les terroristes
palestiniens soient emprisonnés ou complètement. Il implique également que les Etats-Unis
devraient aller après des pays comme la République islamique d'Al de l'Iran,
du Saddam Hussein.s Irak, et du Bashar. Assad.s Syrie. L'Israel est ainsi vu en tant qu'
allié crucial dans la guerre sur la terreur, parce que ses ennemis sont des ennemis
d'America.s.
Ce nouveau raisonnement semble persuasif, mais l'Israel est en fait une responsabilité dans
la guerre sur la terreur et l'effort plus large de traiter les états escrocs.
4 pour commencer par, .terrorism. est une tactique utilisée par une grande sélection
de groupes politiques ; ce n'est pas un adversaire unifié simple. Les organismes
de terroriste qui menacent l'Israel (par exemple, Hamas ou Hezbollah)
ne menacent pas les Etats-Unis, excepté quand ils interviennent contre eux (comme
au Liban en 1982). D'ailleurs, le terrorisme palestinien n'est pas violence aléatoire
dirigée contre l'Israel ou l'ouest de .the. ; c'est en grande partie une réponse
à la campagne prolongée par Israel.s pour coloniser la bande de la Cisjordanie et de Gaza.
D'une manière primordiale, dire que l'Israel et les Etats-Unis sont unis par
une menace partagée de terroriste a le rapport causal vers l'arrière : plutôt,
les Etats-Unis ont un problème de terrorisme dans la bonne partie parce qu'ils
sont tellement étroitement alliés avec l'Israel, pas l'autre manière autour. LES États-Unis le soutien
de l'Israel n'est pas la seule source d'anti. Terrorisme américain, mais il est
important, et il fait gagner la guerre sur la terreur que plus de difficult.15
là n'est aucune question, par exemple, que beaucoup de chefs de Qaeda d'Al, y compris
Ben Laden, sont motivé par la présence d'Israel.s à Jérusalem et situation difficile
des Palestiniens. Selon les États-Unis La 9/11 Commission, Ben Laden
a explicitement cherché à punir les Etats-Unis pour ses politiques dans
le Moyen-Orient, y compris son soutien de l'Israel, et il a même essayé de chronométrer
les attaques pour accentuer cet issue.16
également important, États-Unis sans conditions le soutien de l'Israel le facilite
pour des extrémistes comme Ben Laden pour rassembler l'appui populaire et pour attirer
des recrues. Les sondages d'opinion publique confirment que les populations arabes sont profondément
hostiles au soutien américain de l'Israel, et les États-Unis Énoncez que groupe
consultatif de Department.s sur la diplomatie publique pour le monde arabe et musulman a constaté
que .citizens dans ces pays sont véritablement affligés à la situation difficile
des Palestiniens et au rôle ils perçoivent les Etats-Unis pour être
playing..17
quant aux états escrocs de so.called dans le Moyen-Orient, ils n'est pas une grande
menace aux États-Unis essentiels intérêts, indépendamment des États-Unis engagement vers l'Israel
lui-même. Bien que les Etats-Unis aient un certain nombre de désaccords
avec ces régimes, Washington ne serait pas presque comme inquiété de l'Iran,
du Ba.thist Irak, ou de la Syrie étaient il pas aussi étroitement attachée en Israel. Même si
ces états acquièrent weapons.which nucléaire n'est pas desirable.it
ne serait évidemment pas un désastre stratégique pour les Etats-Unis. Ni l'Amérique
ni l'Israel ne pourrait être faite du chantage par un escroc de nuclear.armed, parce que
le maître-chanteur ne pourrait pas mettre la menace sans recevoir la revanche
accablante. Le danger d'un transfert de .nuclear. aux terroristes est également
à distance, parce qu'un état escroc ne pourrait pas être sûr que le transfert serait
non détecté ou cela il ne serait pas blâmé et n'a pas été puni après. 5
en outre, les États-Unis rapport avec de l'Israel des marques réellement il plus dur
à traiter ces états. L'arsenal nucléaire d'Israel.s est une raison pour laquelle certains
de ses voisins veulent les armes nucléaires, et menacer ces états par
les augmentations de changement de régime simplement qui désirent. Pourtant l'Israel n'est pas beaucoup
des capitaux quand les Etats-Unis contemplent employer la force contre ces
régimes, parce qu'ils ne peuvent pas participer au combat.
En bref, traitant l'Israel comme America.s la plupart d'allié important dans la campagne
contre le terrorisme et la capacité assortie des bothexaggerates Israel.s
de dictatures de Moyen-Orient d'aider sur ces questions et ignore les manières dont
les politiques d'Israel.s font aux États-Unis efforts plus difficiles.
Le soutien d'Unquestioned de l'Israel affaiblit également les États-Unis placez en dehors
du Moyen-Orient. Les élites étrangères regardent uniformément les Etats-Unis comme trop
de support de l'Israel, et pensent que sa tolérance de répression israélienne dans
les territoires occupés est moralement obtuse et un handicap dans la guerre sur
terroism.18 en avril 2004, par exemple, 52 anciens diplomates britanniques envoyés
premier ministre Tony Blair une énonciation de lettre que le conflit
d'Israel.Palestine a eu des relations de .poisoned entre l'ouest et arabes et islamiques
les mondes. et que les politiques de Bush et du premier ministre Ariel Sharon
étaient raison finale de .one.sided et
d'illegal..19 A d'interroger la valeur stratégique avertissante d'Israel.s est qu'elle
n'agit pas comme un allié fidèle. Les fonctionnaires israéliens ignorent fréquemment les États-Unis les demandes
et renoncent sur des promesses faites pour compléter les États-Unis chefs (y compris après des engagements
pour stopper la construction de règlement et pour s'abstenir à .tar geted des assassinats.
des chefs palestiniens) .20 d'ailleurs, l'Israel a fourni les États-Unis sensibles
technologie militaire au potentiel États-Unis les rivaux aiment la Chine, dans ce qui les États-Unis
Énoncez le département Inspector.General appelé modèle systématique et croissant
du .a de transfers..21 non autorisé selon les États-Unis Office
général de comptabilité, Israel également .conducts les opérations d'espionnage
les plus agressives contre les États-Unis de n'importe quel ally..22 en plus de la caisse
de Jonathan Pollard, qui a donné à l'Israel les grandes quantités de matériel classifié
au début des années 80 (qui l'Israel censément passé sur l'Union Soviétique
pour gagner plus de visas de sortie pour les juifs soviétiques), une nouvelle polémique a éclaté en
2004 où on l'a indiqué qu'un fonctionnaire principal du Pentagone (Larry Franklin)
avait passé des informations secrètes à un diplomate israélien, prétendument aidé
par deux AIPAC officials.23 Israel est à peine le seul pays qui remarque sur
les Etats-Unis, mais sa volonté de remarquer sur ses principales fontes
de patron doutent plus loin sur sa valeur stratégique.
6 UN CAS MORAL de DIMINUTION
indépendamment de sa valeur stratégique alléguée, appuis d'Israel.s arguent du fait également qu'
elle mérite les États-Unis incompétents l'appui parce que 1) il est faible et entouré
par des ennemis, 2) c'est une démocratie, qui est une forme moralement préférable
de gouvernement ; 3) the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and
therefore deserve special treatment, and 4) Israel.s conduct has been
morally superior to its adversaries. behavior.
On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive.
There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel.s existence, but that
is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, Israel.s past and present conduct
offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.
Backing the Underdog?
Israel is often portrayed as weak and besieged, a Jewish David surrounded
by a hostile Arab Goliath. This image has been carefully nurtured by
Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers, but the opposite image is closer
to the truth. Contrary to popular belief, the Zionists had larger,
better.equipped, and better.led forces during the 1947.49 War of
Independence and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won quick and easy
victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in
1967.before large.scale U.S. aid began flowing to Israel.24 These
victories offer eloquent evidence of Israeli patriotism, organizational
ability, and military prowess, but they also reveal that Israel was far
from helpless even in its earliest years.
Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its
conventional forces are far superior to its neighbors and it is the only
state in the region with nuclear weapons. Egypt and Jordan signed peace
treaties with Israel and Saudi Arabia has offered to do so as well. Syria
has lost its Soviet patron, Iraq has been decimated by three disastrous
wars, and Iran is hundreds of miles away. The Palestinians barely have
effective police, let alone a military that could threaten Israel.
According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University.s prestigious Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, .the strategic balance decidedly favors
Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own
military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neghbors..25 If
backing the underdog were a compelling rationale, the United States would
be supporting Israel.s opponents.
7 Aiding a Fellow Democracy?
American backing is often justified by the claim that Israel is a
fellow.democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships. This rationale
sounds convincing, but it cannot account for the current level of U.S.
support. After all, there are many democracies around the world, but none
receives the lavish support that Israel does. The United States has
overthrown democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when
this was thought to advance .S. interests, and it has good relations with
a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic neither justifies
nor explains America.s support for Israel.
The .shared democracy. rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli
democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is
a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are
supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded
as a Jewish state and citizenship is based on the principle of blood
kinship.26 Given this conception of citizenship, it is not surprising that
Israel.s 1.3 million Arabs are treated as second.class citizens, or that a
recent Israeli government commission found that Israel behaves in a
.neglectful and discriminatory. manner towards them.27
Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens
to become citizens themselves, and does not give these spouses the right
to live in Israel. The Israeli human rights organization B.tselem called
this restriction .a racist law that determines who can live here according
to racist criteria..28 Such laws may be understandable given Israel.s
founding principles, but they are not consistent with America.s image of
democracy.
Israel.s democratic status is also undermined by its refusal to grant the
Palestinians a viable state of their own. Israel controls the lives of
about 3.8 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, while colonizing
lands on which the Palestinians have long dwelt. Israel is formally
democratic, but the millions of Palestinians that it controls are denied
full political rights and the .shared democracy. rationale is
correspondingly weakened.
Compensation for Past Crimes
A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the
Christian West, especially the tragic episode of the Holocaust. Because
Jews were persecuted for 8 centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish
homeland, many believe that Israel deserves special treatment from the
United States.
There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy
of anti.Semitism, and that Israel.s creation was an appropriate response
to a long record of crimes. This history, as noted, provides a strong
moral case for supporting Israel.s existence. But the creation of Israel
involved additional crimes against a largely innocent third party: the
Palestinians.
The history of these events is well.understood. When political Zionism
began in earnest in the late 19th century, there were only about 15,000
Jews in Palestine.29 In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95
percent of the population, and though under Ottoman control, they had been
in continuous possession of this territory for 1300 years.30 Even when
Israel was founded, Jews were only about 35 percent of Palestine.s
population and owned 7 percent of the land.31
The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a
bi.national state or accepting a permanent partition of Palestine. The
Zionist leadership was sometimes willing to accept partition as a first
step, but this was a tactical maneuver and not their real objective. As
David Ben.Gurion put it in the late 1930s, .After the formation of a large
army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we shall abolish
partition and expand to the whole of Palestine..32
To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs
from the territory that would eventually become Israel. There was simply
no other way to accomplish their objective. Ben.Gurion saw the problem
clearly, writing in 1941 that .it is impossible to imagine general
evacuation [of the Arab population] without compulsion, and brutal
compulsion..33 Or as Israeli historian Benny Morris puts it, .the idea of
transfer is as old as modern Zionism and has accompanied its evolution and
praxis during the past century..34
This opportunity came in 1947.48, when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000
Palestinians into exile.35 Israeli officials have long claimed that the
Arabs fled because their leaders told them to, but careful scholarship
(much of it by Israeli historians like Morris) have demolished this myth.
In fact, most Arab leaders urged the Palestinian population to stay home,
but fear of violent death at the hands of Zionist forces led most of them
to flee.36 After the war, Israel barred the return of the Palestinian
exiles.
9 The fact that the creation of Israel entailed a moral crime against the
Palestinian people was well understood by Israel.s leadrs. As Ben.Gurion
told Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, .If I were an
Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have
taken their country. . . . We come from Israel, but two thousand years
ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti.Semitism, the Nazis,
Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we
have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?.37
Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the
Palestinians. national ambitions.38 Prime Minister Golda Meir famously
remarked that .there was no such thing as a Palestinian,. and even Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, nonetheless
opposed creating a full.fledged Palestinian state.39 Pressure from
extremist violence and the growing Palestinian population has forced
subsequent Israeli leaders to disengage rom some of the occupied
territories and to explore territorial compromise, but no Israeli
government has been willing to offer the Palestinians a viable state of
their own. Even Prime Minister Ehud Barak.s purportedly generous offer at
Camp David in July 2000 would only have given the Palestiniansa disarmed
and dismembered set of .Bantustans. under de facto Israeli control.40
Europe.s crimes against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for
Israel.s right to exist. But Israel.s survival is not in doubt.even if
some Islamic extremists make outrageous and unrealistic references to
.wiping it off the map..and the tragic history of the Jewish people does
not obligate the United States to help Israel no matter what it does
today.
.Virtuous Israelis. versus .Evil Arabs.
The final moral argument portrays Israel as a country that has sought
peace at every turn and showed great restraint even when rovoked. The
Arabs, by contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. This
narrative.which is endlessly repeated by Israeli leaders and American
apologists such as Alan Dershowitz.is yet another myth.41 In terms of
actual behavior, Israel.s conduct is not morally distinguishable from the
actions of its opponents.
Israeli scholarship shows that the early Zionists were far from benevolent
towards the Palestinian Arabs.42 The Arab inhabitants did resist the
Zionists. encroachments, which is hardly surprising given that the
Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab lands. The Zionists
responded vigorously, and 10 neither side owns the moral high ground
during this period. This same scholarship also reveals that the creation
of Israel in 1947.48 involved explicit acts of ethnic cleansing, including
executions, massacres, and rapes by Jews.43
Furthermore, Israel.s subsequent conduct towards its Arab adversaries and
its Palestinian subjects has often been brutal, belying any claim to
morally superior conduct. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli
security forces killed between 2,700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the
overwhelming majority of them unarmed.44 The IDF conducted numerous
cross.border raids against its neighbors in the early 1950s, and though
these actions were portrayed as defensive responses, they were actually
part of a broader effort to expand Israel.s borders. Israel.s expansionist
ambitions also led it to join Britain and France in attacking Egypt in
1956, and Israel withdrew from the lands it had conquered only in the face
of intense U.S. pressure. 45
The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners.of.war in both the
1956 and 1967 wars.46 In 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000
Palestinians from the newly.conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians
from the Golan Heights.47 It was also complicit in the massacre of 700
innocent Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps following its
invsion of Lebanon in 1982, and an Israeli investigatory commission found
then.Defence Minister Sharon .personally responsible. for these
atrocities.48
Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners,
systematically humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and
used force indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the
First Intifida (1987.1991), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to
its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian
protestors. The Swedish .Save the Children. organization estimated that
.23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating
injuries in the first two years of the intifida,. with nearly one.third
sustaining broken bones. Nearly one.third of the beaten children were aged
ten and under..49
Israel.s response to the Second Intifida (2000.2005) has been even more
violent, leading Ha.aretz to declare that .the IDF . is turning into a
killing machine whose efficiency is awe.inspiring, yet shocking..50 The
IDF fired one million bullets in the first days of the uprising, which is
far from a measured response.51 Since then, Israel has killed 3.4
Palestinians for every Israeli lost, the majority of whom have been
innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children killed
is even higher (5.7 to 1).52 Israeli forces have also killed several
foreign 11 peace activists, including a 23 year.old American woman crushed
by an Israeli bulldozer in March 2003.53
These facts about Israel.s conduct have been amply documented by numerous
human rights organizations.including prominent Israeli groups.and are not
disputed by fair.minded observers. And that is why four former officials
of Shin Bet (the Israeli domestic security organization) condemned
Israel.s conduct during the Second Intifada in November 2003. One of them
declared .we are behaving disgracefully,. and another termed Israel.s
conduct .patently immoral..54
But isn.t Israel entitled to do whatever it takes to protect its citizens?
Doesn.t the unique evil of terrorism justify continued U.S. support, even
if Israel often responds harshly?
In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either.
Palestinians have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and
their willingness to attack innocent civilians is wrong. This behavior is
not surprising, however, because the Palestinians believe they have no
other way to force Israeli concessions. As former Prime Minister Barak
once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he .would have joined a
terrorist organization..55
Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used terrorism when they
were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their on state.
Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist
bombings to drive the British from Palestine, and took the lives of many
innocent civilians along the way.56 Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N.
mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, because they opposed his proposal
to internationalize Jerusalem.57 Nor were the perpetrators of these acts
isolated extremists: the leaders of the murder plot were eventually
granted amnesty by the Israeli government and one of them was elected to
the Knsset. Another terrorist leader, who approved the murder but was not
tried, was future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, Shamir openly
argued that .neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify
terrorism as a means of combat.. Rather, terrorism had .a great part to
play . in our war against the occupier [Britain]..58 If the Palestinians.
use of terrorism is morally reprehensible today, so was Israel.s reliance
upon it in the past, and thus one cannot justify U.S. support for Israel
on the grounds that its past conduct was morally superior.59
12 Israel may not have acted worse than many other countries, but it
clearly has not acted any better. And if neither strategic nor moral
arguments can account for America.s support for Israel, how are we to
explain it?
THE ISRAEL LOBBY
The explanation lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were it
not for the Lobby.s ability to manipulate the American political system,
the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less
intimate than it is today.
What Is The Lobby?
We use .the Lobby.as a convenient short.hand term for the loose coalition
of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape U.S. foreign
policy in a pro.Israel direction. Our use of this term is not meant to
suggest that .the Lobby.is a unified movement with a central leadership,
or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues
The core of the Lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant
effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it
advances Israel.s interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for
candidates who are pro.Israel to include letter.writing, financial
contributions, and supporting pro.Israel organizations. But not all
Jewish.Americans are part of the Lobby, because Israel is not a salient
issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly 36 percent
of Jewish.Americans said they were either .not very. or .not at all.
emotionally attached to Israel.60
Jewish.Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key
organizations in the Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of
Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally
supported the expansionist policies of Israel.s Likud Party, including its
hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other
hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the
Palestinians, and a few groups.such as Jewish Voice for Peace.strongly
advocate such steps.61 Despite these differences, moderates and hardliners
both support steadfast U.S. support for Israel.
Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli
officials, so that the former can maximize their influence in the United
States. As one activist with a major Jewish organization wrote, .it is
routine for us to say: .This is our 13 policy on a certain issue, but we
must check what the Israelis think.. We as a community do it all the
time..62 There is also a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy,
and Jewish.American leaders rarely support putting pressure on Israel.
Thus, Edgar Bronfman Sr., the president of the World Jewish Congress, was
accused of .perfidy. when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid.2003
urging Bush to pressure Israel to curb construction of its controversial
.security fence..63 Critics declared that, .It would be obscene at any
time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the president
of the United States to rsist policies being promoted by the government of
Israel..
Similarly, when Israel Policy Forum president Seymour Reich advised
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pressure Israel to reopen a crtical
border crossing in the Gaza Strip in November 2005, critics denounced his
action as .irresponsible behavior,. and declared that, .There is
absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing
against the security.related policies . . . of Israel..64 Recoiling from
these attacks, Reich proclaimed that .the word pressure is not in my
vocabulary when it comes to Israel..
Jewish.Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to
influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and
well.known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their
staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington.65 AIPAC was ranked
second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP), but ahead
of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL.CIO and the National Rifle
Association. A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar
conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in the
Washington.s .muscle rankings..66
The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer,
Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and
Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They
believe Israel.s rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its
expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is contrary to God.s
will.67 In addition, the Lobby.s membership includes neoconservative
gentiles such as John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert
Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former U.N.
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and columnist George Will. 14
Sources of Power
The United States has a divided government that offers many ways to
influence the policy process. As a result, interest groups can shape
policy in many different ways.by lobbying elected representatives and
members of the executive branch, making campaign contributions, voting in
elections, molding public opinion, etc.
Furthermore, special interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when
they are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the populaton is
indifferent. Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about
the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the
rest of the population will not penalize them.
The Israel Lobby.s power flows from its unmatched ability to play this
game of interest group politics. In its basic operations, it is no
different from interest groups like the Farm Lobby, steel and textile
workers, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel Lobby apart is its
extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American
Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway U.S. policy towards
Israel. The Lobby.s activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in
anti.Semitic tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the most
part, the individuals and groups that comprise the Lobby are doing what
other special interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro.Arab
interest groups are weak to non.existent, which makes the Lobby.s task
even easier.68
Strategies for Success
The Lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel.
First, it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both
Congress and the Executive branch to support Israel down the line.
Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker.s own views, the Lobby
tries to make supporting Israel the .smart. political choice.
Second, the Lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel
portrays it in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its
founding and by publicizing Israel.s side in the policy debates of the
day. The goal is to prevent critical commentary about Israel from getting
a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential
to guaranteeing U.S. support, because a 15 candid discussion of
U.S..Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy.
Influencing Congress
A key pillar of the Lobby.s effectiveness is its influence in the U.S.
Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This is in
itself a remarkable situation, because Congress almost never shies away
from contentious issues. Whether the issue is abortion, affirmative
action, health care, or welfare, there is certain to be a lively debate on
Capitol Hill. Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall
silent and there is hardly any debate at all.
One reason for the Lobby.s success with Congress is that some key members
are Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002 that
.My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel..69 One would
think that the number 1 priority for any congressman would be to .protect
America,. but that is not what Armey said. There are also Jewish senators
and congressmen who work to make U.S. foreign policy support Israel.s
interests.
Pro.Israel congressional staffers are another source of the Lobby.s power.
As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once admitted, .There are a lot
of guys at the working level up here [on Capitol Hill] . who happen to be
Jewish, who are willing . to look at certain issues in terms of their
Jewishness .. These are all guys who are in a position to make the
decision in these areas for those senators .. You can get an awful lot
done just at the staff level..70
It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the Lobby.s influence
in Congress. AIPAC.s success is due to its ability to reward legislators
and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those
who challenge it. Money is critical to U.S. elections (as the recent
scandal over lobbyist Jack Abramoff.s various shady dealings reminds us),
and AIPAC makes sure that its friends get strong financial support from
the myriad pro.Israel political action committees. Those seen as hostile
to Israel, on the other hand, can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign
contributions to their political opponents. AIPAC also organizes
letter.writing campaigns and encourages newspaper editors to endorse
pro.Israel candidates.
There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one
example, in 1984 AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois,
who, according to one prominent Lobby figure, had .displayed insensitivity
and even hostility to 16 our concerns.. Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at
the time, explained what happened: .All the Jews in America, from coast to
coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians ..those who
hold public positions now, and those who aspire ..got the message..71
AIPAC prizes its reputation as a formidable adversary, of course, because
it discourages anyone from questioning its agenda.
AIPAC.s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further, however. According to
Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, .It is common for members
of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need
information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional
Research Service, committee staff or administration experts..72 More
importantly, he notes that AIPAC is .often called upon to draft speeches,
work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect
co.sponsors and marshal votes..
The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a foreign
government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress.73 Open debate about
U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy
has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three
main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting
Israel. As former Senator Ernest Hollings (D.SC) noted as he was leaving
office, .You can.t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you
around here..74 Small wonder that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once
told an American audience. .When people ask me how they can help Israel, I
tell them.Help AIPAC..75
Influencing the Executive
The Lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch. That
power derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on
presidential elections. Despite their small numbers in the population
(less than 3 percent), they make large campaign donations to candidates
from both parties. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic
presidential candidates .depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as
60 percent of the money..76 Furthermore, Jewish voters have high turn.out
rates and are concentrated in key states like California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania. Because they matter in close
elections, Presidential candidates go to great lengths not to antagonize
Jewish voters.
Key organizations in the Lobby also directly target the administration in
power. For example, pro.Israel forces make sure that critics of the Jewish
state do not get important foreign.policy appointments. Jimmy Carter
wanted to make George 17 Ball his first secretary of state, but he knew
that Ball was perceived as critical of Israel and that the Lobby would
oppose the appointment.77 This litmus test forces any aspiring policymaker
to become an overt supporter of Israel, which is why public critics of
Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the U.S. foreign
policy establishment.
These constraints still operate today. When 2004 presidential candidate
Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more .even.handed role.
in the Arab.Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of
selling Israel down the river and said his statement was
.irresponsible..78 Virtually all of the top Democrats in the House signed
a hard.hitting letter to Dean criticizing his comments, and the Chicago
Jewish Star reported that .anonymous attackers . are clogging the e.mail
inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning ..without much
evidence ..that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel..79
This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on
Israel.80 His campaign co.chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean
said his own views on the Middle East more closely reflected those of
AIPAC than the more moderate Americans for Peac Now. Dean had merely
suggested that to .bring the sides together,. Washington should act as an
honest broker. This is hardly a radical idea, but it is anathema to the
Lobby, which does not tolerate the idea of even.handedness when it comes
to the Arab.Israeli conflict.
The Lobby.s goals are also served when pro.Israel individuals occupy
important positions in the executive branch. During the Clinton
Administration, for example, Middle East policy was largely shaped by
officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro.Israel
organizations.including Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of
research at AIPAC and co.founder of the pro.Israel Washington Institute
for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving
government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often
visits there.81
These men were among President Clinton.s closest advisors at the Camp
David summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace
process and favored creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only
within the limits of what would be acceptable to Israel.82 In particular,
the American delegation took its cues from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak, coordinated negotiating positions in advance, and did not offer its
own independent proposals for settling the conflict. Not surprisingly,
Palestinian negotiators complained that they were 18 .negotiating with two
Israeli teams ..one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American
flag..83
The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush Administration, whose
ranks include fervently pro.Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John
Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis (.Scooter.) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials
consistently pushed for policies favored by Israel and backed by
organizations in the Lobby.
Manipulating the Media
In addition to influencing government policy directly, the Lobby strives
to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not
want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate
might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently
provide. Accordingly, pro.Israel organizations work hard to influence the
media, think tanks, and academia, because these institutions are critical
in shaping popular opinion.
The Lobby.s perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream
media in good part because most American commentators ae pro.Israel. The
debate among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is
.dominated by people who cannot imagine criticizing Israel..84 He lists 61
.columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel
reflexively and without qualification.. Conversely, Alterman found just
five pundits who consistently criticize Israeli behavior or endorse
pro.Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op.eds
challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favors the
other side.
This pro.Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers.
Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked
that, .Shamir, Sharon, Bibi . whatever those guys want is pretty much fine
by me..85 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent
newspapers like The Chicago Sun.Times and The Washington Times regularly
run editorials that are strongly pro.Israel. Magazines like Commentary,
the New Republic, and the Weekly Standard also zealously defend Israel at
every turn.
Editorial bias is also found in papers like the New York Times. The Times
occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes concedes that the
Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even.handed. In his
memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel
acknowledged 19 the impact his own pro.Israel attitude had on his
editorial choices. In his words: .I was much more deeply devoted to Israel
than I dared to assert.. He goes on: .Fortified by my knowledge of Israel
and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East
commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them
from a pro.Israel perspective.. 86
The media.s reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more
even.handed than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive
to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the
occupied territories without acknowledging Israel.s actual behavior. To
discourage unfavorable reporting on Israel, the Lobby organizes letter
writing campaigns, demonstrations, and boycotts against news outlets whose
content it considers anti.Israel. One CNN executive has said that he
sometimes gets 6,000 e.mail messages in a single day complaining that a
story is anti.Israel.87 Similarly, the pro.Israel Committee for Accurate
Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organized demonstrations outside
National Public Radio stations in 33 cities in May 2003, and it also tried
to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle
East coverage became more sympatheticto Israel.88 Boston.s NPR station,
WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of
these efforts. Pressure on NPR has also come from Israel.s friends in
Congress, who have asked NPR for an internal audit as well as more
oversight of its Middle East coverage.
These factors help explain why the American media contains few criticisms
of Israeli policy, rarely questions Washington.s relationship with Israel,
and only occasionally discusses the Lobby.s profound influence on U.S.
policy.
Think Tanks That Think One Way
Pro.Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important
role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The Lobby created
its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped found WINEP.89
Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel and claims instead that it
provides a .balanced and realistic. perspective on Middle East issues,
this is not the case.90 In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals
who are deeply committed to advancing Israel.s agenda.
The Lobby.s influence in the think tank world extends well beyond WINEP.
Over the past 25 years, pro.Israel forces have established a commanding
presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution,
the 20 Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute,
the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro.Israel, and include few, if
any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.
A good indicator of the Lobby.s influence in the think tank world is the
evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert
on Middle East issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and
former NSC official with a well.deserved reputation for evenhandedness
regarding the Arab.Israeli conflict. Today, however, Brookings.s work on
these issues is conducted through its Saban Center for Middle East
Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, a wealthy Israeli.American
businessman and ardent Zionist.91 The director of the Saban Center is the
ubiquitous Martin Indyk. Thus, what was once a non.partisan policy
institute on Middle East matters is now part of the chorus of largely
pro.Israel think tanks.
Policing Academia
The Lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about Israel on
college campuses, because academic freedom is a core value and because
tenured professors are hard to threaten or silence. Even so, there was
only mild criticism of Israel in the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process
was underway. Criticism rose after that process collapsed and Ariel Sharon
came to power in early 2001, and it became especially intense when the IDF
re.occupied the West Bank in spring 2002 and employed massive force
against the Second Intifada.
The Lobby moved aggressively to .take back the campuses.. New groups
sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers
to U.S. colleges.92 Established groups like the Jewish Council for Public
Affairs and Hillel jumped into the fray, and a new group.the Israel on
Campus Coalition.was formed to coordinate the many groups that now sought
to make Israel.s case on campus. Finally, AIPAC more than tripled its
spending for programs to monitor university activities and to train young
advocates for Israel, in order to .vastly expand the number of students
involved on campus . . . in the national pro.Israel effort..93
The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September
2002, for example, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately
pro.Israel neoconservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that
posted dossiers on 21 suspect academics and encouraged students to report
comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel.94 This
transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted a harsh
reaction and Pipes and Kramer later removed he dossiers, but the website
still invites students to report alleged anti.Israel behavior at U.S.
colleges.
Groups in the Lobby also direct their fire at particular professors and
the universities that hire them. Columbia University, which had the late
Palestinian scholar Edward Said on its faculty, has been a frequent target
of pro.Israel forces. Jonathan Cole, the former Columbia provost, reported
that, .One can be sure that any public statement in support of the
Palestinian people by the preeminent literary critic Edward Said wil
elicit hundreds of e.mails, letters, and journalistic accounts that call
on us to denounce Said and to either sanction or fire him..95 When
Columbia recruited historian Rashid Khalidi from the University of
Chicago, Cole says that .the complaints started flowing in from people who
disagreed with the content of his political views.. Princeton faced the
same problem a few years later when it considered wooing Khalidi away from
Columbia.96
A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late
2004, when the .David Project. produced a propaganda film alleging that
faculty in Columbia University.s Middle East studies program were
anti.Semitic and were intimidating Jewish students who defended Israel.97
Columbia was raked over the coals in pro.Israel circles, but a faculty
committee assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of
anti.Semitism and the only incident worth noting was the possibility that
one professor had .responded heatedly. to a student.s question.98 The
committee also discovered that the accused professors had been the target
of an overt intimidation campaign.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this campaign to eliminate criticism
of Israel from college campuses is the effort by Jewsh groups to push
Congress to establish mechanisms that monitor what professors say about
Israel.99 Schools judged to have an anti.Israel bias would be denied
Federal funding. This effort to get the U.S. government to police campuses
have not yet succeeded, but the attempt illustrates the importance
pro.Israel groups place on controlling debate on these issues.
Finally, a number of Jewish philanthropists have established Israel
studies programs (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programs
that already exist) so as to increase the number of Israel.friendly
scholars on campus.100 NYU 22 announced the establishment of the Taub
Center for Israel Studies on May 1, 2003, and similar programs have been
established at other schools like Berkeley, Brandeis, and Emory. Academic
administrators emphasize the pedagogical value of these programs, but the
truth is that they are intended in good part to promote Israel.s image on
campus. Fred Laffer, the head of the Taub Foundation, makes clear that his
foundation funded the NYU center to help counter the .Arabic [sic] point
of view. that he thinks is prevalent in NYU.s Middle East programs.101
In sum, the Lobby has gone to considerable lengths to insulate Israel from
criticism on college campuses. It has not been as successful in academia
as it has been on Capitol Hill, but it has worked hard to stifle criticism
of Israel by professors and students and there is much less of it on
campuses today102
The Great Silencer
No discussion of how the Lobby operates would be complete without
examining one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of anti.Semitism.
Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro.Israel groups have
significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy.an influence that AIPAC
celebrates.stands a good chance of getting labeled an anti.Semite. In
fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel Lobby runs the risk of being
charged with anti.Semitism, even though the Israeli media themselves refer
to America.s .Jewish Lobby.. In effect, the Lobby boasts of its own power
and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it. This tactic is very
effective, because anti.Semitism is loathsome and no responsible person
wants to be accused of it.
Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticize Israeli
policy in recent years, which some attribute to a resurgence of
anti.Semitism in Europe. We are .getting to a point,. the U.S. Ambassador
to the European Union said in early 2004, .where it is as bad as it was in
the 1930s..103 Measuring anti.Semitism is a complicated matter, but the
weight of evidence points in the opposite direction. For example, in the
spring of 2004, when accusations of European anti.Semitism filled the air
in America, separate surveys of European public opinion conducted by the
Anti.Defamation League and the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press showed that it was actually declining.104
Consider France, which pro.Israel forces often portray as the most
anti.Semitic state in Europe. A poll of French citizens in 2002 found
that: 89 percent could envisage living with a Jew; 97 percent believe
making anti.Semitic graffiti is a 23 serious crime; 87 percent think
attacks on French synagogues are scandalous; and 85 percent of practicing
French Catholics reject the charge that Jews have too much influence in
business and finance.105 It is unsurprising that the head of the French
Jewish community declared in the summer of 2003 that .France is not more
anti.Semitic than America..106 According to a recent article in Ha.aretz,
the French police report that anti.Semitic incidents in France declined by
almost 50 per cent in 2005; and this despite the fact that France has the
largest Muslim population of any country in Europe.107
Finally, when a French Jew was brutally murdered last month by a Muslim
gang, tens of thousands of French demonstrators poured into the streets to
condemn anti.Semitism. Moreover, President Jacques Chirac and Prime
Minister Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim.s memorial service
in a public showof solidarity with French Jewry.108 It is also worth
noting that in 2002 more Jews immigrated to Germany than Israel, making it
.the fastest growing Jewish community in the world,. according to an
article in the Jewish newspaper Forward.109 If Europe were really heading
back to the 1930s, it is hard to imagine that Jews would be moving there
in large numbers.
We recognize, however, that Europe is not free of the scourge of
anti.Semitism. No one would deny that there are still some virulent
autochthonous anti.Semites in Europe (as there are in the United States)
but their numbers are small and their extreme views are rejected by the
vast majority of Europeans. Nor would one deny that there is anti.Semitism
among European Muslims, some of it provoked by Israel.s behavior towards
the Palestinians and some of it straightforwardly racist. 110 This problem
is worrisome, but it is hardly out of control. Muslims constitute less
than five percent of Europe.s total population, and European governments
are working hard to combat the problem. Why? Because most Europeans reject
such hateful views.111 In short, when it comes to anti.Semitism, Europe
today bears hardly any resemblance to Europe in the 1930s.
This is why pro.Israel forces, when pressed to go beyond assertion, claim
that there is a .new anti.Semitism., which they equate with criticism of
Israel.112 In other words criticize Israeli policy and you are by
definition an anti.Semite. When the synod of the Church of England
recently voted to divest from Caterpillar Inc on the grounds that
Caterpillar manufacures the bulldozers used to demolish Palestinian homes,
the Chief Rabbi complained that it would .have the most adverse
repercussions on ... Jewish.Christian relations in Britain., while Rabbi
Tony Bayfield, the head of the Reform movement, said: ..There is a clear
problem of anti.Zionist .verging on anti.Semitic .attitudes emerging in
the grass 24 roots, and even in the middle ranks of the Church..113
However, the Church was neither guilty of anti.Zionism nor anti.Semitism;
it was merely protesting Israeli policy.114
Critics are also accused of holding Israel to an unfair standard or
questioning its right to exist. But these are bogus charges too. Western
critics of Israel hardly ever question its right t

Porqué América no cambiará es política extranjera de MiddleEast
Automatically translated into Spanish thanks to WorldLingo
Estudio de Harvard: El pasillo de Israel y los E.E.U.U. La página imprimible
de la política extranjera
se sentó, 2006-03-18 14:34 - admin
Juan J. Mearsheimer y
Stephen M. Walt
Juan F. Escuela de Kennedy de la universidad de Harvard del gobierno
el marzo de 2006
los E.E.U.U. la política extranjera forma acontecimientos en cada esquina del globo. Ninguna parte es
ésta más verdad que en el Oriente Medio, una región de la inestabilidad que se repite y
de la importancia estratégica enorme. Lo más recientemente posible, la tentativa de Bush
Administration.s de transformar la región en una comunidad de democracias ha ayudado
al producto un insurency resistente en Iraq, una subida aguda de precios del petróleo del mundo,
y de bombardeos del terrorista en Madrid, Londres, y Amman. Con tanto en juego
para tan muchos, todos los países necesitan entender las fuerzas que conducen los E.E.U.U.
Política de Medio Oriente.
Los E.E.U.U. el interés nacional debe ser el objeto primario de la política
extranjera americana. Para el pasado varias décadas, sin embargo, y especialmente
desde la guerra en 1967, la pieza central de seis días de los E.E.U.U. La política de Medio Oriente
ha sido su relación con Israel. La combinación de los E.E.U.U. constantes
la ayuda para que Israel y el esfuerzo relacionado separen democracia a través
de la región ha inflamado la opinión árabe e islámica y eopardized los E.E.U.U.
seguridad.
Esta situación no tiene ningún igual en historia política americana. ¿Por qué
los Estados Unidos han estado dispuestos a poner su propia seguridad a un lado para
avanzar los intereses de otro estado? Uno pudo asumir que el enlace
entre los dos países está basado en intereses estratégicos compartidos o
imperativs morales que obligan. Como demostramos abajo, sin embargo, ni unas ni otras de esas
explicaciones pueden explicar el nivel notable de la ayuda material
y diplomática esa los povides de Estados Unidos a Israel.
En lugar, el empuje total de los E.E.U.U. la política en la región es debida casi
enteramente a los E.E.U.U. política doméstica, y especialmente a las actividades
del. Pasillo de Israel. Otros grupos de interés especial han manejado sesgar
los E.E.U.U. política extranjera en direcciones que favorecieron, pero ningún pasillo ha manejado
divertir los E.E.U.U. política extranjera como lejos de lo que sugeriría el interés
nacional americano de otra manera, mientras que simultáneamente convence
a los americanos que los E.E.U.U. y los intereses israelíes son esencialmente identical.1
en las páginas que siguen, nosotros describen cómo el pasillo ha logrado esta
hazaña, y cómo sus actividades han formado acciones de America.s en esta
región crítica. Dado la importancia estratégica de el Oriente Medio y de su
impacto potencial en otros, ambos americanos y no. Los americanos necesitan
entender y tratar la influencia de Lobby.s en los E.E.U.U. política. 1
algunos lectores encontrará este análisis el disturbar, pero los hechos contados de nuevo
aquí no están en conflicto serio entre eruditos. De hecho, nuestra cuenta confía
pesadamente en el trabajo de los eruditos y de los periodistas israelíes, que merecen el gran
crédito para la luz del vertimiento en estas ediciones. También confiamos en la evidencia
proporcionada por organizaciones israelíes e internacionales respetadas de los derechos
humanos. Semejantemente, nuestras demandas sobre el impacto de Lobby.s confían en
testimonio del Lobby.s poseen a miembros, así como testimonio
de los políticos que han trabajado con ellos. Los lectores pueden rechazar nuestras conclusiones,
por supuesto, solamente la evidencia en las cuales ellas se reclina no es polémico.
EL GRAN BENEFACTOR
desde la guerra de octubre en 1973, Washington ha proveído de Israel un nivel
de la ayuda dwarfing las cantidades proporcionadas a cualquier otro estado. Ha sido
el recipiente anual más grande de los E.E.U.U. directos ayuda económica y
militar desde 1976 y el recipiente total más grande desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial.
Total los E.E.U.U. directos la ayuda a las cantidades de Israel a bien sobre $140 mil millones en 2003
dollars.2 Israel recibe cerca de $3 mil millones en la ayuda extranjera directa
cada año, que es áspero one.fifth del presupuesto de la ayuda exterior de America.s. En
per capita términos, los Estados Unidos dan a cada uno israelí un valor directo
del subsidio cerca de $500 por year.3 que este largesse está pulsando especialmente cuando uno
realiza que Israel ahora es un estado industrial rico con per capita
un incom áspero igual a Corea del sur o Spain.4
Israel también consigue a otros repartos especiales de Washington.5 la otra ayuda
los recipientes consiguen su dinero en instalaciones trimestrales, pero Israel recibe
su apropiación entera al principio de cada ejercicio económico y gana
así interés adicional. Requieren a la mayoría de los recipientes de la ayuda militar americana
pasar todo el él en los Estados Unidos, pero Israel puede utilizar
áspero por ciento de twenty.five de su asignación de la ayuda para subvencionar su propia
industria de la defensa. Israel es el único recipiente que no tiene que
explicar cómo la ayuda está pasada, una exención que las marcas él virtualmente
imposible evitar que el dinero sea utilizado para los propósitos los estados
unidos opongan, como establecimientos del edificio en Cisjordania.
Por otra parte, los Estados Unidos han proveído de Israel casi $3 mil millones
para desarrollar sistemas de armas como el avión de Lavi que el pentágono
no deseó ni necesitó, mientras que da el acceso de Israel a top.drawer los E.E.U.U. el armamento tiene gusto
de los helicópteros de Blackhawk y de los jets F.16. Finalmente, los Estados Unidos dan
el acceso de Israel a la inteligencia que niegan a sus aliados de la OTAN y
han dado vuelta a un ojo oculto hacia la adquisición de Israels de weapons.6 nuclear
2 además, Washington proveen de Israel la ayuda diplomática
constante. Desde 1982, los Estados Unidos tienen vetoed 32 resoluciones
que eran críticas de Israel, un número del consejo de seguridad de Naciones Unidas
mayor que el total combinado del molde de los vetos de todo el otro consejo
de seguridad members.7 que también bloquea estados árabes. los esfuerzos de poner el arsenal
nuclear de Israel.s en la energía atómica internacional Agency.s agenda.8
los Estados Unidos también vienen al rescate de Israel.s en tiempo de guerra y toman su
lado al negociar paz. La administración re.supplied Israel durante
la guerra de octubre e Israel protegido de Nixon de la amenaza de la intervención
soviética. Washington estuvo implicado profundamente en las negociaciones que
terminaron esa guerra así como el .step.by.step muy largo. procese eso
seguida, apenas como desempeñó un papel dominante en las negociaciones que precedieron
y siguieron la Oslo 1993 Accords.9 allí eran fricciones ocasionales
entre los E.E.U.U. y los funcionarios israelíes en ambos casos, pero los Estados Unidos
coordinaron sus posiciones de cerca con Israel y movieron hacia atrás constantemente
el acercamiento israelí a los negotitions. De hecho, un participante americano en
el campo David (2000) dijo más adelante, .far demasiado a menudo, funcionamos. . . como
Israel.s lawyer..10
según lo discutido abajo, Washington ha dado a Israel latitud amplia en tratar
de los territorios ocupados (Cisjordania y la tira de Gaza), aun cuando
sus acciones era en desacuerdo con los E.E.U.U. indicados política. Por otra parte, la estrategia
ambiciosa de Bush Administration.s para transformar el Oriente Medio .beginning
con la invasión de Iraq.is por lo menos se prepuso en parte mejorar la situación
estratégica de Israel.s. Aparte de alianzas del tiempo de guerra, es duro pensar en
otro caso donde un país ha proveído de otro un nivel
similar del material y del diplomaticsupport por un período tan extendido.
La ayuda de America.s para Israel es, en fin, única.
Esta generosidad extraordinaria pudo ser comprensible si Israel era
un activo estratégico vital o si había un caso del mora que obligaba para
los E.E.U.U. sostenidos forro. Pero ninguno de los dos análisis razonados está convenciendo.
UNA RESPONSABILIDAD ESTRATÉGICA
según el Web site de los asuntos públicos Committee.s (AIPAC)
de American.Israel, .the Estados Unidos e Israel han formado una sociedad única
para resolver las amenazas estratégicas cada vez mayor en el Oriente Medio. . . . Este
esfuerzo cooperativo proporciona las ventajas significativas para ambos los estados
unidos y esta demanda Israel..11 es un artículo de la fe entre los partidarios
de Israel.s y es invocada rutinariamente por los políticos israelíes y favorable. Americanos
de Israel.
3 Israel pudieron haber sido un activo estratégico durante el War.12 frío sirviendo
como poder de America.s después del día seises War (1967), Israel ayudado a contener
la extensión soviética en la región e infligieron derrotas de humillación en clientes
soviéticos como Egipto y Siria. Israel ayudado de vez en cuando a proteger otros
E.E.U.U. los aliados (como rey Hussein de Jordan.s) y su valor militar forzaron
Moscú para pasar más forro sus clientes perdidosos. Israel también dio
a Estados Unidos inteligencia útil sobre capacidades soviéticas.
El valor estratégico de Israel.s durante este período no debe ser exagerado,
however.13 el forro Israel no era barato, y complicó relaciones
de America.s con el mundo árabe. Por ejemplo, los E.E.U.U. la decisión para dar
a Israel $2.2 mil millones en ayuda militar de la emergencia durante la guerra de octubre
accionó un embargo del aceite de la OPEP que infligió economías occidentales considerables del daños
o. Por otra parte, los militares de Israel.s no podrían proteger los E.E.U.U. intereses en
la región. Por ejemplo, los Estados Unidos no podían confiar en Israel cuando
la revolución iraní en 1979 preocupaciones levantadas por la seguridad
de las fuentes de aceite persas de Glf, y tuvieron que crear sus el propios. Fuerza rápida
del despliegue. en lugar.
Aunque Israel era un activo estratégico durante la guerra fría, la primera guerra
del Golfo (1990.91) reveló que Israel se convertía en una carga estratégica.
Los Estados Unidos no podían utilizar bases israelíes durante la guerra sin romper
contra. La coalición de Iraq, y ellos tuvieron que divertir los recursos (e.g., baterías
del misil del patriota) para guardar Tel Aviv de hacer cualquier cosa que pudo
fracturar la alianza contra Saddam. La historia se repitió en 2003:
aunque Israel era impaciente para que los Estados Unidos ataquen a Saddam,
presidente Bush no podría pedirlos para ayudar sin accionar la oposición
árabe. Israel permanecía tan en las líneas laterales again.14
que comenzaban en los años 90, y especialmente después de 9/11, los E.E.U.U. la ayuda para Israel
ha sido justificada por la demanda que ambos estados son amenazados por
los grupos del terrorista que originan en el mundo musulmán de Arabor, y por un sistema
de estados de .rogue. que trasero estos grupos y búsqueda WMD. Este análisis razonado implica
que Washington debe dar a Israel una mano libre haciendo frente
a los palestinos y no la prensa Israel t hace concesiones hasta que encarcelan a todos los
terroristas palestinos o absolutamente. También implica que los Estados Unidos
deben ir después de países como la república islámica del al de Irán,
de Saddam Hussein.s Iraq, y de Bashar. Assad.s Siria. Israel se ve así como
aliado crucial en la guerra en terror, porque sus enemigos son enemigos
de America.s.
Este nuevo análisis razonado se parece persuasivo, pero Israel es de hecho una responsabilidad en
la guerra en terror y el esfuerzo más amplio de ocuparse de los estados del granuja.
4 para comenzar con, .terrorism. es una táctica empleada por una amplia gama
de grupos políticos; no es un solo adversario unificado. Las organizaciones
del terrorista que amenazan Israel (e.g., Hamas o Hezbollah)
no amenazan los Estados Unidos, excepto cuando intervienen contra ellos (como en
Líbano en 1982). Por otra parte, el terrorismo palestino no es violencia al azar
dirigida contra Israel o el oeste de .the. ; es en gran parte una respuesta
a la campaña prolongada Israel.s para colonizar Cisjordania y la tira de Gaza.
Más importantemente, decir que Israel y los Estados Unidos son unidos por
una amenaza compartida del terrorista tiene la relación causal al revés: algo,
los Estados Unidos tienen un problema en buena parte porque se alían tan
de cerca con Israel, no la otra manera del terrorismo alrededor. LOS E.E.U.U. la ayuda para
Israel no es la única fuente de contra. Terrorismo americano, pero es
importante, y hace ganar la guerra en terror que más difficult.15
allí no es ninguna pregunta, por ejemplo, que presencia de Israel.s en Jerusalén motivan muchos
líderes de Qaeda del al, incluyendo el compartimiento cargado, y apuro
de los palestinos. Según los E.E.U.U. 9/11 Comisión, cargado del compartimiento
buscado explícitamente a castiga los Estados Unidos para sus políticas en
el Medio Oriente, incluyendo su ayuda para Israel, y él incluso intentó medir el tiempo
de los ataques para destacar este issue.16
igualmente importante, los E.E.U.U. incondicionales la ayuda para Israel hace más fácil
para los extremistas como el compartimiento cargado para reunir la ayuda popular y para atraer
a reclutas. Las encuestas de la opinión pública confirman que las poblaciones árabes son profundamente
hostiles a la ayuda americana para Israel, y los E.E.U.U. Indique que grupo
consultivo de Department.s en la diplomacia pública para el mundo árabe y musulmán encontró
que .citizens en estos países genuino están apenados en el apuro
de los palestinos y en el papel perciben los Estados Unidos para ser
playing..17
en cuanto a estados del granuja de so.called en el Oriente Medio, él no es una amenaza
calamitosa a los E.E.U.U. vitales intereses, aparte de los E.E.U.U. comisión con Israel
sí mismo. Aunque los Estados Unidos tienen un número de desacuerdos
con estos regímenes, Washington no estaría casi como preocupado de Irán,
de Ba.thist Iraq, o de Siria era atada no tan de cerca a Israel. Aunque
estos estados adquieren weapons.which nuclear no son desirable.it
no serían obviamente un desastre estratégico para los Estados Unidos. Ni América
ni Israel se podría chantajear por un granuja de nuclear.armed, porque
el chantajista no podría realizar la amenaza sin la recepción de la venganza
abrumadora. El peligro de un handoff de .nuclear. a los terroristas está igualmente
alejado, porque un estado del granuja no podría ser seguro que la transferencia sería
desapercibida o eso no sería culpada y no fue castigada luego. 5
además, los E.E.U.U. relación con de Israel las marcas realmente él más difícilmente
a ocuparse de estos estados. El arsenal nuclear de Israel.s es una razón por la que algunos
de sus vecinos desean las armas nucleares, y amenazar estos estados con
los aumentos del cambio del régimen simplemente que desean. Con todo Israel no es mucho
de un activo cuando los Estados Unidos comtemplan el usar de la fuerza contra estos
regímenes, porque no pueden participar en la lucha.
En fin, tratando Israel como America.s la mayoría del aliado importante en la campaña
contra terrorismo y capacidad clasificada de los bothexaggerates Israel.s
de las dictaduras de Medio Oriente de ayudar en estas ediciones y no hace caso de las maneras que
las políticas de Israel.s hacen los E.E.U.U. esfuerzos más difíciles.
La ayuda de Unquestioned para Israel también debilita los E.E.U.U. coloque fuera
del Medio Oriente. Las élites extranjeras ven constantemente los Estados Unidos como demasiado
de apoyo de Israel, y piensan que su tolerancia de la represión israelí en
los territorios ocupados es moral obtusa y una desventaja en la guerra en
terroism.18 en abril de 2004, por ejemplo, 52 diplomatas británicos anteriores enviados
primer ministro Tony Blair un refrán de la letra que el conflicto
de Israel.Palestine tenía relaciones de .poisoned entre el oeste y árabes e islámicos
los mundos. y que las políticas de Bush y del primer ministro Ariel Sharon
eran razón final de .one.sided y
de illegal..19 A de preguntar el valor estratégico de cuidado de Israel.s es que
no actúa como un aliado leal. Los funcionarios israelíes no hacen caso con frecuencia de los E.E.U.U. las peticiones
y renuncian en las promesas hechas para rematar los E.E.U.U. líderes (el incluir más allá de compromisos
para parar la construcción del establecimiento y para refrenarse de .tar geted asesinatos.
de los líderes palestinos) .20 por otra parte, Israel ha proporcionado los E.E.U.U. sensibles
tecnología militar al potencial los E.E.U.U. los rivales tienen gusto de China, en lo que los E.E.U.U.
Indique el departamento Inspector.General llamado patrón sistemático y cada vez mayor
de .a de transfers..21 desautorizado según los E.E.U.U. Oficina
general de la contabilidad, Israel también .conducts las operaciones más agresivas
del espionaje contra los E.E.U.U. de cualquier ally..22 además de la caja
de Jonatán Pollard, que dio a Israel cantidades grandes de material clasificado
en los años 80 tempranos (que Israel pasado según se informa sobre la Unión Soviética
para ganar más visas de la salida para los judíos soviéticos), una nueva controversia entró en erupción en
2004 en que fue revelado que un funcionario dominante del pentágono (Larry Franklin)
había pasado la información clasificada a un diplomata israelí, alegado ayudado
por dos AIPAC officials.23 Israel es apenas el único país que espía en
los Estados Unidos, pero su buena voluntad de espiar en sus moldes principales
el patrón duda más lejos en su valor estratégico.
6 UN CASO MORAL DE DISMINUCIÓN
aparte de su valor estratégico alegado, soportes de Israel.s también discuten que
merece los E.E.U.U. incompetentes la ayuda porque 1) él es débil y rodeado
por los enemigos, 2) es una democracia, que es una forma moral preferible
de gobierno; 3) the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and
therefore deserve special treatment, and 4) Israel.s conduct has been
morally superior to its adversaries. behavior.
On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive.
There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel.s existence, but that
is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, Israel.s past and present conduct
offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.
Backing the Underdog?
Israel is often portrayed as weak and besieged, a Jewish David surrounded
by a hostile Arab Goliath. This image has been carefully nurtured by
Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers, but the opposite image is closer
to the truth. Contrary to popular belief, the Zionists had larger,
better.equipped, and better.led forces during the 1947.49 War of
Independence and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won quick and easy
victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in
1967.before large.scale U.S. aid began flowing to Israel.24 These
victories offer eloquent evidence of Israeli patriotism, organizational
ability, and military prowess, but they also reveal that Israel was far
from helpless even in its earliest years.
Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its
conventional forces are far superior to its neighbors and it is the only
state in the region with nuclear weapons. Egypt and Jordan signed peace
treaties with Israel and Saudi Arabia has offered to do so as well. Syria
has lost its Soviet patron, Iraq has been decimated by three disastrous
wars, and Iran is hundreds of miles away. The Palestinians barely have
effective police, let alone a military that could threaten Israel.
According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University.s prestigious Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, .the strategic balance decidedly favors
Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own
military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neghbors..25 If
backing the underdog were a compelling rationale, the United States would
be supporting Israel.s opponents.
7 Aiding a Fellow Democracy?
American backing is often justified by the claim that Israel is a
fellow.democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships. This rationale
sounds convincing, but it cannot account for the current level of U.S.
support. After all, there are many democracies around the world, but none
receives the lavish support that Israel does. The United States has
overthrown democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when
this was thought to advance .S. interests, and it has good relations with
a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic neither justifies
nor explains America.s support for Israel.
The .shared democracy. rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli
democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is
a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are
supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded
as a Jewish state and citizenship is based on the principle of blood
kinship.26 Given this conception of citizenship, it is not surprising that
Israel.s 1.3 million Arabs are treated as second.class citizens, or that a
recent Israeli government commission found that Israel behaves in a
.neglectful and discriminatory. manner towards them.27
Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens
to become citizens themselves, and does not give these spouses the right
to live in Israel. The Israeli human rights organization B.tselem called
this restriction .a racist law that determines who can live here according
to racist criteria..28 Such laws may be understandable given Israel.s
founding principles, but they are not consistent with America.s image of
democracy.
Israel.s democratic status is also undermined by its refusal to grant the
Palestinians a viable state of their own. Israel controls the lives of
about 3.8 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, while colonizing
lands on which the Palestinians have long dwelt. Israel is formally
democratic, but the millions of Palestinians that it controls are denied
full political rights and the .shared democracy. rationale is
correspondingly weakened.
Compensation for Past Crimes
A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the
Christian West, especially the tragic episode of the Holocaust. Because
Jews were persecuted for 8 centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish
homeland, many believe that Israel deserves special treatment from the
United States.
There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy
of anti.Semitism, and that Israel.s creation was an appropriate response
to a long record of crimes. This history, as noted, provides a strong
moral case for supporting Israel.s existence. But the creation of Israel
involved additional crimes against a largely innocent third party: the
Palestinians.
The history of these events is well.understood. When political Zionism
began in earnest in the late 19th century, there were only about 15,000
Jews in Palestine.29 In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95
percent of the population, and though under Ottoman control, they had been
in continuous possession of this territory for 1300 years.30 Even when
Israel was founded, Jews were only about 35 percent of Palestine.s
population and owned 7 percent of the land.31
The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a
bi.national state or accepting a permanent partition of Palestine. The
Zionist leadership was sometimes willing to accept partition as a first
step, but this was a tactical maneuver and not their real objective. As
David Ben.Gurion put it in the late 1930s, .After the formation of a large
army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we shall abolish
partition and expand to the whole of Palestine..32
To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs
from the territory that would eventually become Israel. There was simply
no other way to accomplish their objective. Ben.Gurion saw the problem
clearly, writing in 1941 that .it is impossible to imagine general
evacuation [of the Arab population] without compulsion, and brutal
compulsion..33 Or as Israeli historian Benny Morris puts it, .the idea of
transfer is as old as modern Zionism and has accompanied its evolution and
praxis during the past century..34
This opportunity came in 1947.48, when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000
Palestinians into exile.35 Israeli officials have long claimed that the
Arabs fled because their leaders told them to, but careful scholarship
(much of it by Israeli historians like Morris) have demolished this myth.
In fact, most Arab leaders urged the Palestinian population to stay home,
but fear of violent death at the hands of Zionist forces led most of them
to flee.36 After the war, Israel barred the return of the Palestinian
exiles.
9 The fact that the creation of Israel entailed a moral crime against the
Palestinian people was well understood by Israel.s leadrs. As Ben.Gurion
told Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, .If I were an
Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have
taken their country. . . . We come from Israel, but two thousand years
ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti.Semitism, the Nazis,
Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we
have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?.37
Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the
Palestinians. national ambitions.38 Prime Minister Golda Meir famously
remarked that .there was no such thing as a Palestinian,. and even Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, nonetheless
opposed creating a full.fledged Palestinian state.39 Pressure from
extremist violence and the growing Palestinian population has forced
subsequent Israeli leaders to disengage rom some of the occupied
territories and to explore territorial compromise, but no Israeli
government has been willing to offer the Palestinians a viable state of
their own. Even Prime Minister Ehud Barak.s purportedly generous offer at
Camp David in July 2000 would only have given the Palestiniansa disarmed
and dismembered set of .Bantustans. under de facto Israeli control.40
Europe.s crimes against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for
Israel.s right to exist. But Israel.s survival is not in doubt.even if
some Islamic extremists make outrageous and unrealistic references to
.wiping it off the map..and the tragic history of the Jewish people does
not obligate the United States to help Israel no matter what it does
today.
.Virtuous Israelis. versus .Evil Arabs.
The final moral argument portrays Israel as a country that has sought
peace at every turn and showed great restraint even when rovoked. The
Arabs, by contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. This
narrative.which is endlessly repeated by Israeli leaders and American
apologists such as Alan Dershowitz.is yet another myth.41 In terms of
actual behavior, Israel.s conduct is not morally distinguishable from the
actions of its opponents.
Israeli scholarship shows that the early Zionists were far from benevolent
towards the Palestinian Arabs.42 The Arab inhabitants did resist the
Zionists. encroachments, which is hardly surprising given that the
Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab lands. The Zionists
responded vigorously, and 10 neither side owns the moral high ground
during this period. This same scholarship also reveals that the creation
of Israel in 1947.48 involved explicit acts of ethnic cleansing, including
executions, massacres, and rapes by Jews.43
Furthermore, Israel.s subsequent conduct towards its Arab adversaries and
its Palestinian subjects has often been brutal, belying any claim to
morally superior conduct. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli
security forces killed between 2,700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the
overwhelming majority of them unarmed.44 The IDF conducted numerous
cross.border raids against its neighbors in the early 1950s, and though
these actions were portrayed as defensive responses, they were actually
part of a broader effort to expand Israel.s borders. Israel.s expansionist
ambitions also led it to join Britain and France in attacking Egypt in
1956, and Israel withdrew from the lands it had conquered only in the face
of intense U.S. pressure. 45
The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners.of.war in both the
1956 and 1967 wars.46 In 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000
Palestinians from the newly.conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians
from the Golan Heights.47 It was also complicit in the massacre of 700
innocent Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps following its
invsion of Lebanon in 1982, and an Israeli investigatory commission found
then.Defence Minister Sharon .personally responsible. for these
atrocities.48
Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners,
systematically humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and
used force indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the
First Intifida (1987.1991), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to
its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian
protestors. The Swedish .Save the Children. organization estimated that
.23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating
injuries in the first two years of the intifida,. with nearly one.third
sustaining broken bones. Nearly one.third of the beaten children were aged
ten and under..49
Israel.s response to the Second Intifida (2000.2005) has been even more
violent, leading Ha.aretz to declare that .the IDF . is turning into a
killing machine whose efficiency is awe.inspiring, yet shocking..50 The
IDF fired one million bullets in the first days of the uprising, which is
far from a measured response.51 Since then, Israel has killed 3.4
Palestinians for every Israeli lost, the majority of whom have been
innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children killed
is even higher (5.7 to 1).52 Israeli forces have also killed several
foreign 11 peace activists, including a 23 year.old American woman crushed
by an Israeli bulldozer in March 2003.53
These facts about Israel.s conduct have been amply documented by numerous
human rights organizations.including prominent Israeli groups.and are not
disputed by fair.minded observers. And that is why four former officials
of Shin Bet (the Israeli domestic security organization) condemned
Israel.s conduct during the Second Intifada in November 2003. One of them
declared .we are behaving disgracefully,. and another termed Israel.s
conduct .patently immoral..54
But isn.t Israel entitled to do whatever it takes to protect its citizens?
Doesn.t the unique evil of terrorism justify continued U.S. support, even
if Israel often responds harshly?
In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either.
Palestinians have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and
their willingness to attack innocent civilians is wrong. This behavior is
not surprising, however, because the Palestinians believe they have no
other way to force Israeli concessions. As former Prime Minister Barak
once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he .would have joined a
terrorist organization..55
Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used terrorism when they
were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their on state.
Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist
bombings to drive the British from Palestine, and took the lives of many
innocent civilians along the way.56 Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N.
mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, because they opposed his proposal
to internationalize Jerusalem.57 Nor were the perpetrators of these acts
isolated extremists: the leaders of the murder plot were eventually
granted amnesty by the Israeli government and one of them was elected to
the Knsset. Another terrorist leader, who approved the murder but was not
tried, was future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, Shamir openly
argued that .neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify
terrorism as a means of combat.. Rather, terrorism had .a great part to
play . in our war against the occupier [Britain]..58 If the Palestinians.
use of terrorism is morally reprehensible today, so was Israel.s reliance
upon it in the past, and thus one cannot justify U.S. support for Israel
on the grounds that its past conduct was morally superior.59
12 Israel may not have acted worse than many other countries, but it
clearly has not acted any better. And if neither strategic nor moral
arguments can account for America.s support for Israel, how are we to
explain it?
THE ISRAEL LOBBY
The explanation lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were it
not for the Lobby.s ability to manipulate the American political system,
the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less
intimate than it is today.
What Is The Lobby?
We use .the Lobby.as a convenient short.hand term for the loose coalition
of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape U.S. foreign
policy in a pro.Israel direction. Our use of this term is not meant to
suggest that .the Lobby.is a unified movement with a central leadership,
or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues
The core of the Lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant
effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it
advances Israel.s interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for
candidates who are pro.Israel to include letter.writing, financial
contributions, and supporting pro.Israel organizations. But not all
Jewish.Americans are part of the Lobby, because Israel is not a salient
issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly 36 percent
of Jewish.Americans said they were either .not very. or .not at all.
emotionally attached to Israel.60
Jewish.Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key
organizations in the Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of
Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally
supported the expansionist policies of Israel.s Likud Party, including its
hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other
hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the
Palestinians, and a few groups.such as Jewish Voice for Peace.strongly
advocate such steps.61 Despite these differences, moderates and hardliners
both support steadfast U.S. support for Israel.
Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli
officials, so that the former can maximize their influence in the United
States. As one activist with a major Jewish organization wrote, .it is
routine for us to say: .This is our 13 policy on a certain issue, but we
must check what the Israelis think.. We as a community do it all the
time..62 There is also a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy,
and Jewish.American leaders rarely support putting pressure on Israel.
Thus, Edgar Bronfman Sr., the president of the World Jewish Congress, was
accused of .perfidy. when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid.2003
urging Bush to pressure Israel to curb construction of its controversial
.security fence..63 Critics declared that, .It would be obscene at any
time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the president
of the United States to rsist policies being promoted by the government of
Israel..
Similarly, when Israel Policy Forum president Seymour Reich advised
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pressure Israel to reopen a crtical
border crossing in the Gaza Strip in November 2005, critics denounced his
action as .irresponsible behavior,. and declared that, .There is
absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing
against the security.related policies . . . of Israel..64 Recoiling from
these attacks, Reich proclaimed that .the word pressure is not in my
vocabulary when it comes to Israel..
Jewish.Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to
influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and
well.known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their
staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington.65 AIPAC was ranked
second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP), but ahead
of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL.CIO and the National Rifle
Association. A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar
conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in the
Washington.s .muscle rankings..66
The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer,
Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and
Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They
believe Israel.s rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its
expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is contrary to God.s
will.67 In addition, the Lobby.s membership includes neoconservative
gentiles such as John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert
Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former U.N.
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and columnist George Will. 14
Sources of Power
The United States has a divided government that offers many ways to
influence the policy process. As a result, interest groups can shape
policy in many different ways.by lobbying elected representatives and
members of the executive branch, making campaign contributions, voting in
elections, molding public opinion, etc.
Furthermore, special interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when
they are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the populaton is
indifferent. Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about
the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the
rest of the population will not penalize them.
The Israel Lobby.s power flows from its unmatched ability to play this
game of interest group politics. In its basic operations, it is no
different from interest groups like the Farm Lobby, steel and textile
workers, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel Lobby apart is its
extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American
Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway U.S. policy towards
Israel. The Lobby.s activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in
anti.Semitic tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the most
part, the individuals and groups that comprise the Lobby are doing what
other special interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro.Arab
interest groups are weak to non.existent, which makes the Lobby.s task
even easier.68
Strategies for Success
The Lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel.
First, it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both
Congress and the Executive branch to support Israel down the line.
Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker.s own views, the Lobby
tries to make supporting Israel the .smart. political choice.
Second, the Lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel
portrays it in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its
founding and by publicizing Israel.s side in the policy debates of the
day. The goal is to prevent critical commentary about Israel from getting
a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential
to guaranteeing U.S. support, because a 15 candid discussion of
U.S..Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy.
Influencing Congress
A key pillar of the Lobby.s effectiveness is its influence in the U.S.
Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This is in
itself a remarkable situation, because Congress almost never shies away
from contentious issues. Whether the issue is abortion, affirmative
action, health care, or welfare, there is certain to be a lively debate on
Capitol Hill. Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall
silent and there is hardly any debate at all.
One reason for the Lobby.s success with Congress is that some key members
are Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002 that
.My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel..69 One would
think that the number 1 priority for any congressman would be to .protect
America,. but that is not what Armey said. There are also Jewish senators
and congressmen who work to make U.S. foreign policy support Israel.s
interests.
Pro.Israel congressional staffers are another source of the Lobby.s power.
As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once admitted, .There are a lot
of guys at the working level up here [on Capitol Hill] . who happen to be
Jewish, who are willing . to look at certain issues in terms of their
Jewishness .. These are all guys who are in a position to make the
decision in these areas for those senators .. You can get an awful lot
done just at the staff level..70
It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the Lobby.s influence
in Congress. AIPAC.s success is due to its ability to reward legislators
and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those
who challenge it. Money is critical to U.S. elections (as the recent
scandal over lobbyist Jack Abramoff.s various shady dealings reminds us),
and AIPAC makes sure that its friends get strong financial support from
the myriad pro.Israel political action committees. Those seen as hostile
to Israel, on the other hand, can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign
contributions to their political opponents. AIPAC also organizes
letter.writing campaigns and encourages newspaper editors to endorse
pro.Israel candidates.
There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one
example, in 1984 AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois,
who, according to one prominent Lobby figure, had .displayed insensitivity
and even hostility to 16 our concerns.. Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at
the time, explained what happened: .All the Jews in America, from coast to
coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians ..those who
hold public positions now, and those who aspire ..got the message..71
AIPAC prizes its reputation as a formidable adversary, of course, because
it discourages anyone from questioning its agenda.
AIPAC.s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further, however. According to
Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, .It is common for members
of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need
information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional
Research Service, committee staff or administration experts..72 More
importantly, he notes that AIPAC is .often called upon to draft speeches,
work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect
co.sponsors and marshal votes..
The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a foreign
government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress.73 Open debate about
U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy
has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three
main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting
Israel. As former Senator Ernest Hollings (D.SC) noted as he was leaving
office, .You can.t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you
around here..74 Small wonder that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once
told an American audience. .When people ask me how they can help Israel, I
tell them.Help AIPAC..75
Influencing the Executive
The Lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch. That
power derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on
presidential elections. Despite their small numbers in the population
(less than 3 percent), they make large campaign donations to candidates
from both parties. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic
presidential candidates .depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as
60 percent of the money..76 Furthermore, Jewish voters have high turn.out
rates and are concentrated in key states like California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania. Because they matter in close
elections, Presidential candidates go to great lengths not to antagonize
Jewish voters.
Key organizations in the Lobby also directly target the administration in
power. For example, pro.Israel forces make sure that critics of the Jewish
state do not get important foreign.policy appointments. Jimmy Carter
wanted to make George 17 Ball his first secretary of state, but he knew
that Ball was perceived as critical of Israel and that the Lobby would
oppose the appointment.77 This litmus test forces any aspiring policymaker
to become an overt supporter of Israel, which is why public critics of
Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the U.S. foreign
policy establishment.
These constraints still operate today. When 2004 presidential candidate
Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more .even.handed role.
in the Arab.Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of
selling Israel down the river and said his statement was
.irresponsible..78 Virtually all of the top Democrats in the House signed
a hard.hitting letter to Dean criticizing his comments, and the Chicago
Jewish Star reported that .anonymous attackers . are clogging the e.mail
inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning ..without much
evidence ..that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel..79
This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on
Israel.80 His campaign co.chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean
said his own views on the Middle East more closely reflected those of
AIPAC than the more moderate Americans for Peac Now. Dean had merely
suggested that to .bring the sides together,. Washington should act as an
honest broker. This is hardly a radical idea, but it is anathema to the
Lobby, which does not tolerate the idea of even.handedness when it comes
to the Arab.Israeli conflict.
The Lobby.s goals are also served when pro.Israel individuals occupy
important positions in the executive branch. During the Clinton
Administration, for example, Middle East policy was largely shaped by
officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro.Israel
organizations.including Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of
research at AIPAC and co.founder of the pro.Israel Washington Institute
for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving
government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often
visits there.81
These men were among President Clinton.s closest advisors at the Camp
David summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace
process and favored creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only
within the limits of what would be acceptable to Israel.82 In particular,
the American delegation took its cues from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak, coordinated negotiating positions in advance, and did not offer its
own independent proposals for settling the conflict. Not surprisingly,
Palestinian negotiators complained that they were 18 .negotiating with two
Israeli teams ..one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American
flag..83
The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush Administration, whose
ranks include fervently pro.Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John
Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis (.Scooter.) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials
consistently pushed for policies favored by Israel and backed by
organizations in the Lobby.
Manipulating the Media
In addition to influencing government policy directly, the Lobby strives
to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not
want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate
might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently
provide. Accordingly, pro.Israel organizations work hard to influence the
media, think tanks, and academia, because these institutions are critical
in shaping popular opinion.
The Lobby.s perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream
media in good part because most American commentators ae pro.Israel. The
debate among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is
.dominated by people who cannot imagine criticizing Israel..84 He lists 61
.columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel
reflexively and without qualification.. Conversely, Alterman found just
five pundits who consistently criticize Israeli behavior or endorse
pro.Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op.eds
challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favors the
other side.
This pro.Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers.
Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked
that, .Shamir, Sharon, Bibi . whatever those guys want is pretty much fine
by me..85 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent
newspapers like The Chicago Sun.Times and The Washington Times regularly
run editorials that are strongly pro.Israel. Magazines like Commentary,
the New Republic, and the Weekly Standard also zealously defend Israel at
every turn.
Editorial bias is also found in papers like the New York Times. The Times
occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes concedes that the
Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even.handed. In his
memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel
acknowledged 19 the impact his own pro.Israel attitude had on his
editorial choices. In his words: .I was much more deeply devoted to Israel
than I dared to assert.. He goes on: .Fortified by my knowledge of Israel
and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East
commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them
from a pro.Israel perspective.. 86
The media.s reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more
even.handed than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive
to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the
occupied territories without acknowledging Israel.s actual behavior. To
discourage unfavorable reporting on Israel, the Lobby organizes letter
writing campaigns, demonstrations, and boycotts against news outlets whose
content it considers anti.Israel. One CNN executive has said that he
sometimes gets 6,000 e.mail messages in a single day complaining that a
story is anti.Israel.87 Similarly, the pro.Israel Committee for Accurate
Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organized demonstrations outside
National Public Radio stations in 33 cities in May 2003, and it also tried
to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle
East coverage became more sympatheticto Israel.88 Boston.s NPR station,
WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of
these efforts. Pressure on NPR has also come from Israel.s friends in
Congress, who have asked NPR for an internal audit as well as more
oversight of its Middle East coverage.
These factors help explain why the American media contains few criticisms
of Israeli policy, rarely questions Washington.s relationship with Israel,
and only occasionally discusses the Lobby.s profound influence on U.S.
policy.
Think Tanks That Think One Way
Pro.Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important
role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The Lobby created
its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped found WINEP.89
Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel and claims instead that it
provides a .balanced and realistic. perspective on Middle East issues,
this is not the case.90 In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals
who are deeply committed to advancing Israel.s agenda.
The Lobby.s influence in the think tank world extends well beyond WINEP.
Over the past 25 years, pro.Israel forces have established a commanding
presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution,
the 20 Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute,
the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro.Israel, and include few, if
any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.
A good indicator of the Lobby.s influence in the think tank world is the
evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert
on Middle East issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and
former NSC official with a well.deserved reputation for evenhandedness
regarding the Arab.Israeli conflict. Today, however, Brookings.s work on
these issues is conducted through its Saban Center for Middle East
Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, a wealthy Israeli.American
businessman and ardent Zionist.91 The director of the Saban Center is the
ubiquitous Martin Indyk. Thus, what was once a non.partisan policy
institute on Middle East matters is now part of the chorus of largely
pro.Israel think tanks.
Policing Academia
The Lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about Israel on
college campuses, because academic freedom is a core value and because
tenured professors are hard to threaten or silence. Even so, there was
only mild criticism of Israel in the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process
was underway. Criticism rose after that process collapsed and Ariel Sharon
came to power in early 2001, and it became especially intense when the IDF
re.occupied the West Bank in spring 2002 and employed massive force
against the Second Intifada.
The Lobby moved aggressively to .take back the campuses.. New groups
sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers
to U.S. colleges.92 Established groups like the Jewish Council for Public
Affairs and Hillel jumped into the fray, and a new group.the Israel on
Campus Coalition.was formed to coordinate the many groups that now sought
to make Israel.s case on campus. Finally, AIPAC more than tripled its
spending for programs to monitor university activities and to train young
advocates for Israel, in order to .vastly expand the number of students
involved on campus . . . in the national pro.Israel effort..93
The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September
2002, for example, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately
pro.Israel neoconservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that
posted dossiers on 21 suspect academics and encouraged students to report
comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel.94 This
transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted a harsh
reaction and Pipes and Kramer later removed he dossiers, but the website
still invites students to report alleged anti.Israel behavior at U.S.
colleges.
Groups in the Lobby also direct their fire at particular professors and
the universities that hire them. Columbia University, which had the late
Palestinian scholar Edward Said on its faculty, has been a frequent target
of pro.Israel forces. Jonathan Cole, the former Columbia provost, reported
that, .One can be sure that any public statement in support of the
Palestinian people by the preeminent literary critic Edward Said wil
elicit hundreds of e.mails, letters, and journalistic accounts that call
on us to denounce Said and to either sanction or fire him..95 When
Columbia recruited historian Rashid Khalidi from the University of
Chicago, Cole says that .the complaints started flowing in from people who
disagreed with the content of his political views.. Princeton faced the
same problem a few years later when it considered wooing Khalidi away from
Columbia.96
A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late
2004, when the .David Project. produced a propaganda film alleging that
faculty in Columbia University.s Middle East studies program were
anti.Semitic and were intimidating Jewish students who defended Israel.97
Columbia was raked over the coals in pro.Israel circles, but a faculty
committee assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of
anti.Semitism and the only incident worth noting was the possibility that
one professor had .responded heatedly. to a student.s question.98 The
committee also discovered that the accused professors had been the target
of an overt intimidation campaign.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this campaign to eliminate criticism
of Israel from college campuses is the effort by Jewsh groups to push
Congress to establish mechanisms that monitor what professors say about
Israel.99 Schools judged to have an anti.Israel bias would be denied
Federal funding. This effort to get the U.S. government to police campuses
have not yet succeeded, but the attempt illustrates the importance
pro.Israel groups place on controlling debate on these issues.
Finally, a number of Jewish philanthropists have established Israel
studies programs (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programs
that already exist) so as to increase the number of Israel.friendly
scholars on campus.100 NYU 22 announced the establishment of the Taub
Center for Israel Studies on May 1, 2003, and similar programs have been
established at other schools like Berkeley, Brandeis, and Emory. Academic
administrators emphasize the pedagogical value of these programs, but the
truth is that they are intended in good part to promote Israel.s image on
campus. Fred Laffer, the head of the Taub Foundation, makes clear that his
foundation funded the NYU center to help counter the .Arabic [sic] point
of view. that he thinks is prevalent in NYU.s Middle East programs.101
In sum, the Lobby has gone to considerable lengths to insulate Israel from
criticism on college campuses. It has not been as successful in academia
as it has been on Capitol Hill, but it has worked hard to stifle criticism
of Israel by professors and students and there is much less of it on
campuses today102
The Great Silencer
No discussion of how the Lobby operates would be complete without
examining one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of anti.Semitism.
Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro.Israel groups have
significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy.an influence that AIPAC
celebrates.stands a good chance of getting labeled an anti.Semite. In
fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel Lobby runs the risk of being
charged with anti.Semitism, even though the Israeli media themselves refer
to America.s .Jewish Lobby.. In effect, the Lobby boasts of its own power
and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it. This tactic is very
effective, because anti.Semitism is loathsome and no responsible person
wants to be accused of it.
Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticize Israeli
policy in recent years, which some attribute to a resurgence of
anti.Semitism in Europe. We are .getting to a point,. the U.S. Ambassador
to the European Union said in early 2004, .where it is as bad as it was in
the 1930s..103 Measuring anti.Semitism is a complicated matter, but the
weight of evidence points in the opposite direction. For example, in the
spring of 2004, when accusations of European anti.Semitism filled the air
in America, separate surveys of European public opinion conducted by the
Anti.Defamation League and the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press showed that it was actually declining.104
Consider France, which pro.Israel forces often portray as the most
anti.Semitic state in Europe. A poll of French citizens in 2002 found
that: 89 percent could envisage living with a Jew; 97 percent believe
making anti.Semitic graffiti is a 23 serious crime; 87 percent think
attacks on French synagogues are scandalous; and 85 percent of practicing
French Catholics reject the charge that Jews have too much influence in
business and finance.105 It is unsurprising that the head of the French
Jewish community declared in the summer of 2003 that .France is not more
anti.Semitic than America..106 According to a recent article in Ha.aretz,
the French police report that anti.Semitic incidents in France declined by
almost 50 per cent in 2005; and this despite the fact that France has the
largest Muslim population of any country in Europe.107
Finally, when a French Jew was brutally murdered last month by a Muslim
gang, tens of thousands of French demonstrators poured into the streets to
condemn anti.Semitism. Moreover, President Jacques Chirac and Prime
Minister Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim.s memorial service
in a public showof solidarity with French Jewry.108 It is also worth
noting that in 2002 more Jews immigrated to Germany than Israel, making it
.the fastest growing Jewish community in the world,. according to an
article in the Jewish newspaper Forward.109 If Europe were really heading
back to the 1930s, it is hard to imagine that Jews would be moving there
in large numbers.
We recognize, however, that Europe is not free of the scourge of
anti.Semitism. No one would deny that there are still some virulent
autochthonous anti.Semites in Europe (as there are in the United States)
but their numbers are small and their extreme views are rejected by the
vast majority of Europeans. Nor would one deny that there is anti.Semitism
among European Muslims, some of it provoked by Israel.s behavior towards
the Palestinians and some of it straightforwardly racist. 110 This problem
is worrisome, but it is hardly out of control. Muslims constitute less
than five percent of Europe.s total population, and European governments
are working hard to combat the problem. Why? Because most Europeans reject
such hateful views.111 In short, when it comes to anti.Semitism, Europe
today bears hardly any resemblance to Europe in the 1930s.
This is why pro.Israel forces, when pressed to go beyond assertion, claim
that there is a .new anti.Semitism., which they equate with criticism of
Israel.112 In other words criticize Israeli policy and you are by
definition an anti.Semite. When the synod of the Church of England
recently voted to divest from Caterpillar Inc on the grounds that
Caterpillar manufacures the bulldozers used to demolish Palestinian homes,
the Chief Rabbi complained that it would .have the most adverse
repercussions on ... Jewish.Christian relations in Britain., while Rabbi
Tony Bayfield, the head of the Reform movement, said: ..There is a clear
problem of anti.Zionist .verging on anti.Semitic .attitudes emerging in
the grass 24 roots, and even in the middle ranks of the Church..113
However, the Church was neither guilty of anti.Zionism nor anti.Semitism;
it was merely protesting Israeli policy.114
Critics are also accused of holding Israel to an unfair standard or
questioning its right to exist. But these are bogus charges too. Western
critics of Israel hardly ever question its right to exist. Instead, they
question its behavior towards the Palestinians, which is a legitimate
criticism: Israelis question it themselves. Nor is Israel being judged
unfairly. Rather, Israeli treatment of the Palestinians elicits criticism
because it is contrary to widely.accepted human rights norms and
international law, as well as the principle of national
self.determination. And it is hardly the only state that has faced sharp
criticism on these grounds.
In sum, other ethnic lobbies can only dream of having the political muscle
that pro.Israel organizations possess. The question, therefore, is what
effect does the Lobby have on U.S. foreign policy?
THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG
If the Lobby.s impact were confined to U.S. economic aid to Israel, its
influence might not be that worrisome. Forei

Perchè l'America non cambierà è la politica straniera di MiddleEast
Automatically translated into Italian thanks to WorldLingo
Studio de Harvard: L'ingresso dell'Israele e gli Stati Uniti La pagina stampabile
di politica straniera
si è seduta, 2006-03-18 14:34 - il admin
John J. Mearsheimer e
Stephen M. Walt
John F. Scuola del Kennedy dell'università di Harvard di governo
il marzo 2006
Stati Uniti la politica straniera modella gli eventi in ogni angolo del globo. Nessuna parte è
questa più allineare di nel Medio Oriente, una regione di instabilità di ricorso e
di importanza strategica enorme. Il più recentemente, il tentativo di Bush
Administration.s di trasformare la regione in una Comunità delle democrazie ha aiutato
i prodotti un insurency resiliente in Irak, un brusco aumento nei prezzi del petrolio del mondo
e nei bombardamenti del terrorista a Madrid, Londra ed Amman. Con così tanto in gioco
per tanti, tutti i paesi devono capire le forze che guidano gli Stati Uniti
Politica di Medio Oriente.
Gli Stati Uniti l'interesse nazionale dovrebbe essere l'obiettivo primario della politica
straniera americana. Per il passato parecchie decadi, tuttavia e particolarmente
dalla guerra di sei giorni in 1967, il centro degli Stati Uniti La politica di Medio Oriente
è stata il relativo rapporto con l'Israele. La combinazione degli Stati Uniti costanti
il sostegno l'Israele e lo sforzo relativo spargere la democrazia durante
la regione inflamed l'opinione araba ed islamica e eopardized gli Stati Uniti
sicurezza.
Questa situazione non ha uguale nella storia politica americana. Perchè
gli Stati Uniti sono stati disposti a mettere la relativa propria sicurezza da parte per
avanzare gli interessi di un altro dichiarano? Si potrebbe supporre che il legame
fra i due paesi è basato sugli interessi strategici comuni o
sui imperativs morali costringenti. Come mostriamo sotto, tuttavia, nessuno di quelle
spiegazioni possono rappresentare il livello notevole di supporto materiale
e diplomatico quel i povides degli Stati Uniti nell'Israele.
Invece, la spinta generale degli Stati Uniti la politica nella regione è dovuta quasi
interamente negli Stati Uniti politica domestica e particolarmente alle attività
del. Ingresso dell'Israele. Altri gruppi di interesse comune speciale sono riuscito a dare
agli Stati Uniti una direzione obliqua politica straniera nei sensi che hanno favorito, ma nessun ingresso è riuscito
a deviare gli Stati Uniti politica straniera come lontano da che cosa l'interesse nazionale
americano suggerirebbe al contrario, mentre simultaneamente convincendo
gli Americani che gli Stati Uniti e gli interessi israeliani sono essenzialmente identical.1
nelle pagine che seguono, noi descrivono come l'ingresso ha compiuto questa
abilità e come le relative attività hanno modellato le azioni di America.s in questa
regione critica. Dato importanza strategica del Medio Oriente e del relativo
effetto potenziale su altri, entrambi gli Americani e non. Gli Americani devono
capire e richiamare l'influenza di Lobby.s sugli Stati Uniti politica. 1
alcuni lettori scoprirà che questa analisi si disturba, ma i fatti raccontati
qui non sono nella disputa seria fra gli eruditi. Effettivamente, il nostro cliente conta
pesante sul lavoro degli eruditi e dei giornalisti israeliani, che meritano l'accreditamento
grande per la luce di spargimento su queste edizioni. Inoltre contiamo su prova
fornita dalle organizzazioni israeliane ed internazionali rispettate di diritti dell'uomo
. Similmente, i nostri reclami circa l'effetto di Lobby.s contano
sulla testimonianza dal Lobby.s possiedono i membri, così come la testimonianza
dai politici che hanno lavorato con loro. I lettori possono rifiutare le nostre conclusioni,
naturalmente, ma la prova su cui si riposa non è discutibile.
IL BENEFACTOR GRANDE
dalla guerra di ottobre in 1973, Washington ha fornito all'Israele un livello
di supporto che dwarfing gli importi forniti a qualsiasi altro dichiara. È stato
il più grande destinatario annuale degli Stati Uniti diretti assistenza economica e
militare dal 1976 ed il più grande destinatario totale dalla seconda guerra mondiale.
Totale Stati Uniti diretti il sussidio agli importi dell'Israele a bene oltre $140 miliardo in 2003
dollars.2 Israele riceve ogni anno circa $3 miliardo nell'assistenza straniera
diretta, che è approssimativamente one.fifth del preventivo del sussidio straniero di America.s.
Per capita nei termini, gli Stati Uniti danno ciascuno israeliano un valore diretto
di sovvenzione circa $500 per year.3 questo largesse sta colpendo particolarmente quando si
si rende conto che l'Israele è ora un industriale ricco dichiara con per capita
un incom approssimativamente uguale in Corea del sud o Spain.4
Israele inoltre ottiene ad altri affari speciali da Washington.5 l'altro sussidio che
destinatari ottengono i loro soldi nelle rate trimestrali, ma l'Israele riceve
la relativa intera appropriazione all'inizio di ogni esercizio fiscale e così
guadagna l'interesse supplementare. La maggior parte dei destinatari di assistenza militare americana
sono tenuti a spendergli tutto l'negli Stati Uniti, ma l'Israele può usare
approssimativamente i percento di twenty.five della relativa assegnazione del sussidio per sovvenzionare la relativa propria
industria della difesa. L'Israele è l'unico destinatario che non deve
rappresentare come il sussidio è speso, un'esenzione che le marche esso virtualmente
impossible impedire i soldi usando per di scopi unito
dichiara oppone, come gli stabilimenti della costruzione nella Riva a Ovest.
Inoltre, gli Stati Uniti hanno fornito all'Israele quasi $3 miliardo
per sviluppare i sistemi di armi come il velivolo di Lavi di che il pentagono
non ha desiderato o non avuto bisogno, mentre dando accesso dell'Israele a top.drawer Stati Uniti l'armamento gradisce
gli elicotteri di Blackhawk ed i getti F.16. Per concludere, gli Stati Uniti danno
l'accesso dell'Israele ad intelligenza che negano i relativi alleati di NATO ed
hanno girato un occhio cieco verso aquisizione di Israels di weapons.6 nucleare
2 in più, Washington forniscono all'Israele supporto diplomatico
costante. Dal 1982, gli Stati Uniti hanno vetoed 32 risoluzioni
che erano critiche dell'Israele, un numero del Consiglio di sicurezza delle Nazioni Unite
più grande di il totale unito del getto di veti da tutto il altro Consiglio
di sicurezza members.7 che inoltre ostruisce l'arabo dichiara. gli sforzi mettere l'arsenale
nucleare di Israel.s sull'energia atomica internazionale Agency.s agenda.8
gli Stati Uniti inoltre viene al salvataggio di Israel.s nel wartime e prende il relativo
lato quando negozia la pace. La gestione re.supplied Israele durante
la guerra di ottobre ed Israele protetto del Nixon dalla minaccia di intervento
sovietico. Washington profondamente è stata coinvolta nelle trattative che
hanno concluso quella guerra così come il .step.by.step lungo. procedi quello
seguito, appena come ha svolto un ruolo chiave nelle trattative che hanno preceduto
e seguito Oslo 1993 Accords.9 là erano attriti occasionali
fra gli Stati Uniti ed i funzionari israeliani in entrambi i casi, ma gli Stati Uniti
hanno coordinato molto attentamente le relative posizioni con l'Israele e costantemente hanno sostenuto
il metodo israeliano ai negotitions. Effettivamente, un partecipante americano
all'accampamento David (2000) più successivamente ha detto, .far troppo spesso, abbiamo funzionato. . . come
Israel.s lawyer..10
come discusso sotto, Washington ha dato all'Israele la latitudine larga nell'occuparsi
dei territori occupati (la Riva a Ovest e la striscia di Gaza), anche quando
le relative azioni erano in disaccordo con gli Stati Uniti dichiarati politica. Inoltre, la strategia
ambiziosa di Bush Administration.s per trasformare il Medio Oriente .beginning
con l'invasione di Iraq.is ha inteso almeno parzialmente migliorare la situazione
strategica di Israel.s. Oltre alle alleanze di wartime, è duro pensare
ad un altro caso dove un paese ha fornito un altro un livello
simile di materiale e di diplomaticsupport per così periodo esteso.
Il sostegno di America.s l'Israele è, in breve, unico.
Questo generosity straordinario potrebbe essere comprensibile se l'Israele fosse
un bene strategico vitale o se ci fosse un caso costringente di mora per
gli Stati Uniti continui protezione. Ma né l'unoa né l'altro spiegazione razionale sta convincendo.
UNA RESPONSABILITÀ STRATEGICA
secondo il Web site di affari pubblici Committee.s (AIPAC)
di American.Israel, .the Stati Uniti e l'Israele hanno formato un'associazione unica
per venire a contatto delle minacce strategiche crescenti nel Medio Oriente. . . . Questo
sforzo cooperativo fornisce i benefici significativi per entrambi uniti
dichiara e questo reclamo Israel..11 è un articolo di fede fra i sostenitori
di Israel.s ed ordinariamente è invocato dai politici israeliani e pro. Americani
dell'Israele.
3 Israele possono essere un bene strategico durante il War.12 freddo servendo
come procura di America.s dopo la War di sei giorni (1967), l'Israele contribuito a contenere
l'espansione sovietica nella regione ed hanno inflitto le sconfitte d'umiliazione sui clienti
sovietici come l'Egitto e la Siria. L'Israele contribuito occasionalmente a proteggere gli altri
Stati Uniti gli alleati (come il re Hussein di Jordan.s) ed il relativo prowess militare hanno forzato
Mosca per spendere più protezione i relativi clienti perdenti. L'Israele inoltre ha dato
agli Stati Uniti l'intelligenza utile circa le possibilità sovietiche.
Il valore strategico di Israel.s durante questo periodo non dovrebbe essere esagerato,
however.13 la protezione Israele non era poco costosa ed ha complicato i rapporti
di America.s con il mondo arabo. Per esempio, gli Stati Uniti la decisione per dare
all'Israele $2.2 miliardo nel sussidio militare di emergenza durante la guerra di ottobre
ha innescato un embargo dell'olio dell'OPEC che ha inflitto le economie occidentali considerevoli di danni
o. Inoltre, i militari di Israel.s non potrebbero proteggere gli Stati Uniti interessi
nella regione. Per esempio, gli Stati Uniti non hanno potuto contare sull'Israele quando
la rivoluzione iraniana in 1979 inquietudini suscitate circa la sicurezza
delle forniture di petrolio persiane di Glf ed hanno dovuto generare il relativi propri. Forza veloce
di schieramento. invece.
Anche se l'Israele fosse un bene strategico durante la guerra fredda, la prima guerra
di golfo (1990.91) ha rivelato che l'Israele stava trasformando in in una difficoltà strategica.
Gli Stati Uniti non hanno potuto usare le basi israeliane durante la guerra senza rompersi
anti. La coalizione di Irak ed esso hanno dovuto deviare le risorse (per esempio, batterie
del missile del Patriot) per mantenere Tel Aviv dal fare qualche cosa che potrebbe
fratturare l'alleanza contro Saddam. La storia si è ripetuta in 2003:
anche se l'Israele era desideroso affinchè gli Stati Uniti attacchi Saddam,
il presidente Bush non potrebbe chiedergli per aiutare senza innescare l'opposizione
araba. Così l'Israele ha rimasto sui sidelines again.14
che cominciano negli anni 90 e particolarmente dopo 9/11, Stati Uniti il sostegno l'Israele
è stato giustificato dal reclamo che entrambi dichiarano sono minacciati
dai gruppi del terrorista che provengono dal mondo musulmano di Arabor e da un insieme
di .rogue dichiara. che posteriore questi gruppi e ricerca WMD. Questa spiegazione razionale implica
che Washington dovrebbe dare all'Israele una mano libera trattando
i Palestinesi e non la pressa Israele t fa le concessioni fino a che tutti i terroristi
palestinesi non siano incarcerati o morti. Inoltre implica che gli Stati Uniti
dovrebbero andare dopo i paesi come la Repubblica islamica di Al dell'Iran,
del Saddam Hussein.s Irak e di Bashar. Assad.s Siria. L'Israele è visto così come
alleato cruciale nella guerra con terrore, perché i relativi nemici sono nemici
di America.s.
Questa nuova spiegazione razionale sembra convincente, ma l'Israele è in effetti una responsabilità
nella guerra con terrore ed il più vasto sforzo occuparsi di rogue dichiara.
4 per cominciare con, .terrorism. è una tattica impiegata tramite una grande selezione
dei gruppi politici; non è un singolo avversario unificato. Le organizzazioni
del terrorista che minacciano l'Israele (per esempio, Hamas o Hezbollah)
non minacciano gli Stati Uniti, tranne quando intervengono contro di loro (come
nel Libano in 1982). Inoltre, il terrorismo palestinese non è violenza casuale
diretta contro l'Israele o l'ovest di .the. ; è in gran parte una risposta
alla campagna prolungata Israel.s per colonizzare la Riva a Ovest e la striscia di Gaza.
Più d'importanza, ad esempio che l'Israele e gli Stati Uniti sono uniti
da una minaccia comune del terrorista ha il rapporto causale indietro: piuttosto,
gli Stati Uniti hanno un problema nella buona parte perché sono alleati così
molto attentamente con l'Israele, non l'altro senso di terrorismo intorno. Gli Stati Uniti il sostegno
l'Israele non è l'unica fonte di anti. Terrorismo americano, ma è
importante e fa la vincita della guerra con terrore che più difficult.15
là è domanda, per esempio, che molti capi di Qaeda di Al, compreso
lo scomparto carico, sono motivati da presenza di Israel.s a Gerusalemme e situazione difficile
dei Palestinesi. Secondo gli Stati Uniti 9/11 di Commissione, carico dello scomparto
cercato esplicitamente a punisce gli Stati Uniti per le relative politiche
in Medio Oriente, compreso il relativo sostegno l'Israele e persino ha provato a cronometrare
gli attacchi per evidenziare questo issue.16
ugualmente importante, Stati Uniti incondizionati il sostegno l'Israele lo rende più facile
per gli estremisti come lo scomparto carico per radunare il supporto popolare e per attrarre
le reclute. I sondaggi di opinione pubblica confermano che le popolazioni arabe sono profondamente
ostili a sostegno americano l'Israele e gli Stati Uniti Dichiari il gruppo
consultivo di Department.s sulla diplomazia pubblica per l'arabo ed il mondo musulmano ha trovato
che .citizens in questi paesi genuino sono afflitti alla situazione difficile
dei Palestinesi ed al ruolo percepiscono gli Stati Uniti per essere
playing..17
per quanto riguarda il rogue di so.called dichiara nel Medio Oriente, non è una minaccia
dire negli Stati Uniti vitali interessi, oltre agli Stati Uniti impegno nell'Israele
in se. Anche se gli Stati Uniti hanno un certo numero di disaccordi
con questi regimi, Washington non sarebbe quasi come preoccupata per l'Iran,
Ba.thist Irak, o la Siria era legata non così molto attentamente nell'Israele. Anche se
questi dichiarano acquisti weapons.which nucleare non è ovviamente desirable.it
non sarebbe un disastro strategico per gli Stati Uniti. Nè l'America
nè l'Israele potrebbe essere ricattato da un rogue di nuclear.armed, perché
il blackmailer non potrebbe effettuare la minaccia senza ricevere la rappresaglia
opprimente. Il pericolo di un handoff di .nuclear. ai terroristi è ugualmente
a distanza, perché un rogue dichiara non potrebbe essere sicuro che il trasferimento sarebbe
inosservato o di quello non sarebbe incolpato in seguito e non punito stato. 5
ancora, gli Stati Uniti rapporto con dell'Israele le marche realmente più duro
da occuparsi di questi dichiara. L'arsenale nucleare di Israel.s è una ragione per la quale alcuni
dei relativi vicini desiderano le armi nucleari e minacciando questi dichiara con
gli aumenti del cambiamento di regime soltanto che vogliono. Tuttavia l'Israele non è molto
di un bene quando gli Stati Uniti contemplano usando la forza contro questi
regimi, perché non possono partecipare alla lotta.
In breve, trattando l'Israele come America.s la maggior parte del alleato importante nella campagna
contro il terrorismo e la capacità assorted dei bothexaggerates Israel.s
dei dictatorships di Medio Oriente aiutare su queste edizioni ed ignora i sensi che
le politiche di Israel.s rendono agli Stati Uniti sforzi più difficili.
Il sostegno di Unquestioned l'Israele inoltre indebolisce gli Stati Uniti posizioni fuori
di Medio Oriente. Le elite straniere osservano costantemente gli Stati Uniti come troppo
di appoggio dell'Israele e che pensano che la relativa tolleranza di repressione israeliana
nei territori occupati sia morale ottusa e un handicap nella guerra con
terroism.18 nell'aprile 2004, per esempio, 52 ex diplomatici britannici trasmessi
a Primo Ministro Tony Blair un detto della lettera che il conflitto
di Israel.Palestine ha avuto rapporti di .poisoned fra l'ovest ed i mondi arabi ed
islamici. e che le politiche di Bush e del Primo Ministro Ariel Sharon
erano motivo finale di illegal..19 e
di .one.sided A interrogare il valore strategico avvertente di Israel.s è che
non si comporta come un alleato leale. I funzionari israeliani ignorano frequentemente gli Stati Uniti le richieste
e renege sulle promesse fatte per superare gli Stati Uniti capi (includere oltre gli impegni
per fermare la costruzione di stabilimento e per astenersi da da .tar geted gli assassini.
dei capi palestinesi) .20 inoltre, l'Israele ha fornito gli Stati Uniti sensibili
tecnologia militare a potenziale Stati Uniti i rivale gradiscono la Cina, in che cosa gli Stati Uniti
State Department Inspector.General ha denominato .a modello sistematico e
crescente di transfers..21 non autorizzato secondo gli Stati Uniti Ufficio
generale di contabilità, Israele anche .conducts i funzionamenti di spionaggio
più aggressivi contro gli Stati Uniti di tutto il ally..22 oltre che la cassa
di Jonathan Pollard, che ha dato all'Israele le grandi quantità di materiale classificato
nell'inizio degli anni 80 (che l'Israele secondo come riferito passato sull'Unione Sovietica
per guadagnare più visti dell'uscita per gli ebrei sovietici), una nuova polemica scoppiata
in 2004 quando è stato rivelato che un funzionario chiave di pentagono (Larry Franklin)
aveva comunicato le informazioni classificate ad un diplomatico israeliano, presunto aiutato
da due AIPAC officials.23 Israele è appena l'unico paese che spia
sugli Stati Uniti, ma la relativa compiacenza spiare sui relativi getti principali
del patrono più ulteriormente dubita di sul relativo valore strategico.
6 UN CASO MORALE di DIMINUZIONE
oltre al relativo valore strategico presunto, appoggi di Israel.s inoltre sostengono che
merita gli Stati Uniti incompetenti supporto perché 1) esso è debole e circondato
dai nemici, 2) è una democrazia, che è una forma morale preferibile
del governo; 3) the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and
therefore deserve special treatment, and 4) Israel.s conduct has been
morally superior to its adversaries. behavior.
On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive.
There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel.s existence, but that
is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, Israel.s past and present conduct
offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.
Backing the Underdog?
Israel is often portrayed as weak and besieged, a Jewish David surrounded
by a hostile Arab Goliath. This image has been carefully nurtured by
Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers, but the opposite image is closer
to the truth. Contrary to popular belief, the Zionists had larger,
better.equipped, and better.led forces during the 1947.49 War of
Independence and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won quick and easy
victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in
1967.before large.scale U.S. aid began flowing to Israel.24 These
victories offer eloquent evidence of Israeli patriotism, organizational
ability, and military prowess, but they also reveal that Israel was far
from helpless even in its earliest years.
Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its
conventional forces are far superior to its neighbors and it is the only
state in the region with nuclear weapons. Egypt and Jordan signed peace
treaties with Israel and Saudi Arabia has offered to do so as well. Syria
has lost its Soviet patron, Iraq has been decimated by three disastrous
wars, and Iran is hundreds of miles away. The Palestinians barely have
effective police, let alone a military that could threaten Israel.
According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University.s prestigious Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, .the strategic balance decidedly favors
Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own
military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neghbors..25 If
backing the underdog were a compelling rationale, the United States would
be supporting Israel.s opponents.
7 Aiding a Fellow Democracy?
American backing is often justified by the claim that Israel is a
fellow.democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships. This rationale
sounds convincing, but it cannot account for the current level of U.S.
support. After all, there are many democracies around the world, but none
receives the lavish support that Israel does. The United States has
overthrown democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when
this was thought to advance .S. interests, and it has good relations with
a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic neither justifies
nor explains America.s support for Israel.
The .shared democracy. rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli
democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is
a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are
supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded
as a Jewish state and citizenship is based on the principle of blood
kinship.26 Given this conception of citizenship, it is not surprising that
Israel.s 1.3 million Arabs are treated as second.class citizens, or that a
recent Israeli government commission found that Israel behaves in a
.neglectful and discriminatory. manner towards them.27
Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens
to become citizens themselves, and does not give these spouses the right
to live in Israel. The Israeli human rights organization B.tselem called
this restriction .a racist law that determines who can live here according
to racist criteria..28 Such laws may be understandable given Israel.s
founding principles, but they are not consistent with America.s image of
democracy.
Israel.s democratic status is also undermined by its refusal to grant the
Palestinians a viable state of their own. Israel controls the lives of
about 3.8 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, while colonizing
lands on which the Palestinians have long dwelt. Israel is formally
democratic, but the millions of Palestinians that it controls are denied
full political rights and the .shared democracy. rationale is
correspondingly weakened.
Compensation for Past Crimes
A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the
Christian West, especially the tragic episode of the Holocaust. Because
Jews were persecuted for 8 centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish
homeland, many believe that Israel deserves special treatment from the
United States.
There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy
of anti.Semitism, and that Israel.s creation was an appropriate response
to a long record of crimes. This history, as noted, provides a strong
moral case for supporting Israel.s existence. But the creation of Israel
involved additional crimes against a largely innocent third party: the
Palestinians.
The history of these events is well.understood. When political Zionism
began in earnest in the late 19th century, there were only about 15,000
Jews in Palestine.29 In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95
percent of the population, and though under Ottoman control, they had been
in continuous possession of this territory for 1300 years.30 Even when
Israel was founded, Jews were only about 35 percent of Palestine.s
population and owned 7 percent of the land.31
The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a
bi.national state or accepting a permanent partition of Palestine. The
Zionist leadership was sometimes willing to accept partition as a first
step, but this was a tactical maneuver and not their real objective. As
David Ben.Gurion put it in the late 1930s, .After the formation of a large
army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we shall abolish
partition and expand to the whole of Palestine..32
To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs
from the territory that would eventually become Israel. There was simply
no other way to accomplish their objective. Ben.Gurion saw the problem
clearly, writing in 1941 that .it is impossible to imagine general
evacuation [of the Arab population] without compulsion, and brutal
compulsion..33 Or as Israeli historian Benny Morris puts it, .the idea of
transfer is as old as modern Zionism and has accompanied its evolution and
praxis during the past century..34
This opportunity came in 1947.48, when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000
Palestinians into exile.35 Israeli officials have long claimed that the
Arabs fled because their leaders told them to, but careful scholarship
(much of it by Israeli historians like Morris) have demolished this myth.
In fact, most Arab leaders urged the Palestinian population to stay home,
but fear of violent death at the hands of Zionist forces led most of them
to flee.36 After the war, Israel barred the return of the Palestinian
exiles.
9 The fact that the creation of Israel entailed a moral crime against the
Palestinian people was well understood by Israel.s leadrs. As Ben.Gurion
told Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, .If I were an
Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have
taken their country. . . . We come from Israel, but two thousand years
ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti.Semitism, the Nazis,
Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we
have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?.37
Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the
Palestinians. national ambitions.38 Prime Minister Golda Meir famously
remarked that .there was no such thing as a Palestinian,. and even Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, nonetheless
opposed creating a full.fledged Palestinian state.39 Pressure from
extremist violence and the growing Palestinian population has forced
subsequent Israeli leaders to disengage rom some of the occupied
territories and to explore territorial compromise, but no Israeli
government has been willing to offer the Palestinians a viable state of
their own. Even Prime Minister Ehud Barak.s purportedly generous offer at
Camp David in July 2000 would only have given the Palestiniansa disarmed
and dismembered set of .Bantustans. under de facto Israeli control.40
Europe.s crimes against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for
Israel.s right to exist. But Israel.s survival is not in doubt.even if
some Islamic extremists make outrageous and unrealistic references to
.wiping it off the map..and the tragic history of the Jewish people does
not obligate the United States to help Israel no matter what it does
today.
.Virtuous Israelis. versus .Evil Arabs.
The final moral argument portrays Israel as a country that has sought
peace at every turn and showed great restraint even when rovoked. The
Arabs, by contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. This
narrative.which is endlessly repeated by Israeli leaders and American
apologists such as Alan Dershowitz.is yet another myth.41 In terms of
actual behavior, Israel.s conduct is not morally distinguishable from the
actions of its opponents.
Israeli scholarship shows that the early Zionists were far from benevolent
towards the Palestinian Arabs.42 The Arab inhabitants did resist the
Zionists. encroachments, which is hardly surprising given that the
Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab lands. The Zionists
responded vigorously, and 10 neither side owns the moral high ground
during this period. This same scholarship also reveals that the creation
of Israel in 1947.48 involved explicit acts of ethnic cleansing, including
executions, massacres, and rapes by Jews.43
Furthermore, Israel.s subsequent conduct towards its Arab adversaries and
its Palestinian subjects has often been brutal, belying any claim to
morally superior conduct. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli
security forces killed between 2,700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the
overwhelming majority of them unarmed.44 The IDF conducted numerous
cross.border raids against its neighbors in the early 1950s, and though
these actions were portrayed as defensive responses, they were actually
part of a broader effort to expand Israel.s borders. Israel.s expansionist
ambitions also led it to join Britain and France in attacking Egypt in
1956, and Israel withdrew from the lands it had conquered only in the face
of intense U.S. pressure. 45
The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners.of.war in both the
1956 and 1967 wars.46 In 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000
Palestinians from the newly.conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians
from the Golan Heights.47 It was also complicit in the massacre of 700
innocent Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps following its
invsion of Lebanon in 1982, and an Israeli investigatory commission found
then.Defence Minister Sharon .personally responsible. for these
atrocities.48
Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners,
systematically humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and
used force indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the
First Intifida (1987.1991), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to
its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian
protestors. The Swedish .Save the Children. organization estimated that
.23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating
injuries in the first two years of the intifida,. with nearly one.third
sustaining broken bones. Nearly one.third of the beaten children were aged
ten and under..49
Israel.s response to the Second Intifida (2000.2005) has been even more
violent, leading Ha.aretz to declare that .the IDF . is turning into a
killing machine whose efficiency is awe.inspiring, yet shocking..50 The
IDF fired one million bullets in the first days of the uprising, which is
far from a measured response.51 Since then, Israel has killed 3.4
Palestinians for every Israeli lost, the majority of whom have been
innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children killed
is even higher (5.7 to 1).52 Israeli forces have also killed several
foreign 11 peace activists, including a 23 year.old American woman crushed
by an Israeli bulldozer in March 2003.53
These facts about Israel.s conduct have been amply documented by numerous
human rights organizations.including prominent Israeli groups.and are not
disputed by fair.minded observers. And that is why four former officials
of Shin Bet (the Israeli domestic security organization) condemned
Israel.s conduct during the Second Intifada in November 2003. One of them
declared .we are behaving disgracefully,. and another termed Israel.s
conduct .patently immoral..54
But isn.t Israel entitled to do whatever it takes to protect its citizens?
Doesn.t the unique evil of terrorism justify continued U.S. support, even
if Israel often responds harshly?
In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either.
Palestinians have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and
their willingness to attack innocent civilians is wrong. This behavior is
not surprising, however, because the Palestinians believe they have no
other way to force Israeli concessions. As former Prime Minister Barak
once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he .would have joined a
terrorist organization..55
Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used terrorism when they
were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their on state.
Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist
bombings to drive the British from Palestine, and took the lives of many
innocent civilians along the way.56 Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N.
mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, because they opposed his proposal
to internationalize Jerusalem.57 Nor were the perpetrators of these acts
isolated extremists: the leaders of the murder plot were eventually
granted amnesty by the Israeli government and one of them was elected to
the Knsset. Another terrorist leader, who approved the murder but was not
tried, was future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, Shamir openly
argued that .neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify
terrorism as a means of combat.. Rather, terrorism had .a great part to
play . in our war against the occupier [Britain]..58 If the Palestinians.
use of terrorism is morally reprehensible today, so was Israel.s reliance
upon it in the past, and thus one cannot justify U.S. support for Israel
on the grounds that its past conduct was morally superior.59
12 Israel may not have acted worse than many other countries, but it
clearly has not acted any better. And if neither strategic nor moral
arguments can account for America.s support for Israel, how are we to
explain it?
THE ISRAEL LOBBY
The explanation lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were it
not for the Lobby.s ability to manipulate the American political system,
the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less
intimate than it is today.
What Is The Lobby?
We use .the Lobby.as a convenient short.hand term for the loose coalition
of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape U.S. foreign
policy in a pro.Israel direction. Our use of this term is not meant to
suggest that .the Lobby.is a unified movement with a central leadership,
or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues
The core of the Lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant
effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it
advances Israel.s interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for
candidates who are pro.Israel to include letter.writing, financial
contributions, and supporting pro.Israel organizations. But not all
Jewish.Americans are part of the Lobby, because Israel is not a salient
issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly 36 percent
of Jewish.Americans said they were either .not very. or .not at all.
emotionally attached to Israel.60
Jewish.Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key
organizations in the Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of
Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally
supported the expansionist policies of Israel.s Likud Party, including its
hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other
hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the
Palestinians, and a few groups.such as Jewish Voice for Peace.strongly
advocate such steps.61 Despite these differences, moderates and hardliners
both support steadfast U.S. support for Israel.
Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli
officials, so that the former can maximize their influence in the United
States. As one activist with a major Jewish organization wrote, .it is
routine for us to say: .This is our 13 policy on a certain issue, but we
must check what the Israelis think.. We as a community do it all the
time..62 There is also a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy,
and Jewish.American leaders rarely support putting pressure on Israel.
Thus, Edgar Bronfman Sr., the president of the World Jewish Congress, was
accused of .perfidy. when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid.2003
urging Bush to pressure Israel to curb construction of its controversial
.security fence..63 Critics declared that, .It would be obscene at any
time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the president
of the United States to rsist policies being promoted by the government of
Israel..
Similarly, when Israel Policy Forum president Seymour Reich advised
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pressure Israel to reopen a crtical
border crossing in the Gaza Strip in November 2005, critics denounced his
action as .irresponsible behavior,. and declared that, .There is
absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing
against the security.related policies . . . of Israel..64 Recoiling from
these attacks, Reich proclaimed that .the word pressure is not in my
vocabulary when it comes to Israel..
Jewish.Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to
influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and
well.known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their
staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington.65 AIPAC was ranked
second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP), but ahead
of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL.CIO and the National Rifle
Association. A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar
conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in the
Washington.s .muscle rankings..66
The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer,
Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and
Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They
believe Israel.s rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its
expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is contrary to God.s
will.67 In addition, the Lobby.s membership includes neoconservative
gentiles such as John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert
Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former U.N.
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and columnist George Will. 14
Sources of Power
The United States has a divided government that offers many ways to
influence the policy process. As a result, interest groups can shape
policy in many different ways.by lobbying elected representatives and
members of the executive branch, making campaign contributions, voting in
elections, molding public opinion, etc.
Furthermore, special interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when
they are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the populaton is
indifferent. Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about
the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the
rest of the population will not penalize them.
The Israel Lobby.s power flows from its unmatched ability to play this
game of interest group politics. In its basic operations, it is no
different from interest groups like the Farm Lobby, steel and textile
workers, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel Lobby apart is its
extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American
Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway U.S. policy towards
Israel. The Lobby.s activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in
anti.Semitic tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the most
part, the individuals and groups that comprise the Lobby are doing what
other special interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro.Arab
interest groups are weak to non.existent, which makes the Lobby.s task
even easier.68
Strategies for Success
The Lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel.
First, it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both
Congress and the Executive branch to support Israel down the line.
Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker.s own views, the Lobby
tries to make supporting Israel the .smart. political choice.
Second, the Lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel
portrays it in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its
founding and by publicizing Israel.s side in the policy debates of the
day. The goal is to prevent critical commentary about Israel from getting
a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential
to guaranteeing U.S. support, because a 15 candid discussion of
U.S..Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy.
Influencing Congress
A key pillar of the Lobby.s effectiveness is its influence in the U.S.
Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This is in
itself a remarkable situation, because Congress almost never shies away
from contentious issues. Whether the issue is abortion, affirmative
action, health care, or welfare, there is certain to be a lively debate on
Capitol Hill. Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall
silent and there is hardly any debate at all.
One reason for the Lobby.s success with Congress is that some key members
are Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002 that
.My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel..69 One would
think that the number 1 priority for any congressman would be to .protect
America,. but that is not what Armey said. There are also Jewish senators
and congressmen who work to make U.S. foreign policy support Israel.s
interests.
Pro.Israel congressional staffers are another source of the Lobby.s power.
As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once admitted, .There are a lot
of guys at the working level up here [on Capitol Hill] . who happen to be
Jewish, who are willing . to look at certain issues in terms of their
Jewishness .. These are all guys who are in a position to make the
decision in these areas for those senators .. You can get an awful lot
done just at the staff level..70
It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the Lobby.s influence
in Congress. AIPAC.s success is due to its ability to reward legislators
and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those
who challenge it. Money is critical to U.S. elections (as the recent
scandal over lobbyist Jack Abramoff.s various shady dealings reminds us),
and AIPAC makes sure that its friends get strong financial support from
the myriad pro.Israel political action committees. Those seen as hostile
to Israel, on the other hand, can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign
contributions to their political opponents. AIPAC also organizes
letter.writing campaigns and encourages newspaper editors to endorse
pro.Israel candidates.
There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one
example, in 1984 AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois,
who, according to one prominent Lobby figure, had .displayed insensitivity
and even hostility to 16 our concerns.. Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at
the time, explained what happened: .All the Jews in America, from coast to
coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians ..those who
hold public positions now, and those who aspire ..got the message..71
AIPAC prizes its reputation as a formidable adversary, of course, because
it discourages anyone from questioning its agenda.
AIPAC.s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further, however. According to
Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, .It is common for members
of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need
information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional
Research Service, committee staff or administration experts..72 More
importantly, he notes that AIPAC is .often called upon to draft speeches,
work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect
co.sponsors and marshal votes..
The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a foreign
government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress.73 Open debate about
U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy
has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three
main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting
Israel. As former Senator Ernest Hollings (D.SC) noted as he was leaving
office, .You can.t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you
around here..74 Small wonder that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once
told an American audience. .When people ask me how they can help Israel, I
tell them.Help AIPAC..75
Influencing the Executive
The Lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch. That
power derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on
presidential elections. Despite their small numbers in the population
(less than 3 percent), they make large campaign donations to candidates
from both parties. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic
presidential candidates .depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as
60 percent of the money..76 Furthermore, Jewish voters have high turn.out
rates and are concentrated in key states like California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania. Because they matter in close
elections, Presidential candidates go to great lengths not to antagonize
Jewish voters.
Key organizations in the Lobby also directly target the administration in
power. For example, pro.Israel forces make sure that critics of the Jewish
state do not get important foreign.policy appointments. Jimmy Carter
wanted to make George 17 Ball his first secretary of state, but he knew
that Ball was perceived as critical of Israel and that the Lobby would
oppose the appointment.77 This litmus test forces any aspiring policymaker
to become an overt supporter of Israel, which is why public critics of
Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the U.S. foreign
policy establishment.
These constraints still operate today. When 2004 presidential candidate
Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more .even.handed role.
in the Arab.Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of
selling Israel down the river and said his statement was
.irresponsible..78 Virtually all of the top Democrats in the House signed
a hard.hitting letter to Dean criticizing his comments, and the Chicago
Jewish Star reported that .anonymous attackers . are clogging the e.mail
inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning ..without much
evidence ..that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel..79
This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on
Israel.80 His campaign co.chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean
said his own views on the Middle East more closely reflected those of
AIPAC than the more moderate Americans for Peac Now. Dean had merely
suggested that to .bring the sides together,. Washington should act as an
honest broker. This is hardly a radical idea, but it is anathema to the
Lobby, which does not tolerate the idea of even.handedness when it comes
to the Arab.Israeli conflict.
The Lobby.s goals are also served when pro.Israel individuals occupy
important positions in the executive branch. During the Clinton
Administration, for example, Middle East policy was largely shaped by
officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro.Israel
organizations.including Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of
research at AIPAC and co.founder of the pro.Israel Washington Institute
for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving
government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often
visits there.81
These men were among President Clinton.s closest advisors at the Camp
David summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace
process and favored creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only
within the limits of what would be acceptable to Israel.82 In particular,
the American delegation took its cues from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak, coordinated negotiating positions in advance, and did not offer its
own independent proposals for settling the conflict. Not surprisingly,
Palestinian negotiators complained that they were 18 .negotiating with two
Israeli teams ..one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American
flag..83
The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush Administration, whose
ranks include fervently pro.Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John
Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis (.Scooter.) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials
consistently pushed for policies favored by Israel and backed by
organizations in the Lobby.
Manipulating the Media
In addition to influencing government policy directly, the Lobby strives
to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not
want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate
might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently
provide. Accordingly, pro.Israel organizations work hard to influence the
media, think tanks, and academia, because these institutions are critical
in shaping popular opinion.
The Lobby.s perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream
media in good part because most American commentators ae pro.Israel. The
debate among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is
.dominated by people who cannot imagine criticizing Israel..84 He lists 61
.columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel
reflexively and without qualification.. Conversely, Alterman found just
five pundits who consistently criticize Israeli behavior or endorse
pro.Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op.eds
challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favors the
other side.
This pro.Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers.
Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked
that, .Shamir, Sharon, Bibi . whatever those guys want is pretty much fine
by me..85 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent
newspapers like The Chicago Sun.Times and The Washington Times regularly
run editorials that are strongly pro.Israel. Magazines like Commentary,
the New Republic, and the Weekly Standard also zealously defend Israel at
every turn.
Editorial bias is also found in papers like the New York Times. The Times
occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes concedes that the
Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even.handed. In his
memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel
acknowledged 19 the impact his own pro.Israel attitude had on his
editorial choices. In his words: .I was much more deeply devoted to Israel
than I dared to assert.. He goes on: .Fortified by my knowledge of Israel
and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East
commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them
from a pro.Israel perspective.. 86
The media.s reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more
even.handed than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive
to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the
occupied territories without acknowledging Israel.s actual behavior. To
discourage unfavorable reporting on Israel, the Lobby organizes letter
writing campaigns, demonstrations, and boycotts against news outlets whose
content it considers anti.Israel. One CNN executive has said that he
sometimes gets 6,000 e.mail messages in a single day complaining that a
story is anti.Israel.87 Similarly, the pro.Israel Committee for Accurate
Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organized demonstrations outside
National Public Radio stations in 33 cities in May 2003, and it also tried
to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle
East coverage became more sympatheticto Israel.88 Boston.s NPR station,
WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of
these efforts. Pressure on NPR has also come from Israel.s friends in
Congress, who have asked NPR for an internal audit as well as more
oversight of its Middle East coverage.
These factors help explain why the American media contains few criticisms
of Israeli policy, rarely questions Washington.s relationship with Israel,
and only occasionally discusses the Lobby.s profound influence on U.S.
policy.
Think Tanks That Think One Way
Pro.Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important
role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The Lobby created
its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped found WINEP.89
Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel and claims instead that it
provides a .balanced and realistic. perspective on Middle East issues,
this is not the case.90 In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals
who are deeply committed to advancing Israel.s agenda.
The Lobby.s influence in the think tank world extends well beyond WINEP.
Over the past 25 years, pro.Israel forces have established a commanding
presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution,
the 20 Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute,
the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro.Israel, and include few, if
any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.
A good indicator of the Lobby.s influence in the think tank world is the
evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert
on Middle East issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and
former NSC official with a well.deserved reputation for evenhandedness
regarding the Arab.Israeli conflict. Today, however, Brookings.s work on
these issues is conducted through its Saban Center for Middle East
Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, a wealthy Israeli.American
businessman and ardent Zionist.91 The director of the Saban Center is the
ubiquitous Martin Indyk. Thus, what was once a non.partisan policy
institute on Middle East matters is now part of the chorus of largely
pro.Israel think tanks.
Policing Academia
The Lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about Israel on
college campuses, because academic freedom is a core value and because
tenured professors are hard to threaten or silence. Even so, there was
only mild criticism of Israel in the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process
was underway. Criticism rose after that process collapsed and Ariel Sharon
came to power in early 2001, and it became especially intense when the IDF
re.occupied the West Bank in spring 2002 and employed massive force
against the Second Intifada.
The Lobby moved aggressively to .take back the campuses.. New groups
sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers
to U.S. colleges.92 Established groups like the Jewish Council for Public
Affairs and Hillel jumped into the fray, and a new group.the Israel on
Campus Coalition.was formed to coordinate the many groups that now sought
to make Israel.s case on campus. Finally, AIPAC more than tripled its
spending for programs to monitor university activities and to train young
advocates for Israel, in order to .vastly expand the number of students
involved on campus . . . in the national pro.Israel effort..93
The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September
2002, for example, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately
pro.Israel neoconservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that
posted dossiers on 21 suspect academics and encouraged students to report
comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel.94 This
transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted a harsh
reaction and Pipes and Kramer later removed he dossiers, but the website
still invites students to report alleged anti.Israel behavior at U.S.
colleges.
Groups in the Lobby also direct their fire at particular professors and
the universities that hire them. Columbia University, which had the late
Palestinian scholar Edward Said on its faculty, has been a frequent target
of pro.Israel forces. Jonathan Cole, the former Columbia provost, reported
that, .One can be sure that any public statement in support of the
Palestinian people by the preeminent literary critic Edward Said wil
elicit hundreds of e.mails, letters, and journalistic accounts that call
on us to denounce Said and to either sanction or fire him..95 When
Columbia recruited historian Rashid Khalidi from the University of
Chicago, Cole says that .the complaints started flowing in from people who
disagreed with the content of his political views.. Princeton faced the
same problem a few years later when it considered wooing Khalidi away from
Columbia.96
A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late
2004, when the .David Project. produced a propaganda film alleging that
faculty in Columbia University.s Middle East studies program were
anti.Semitic and were intimidating Jewish students who defended Israel.97
Columbia was raked over the coals in pro.Israel circles, but a faculty
committee assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of
anti.Semitism and the only incident worth noting was the possibility that
one professor had .responded heatedly. to a student.s question.98 The
committee also discovered that the accused professors had been the target
of an overt intimidation campaign.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this campaign to eliminate criticism
of Israel from college campuses is the effort by Jewsh groups to push
Congress to establish mechanisms that monitor what professors say about
Israel.99 Schools judged to have an anti.Israel bias would be denied
Federal funding. This effort to get the U.S. government to police campuses
have not yet succeeded, but the attempt illustrates the importance
pro.Israel groups place on controlling debate on these issues.
Finally, a number of Jewish philanthropists have established Israel
studies programs (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programs
that already exist) so as to increase the number of Israel.friendly
scholars on campus.100 NYU 22 announced the establishment of the Taub
Center for Israel Studies on May 1, 2003, and similar programs have been
established at other schools like Berkeley, Brandeis, and Emory. Academic
administrators emphasize the pedagogical value of these programs, but the
truth is that they are intended in good part to promote Israel.s image on
campus. Fred Laffer, the head of the Taub Foundation, makes clear that his
foundation funded the NYU center to help counter the .Arabic [sic] point
of view. that he thinks is prevalent in NYU.s Middle East programs.101
In sum, the Lobby has gone to considerable lengths to insulate Israel from
criticism on college campuses. It has not been as successful in academia
as it has been on Capitol Hill, but it has worked hard to stifle criticism
of Israel by professors and students and there is much less of it on
campuses today102
The Great Silencer
No discussion of how the Lobby operates would be complete without
examining one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of anti.Semitism.
Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro.Israel groups have
significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy.an influence that AIPAC
celebrates.stands a good chance of getting labeled an anti.Semite. In
fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel Lobby runs the risk of being
charged with anti.Semitism, even though the Israeli media themselves refer
to America.s .Jewish Lobby.. In effect, the Lobby boasts of its own power
and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it. This tactic is very
effective, because anti.Semitism is loathsome and no responsible person
wants to be accused of it.
Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticize Israeli
policy in recent years, which some attribute to a resurgence of
anti.Semitism in Europe. We are .getting to a point,. the U.S. Ambassador
to the European Union said in early 2004, .where it is as bad as it was in
the 1930s..103 Measuring anti.Semitism is a complicated matter, but the
weight of evidence points in the opposite direction. For example, in the
spring of 2004, when accusations of European anti.Semitism filled the air
in America, separate surveys of European public opinion conducted by the
Anti.Defamation League and the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press showed that it was actually declining.104
Consider France, which pro.Israel forces often portray as the most
anti.Semitic state in Europe. A poll of French citizens in 2002 found
that: 89 percent could envisage living with a Jew; 97 percent believe
making anti.Semitic graffiti is a 23 serious crime; 87 percent think
attacks on French synagogues are scandalous; and 85 percent of practicing
French Catholics reject the charge that Jews have too much influence in
business and finance.105 It is unsurprising that the head of the French
Jewish community declared in the summer of 2003 that .France is not more
anti.Semitic than America..106 According to a recent article in Ha.aretz,
the French police report that anti.Semitic incidents in France declined by
almost 50 per cent in 2005; and this despite the fact that France has the
largest Muslim population of any country in Europe.107
Finally, when a French Jew was brutally murdered last month by a Muslim
gang, tens of thousands of French demonstrators poured into the streets to
condemn anti.Semitism. Moreover, President Jacques Chirac and Prime
Minister Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim.s memorial service
in a public showof solidarity with French Jewry.108 It is also worth
noting that in 2002 more Jews immigrated to Germany than Israel, making it
.the fastest growing Jewish community in the world,. according to an
article in the Jewish newspaper Forward.109 If Europe were really heading
back to the 1930s, it is hard to imagine that Jews would be moving there
in large numbers.
We recognize, however, that Europe is not free of the scourge of
anti.Semitism. No one would deny that there are still some virulent
autochthonous anti.Semites in Europe (as there are in the United States)
but their numbers are small and their extreme views are rejected by the
vast majority of Europeans. Nor would one deny that there is anti.Semitism
among European Muslims, some of it provoked by Israel.s behavior towards
the Palestinians and some of it straightforwardly racist. 110 This problem
is worrisome, but it is hardly out of control. Muslims constitute less
than five percent of Europe.s total population, and European governments
are working hard to combat the problem. Why? Because most Europeans reject
such hateful views.111 In short, when it comes to anti.Semitism, Europe
today bears hardly any resemblance to Europe in the 1930s.
This is why pro.Israel forces, when pressed to go beyond assertion, claim
that there is a .new anti.Semitism., which they equate with criticism of
Israel.112 In other words criticize Israeli policy and you are by
definition an anti.Semite. When the synod of the Church of England
recently voted to divest from Caterpillar Inc on the grounds that
Caterpillar manufacures the bulldozers used to demolish Palestinian homes,
the Chief Rabbi complained that it would .have the most adverse
repercussions on ... Jewish.Christian relations in Britain., while Rabbi
Tony Bayfield, the head of the Reform movement, said: ..There is a clear
problem of anti.Zionist .verging on anti.Semitic .attitudes emerging in
the grass 24 roots, and even in the middle ranks of the Church..113
However, the Church was neither guilty of anti.Zionism nor anti.Semitism;
it was merely protesting Israeli policy.114
Critics are also accused of holding Israel to an unfair standard or
questioning its right to exist. But these are bogus charges too. Western
critics of Israel hardly ever question its right to exist. Instead, they
question its behavior towards the Palestinians, which is a legitimate
criticism: Israelis question it themselves. Nor is Israel being judged
unfairly. Rather, Israeli treatment of the Palestinians elicits criticism
because it is contrary to widely.accepted human rights norms and
international law, as well as the principle of national
self.determination. And it is hardly the only state that has faced sharp
criticism on these grounds.
In sum, other ethnic lobbies can only dream of having the political musc

Warum Amerika nicht ändert, ist es MiddleEast fremde Politik
Automatically translated into German thanks to WorldLingo
Harvard Studie: Die Israel Vorhalle und die US Bedruckbare Seite
der fremden Politik
saß, 2006-03-18 14:34 - admin
John J. Mearsheimer und
Stephen M. Walt
John F. Kennedy Schule der Regierung Universität Harvard
März 2006
US fremde Politik formt Fälle in jeder Ecke der Kugel. Nirgendwo ist
dieses, das als im Mittlere Osten, in einer Region der wiederkehrenden Instabilität und im enormen
strategischen Wert zutreffender ist. Vor kurzem, hat der Bush
Administration.s Versuch, die Region in eine Gemeinschaft von Demokratien umzuwandeln Erzeugnis
ein elastisches insurency im Irak, ein scharfer Aufstieg in den Weltölpreisen und
in den Terroristbombardierungen in Madrid, in London und in Amman geholfen. Mit soviel
für so viele, müssen alle Länder die Kräfte verstehen, die US fahren
Mittlere Ostenpolitik.
Die US Staatsinteresse sollte der Primärgegenstand der amerikanischen fremden
Politik sein. Während der Vergangenheit einige Dekaden, jedoch und besonders
seit dem sechstägigen Krieg 1967, das Mittelstück von US Mittlere Ostenpolitik
ist sein Verhältnis zu Israel gewesen. Die Kombination von standhaften US
Unterstützung, damit Israel und die in Verbindung stehende Bemühung Demokratie während der
Region hat entflammt arabische und islamische Meinung und eopardized US verbreitet
Sicherheit.
Diese Situation hat kein Gleichgestelltes in der amerikanischen politischen Geschichte. Warum sind die
Vereinigten Staaten bereit gewesen, seine eigene Sicherheit beiseite zu setzen, um
die Interessen eines anderen Zustandes vorzurücken? Man konnte annehmen, daß die Bindung
zwischen den zwei Ländern auf geteilten strategischen Interessen oder unwiderstehlichen
moralischen imperativs basiert. Wie wir unten jedoch darstellen können keine
jener Erklärungen das bemerkenswerte Niveau der materiellen und diplomatischen
dieser Unterstützung erklären die Vereinigte Staaten povides nach Israel.
Stattdessen der gesamte Schub von US Politik in der Region ist fast völlig
nach US passend inländische Politik und besonders zu den Tätigkeiten von
. Israel Vorhalle. Andere Interessengruppen haben skew US
gehandhabt fremde Politik in den Richtungen, die sie bevorzugten, aber keine Vorhalle hat gehandhabt
, US umzuleiten fremde Politik wie weit von was das amerikanische
Staatsinteresse anders vorschlagen würde, beim Amerikaner gleichzeitig
überzeugen die US und israelische Interessen sind im Wesentlichen identical.1
in den Seiten, die folgen, wir beschreiben, wie die Vorhalle dieses Meisterstück vollendet
hat und wie seine Tätigkeiten America.s Tätigkeiten in dieser kritischen Region
geformt haben. Den strategischen Wert des Mittlere Ostens und seiner möglichen
Auswirkung auf andere gegeben, beide Amerikaner und nicht. Amerikaner müssen
den Lobby.s Einfluß auf US verstehen und adressieren Politik. 1
einige Leser findet diese Analyse zu stören, aber die Tatsachen, die hier
nachgezählt werden, sind nicht in der ernsten Debatte unter Gelehrten. In der Tat beruht unser Konto
schwer auf der Arbeit der israelischen Gelehrter und der Journalisten, die große Gutschrift
für Sheddinglicht zu diesen Punkten verdienen. Wir bauen auch auf den Beweis, der
von respektierten israelischen und internationalen Organisationen der menschlichen Rechte
bereitgestellt wird. Ähnlich beruhen unsere Ansprüche über die Lobby.s Auswirkung auf
Zeugnis vom Lobby.s besitzen Mitglieder, sowie Zeugnis
von den Politikern, die mit ihnen gearbeitet haben. Leser können unsere Zusammenfassungen zurückweisen,
selbstverständlich aber auf denen der Beweis sie stillstehen, ist nicht umstritten.
DER GROSSE WOHLTÄTER
seit dem Oktober Krieg 1973, Washington hat Israel mit einem Niveau
der Unterstützung die Mengen in den Schatten stellend versehen, die zu jedem möglichem anderen Zustand bereitgestellt werden. Es ist die
größte jährliche Empfänger von direkten US gewesen ökonomische und militärische
Unterstützung seit 1976 und die größte Gesamtempfänger seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.
Gesamtmenge direkte US Hilfsmittel für Israel Mengen zu gut über $140 Milliarde in 2003
dollars.2 Israel empfängt ungefähr $3 Milliarde in der direkten fremden Unterstützung
jedes Jahr, die ungefähr one.fifth America.s des Auslandshilfeetats ist.
Per capita in den Bezeichnungen geben die Vereinigten Staaten israelischem jedem einen direkten Beihilfe
wert über $500 pro year.3, das dieses largesse besonders anschlägt, wenn man
feststellt, daß Israel jetzt ein wohlhabender industrieller Zustand mit einem per capita incom
ist, das nach Südkorea ungefähr gleich ist, oder Spain.4
Israel anderen speziellen Abkommen von Washington.5 anderes Hilfsmittel auch erhält
Empfänger ihr Geld in den vierteljährlichen Ratenzahlungen erhalten, aber Israel empfängt
seine gesamte Bestimmung am Anfang jedes steuerlichen Jahres und erwirbt
folglich Extrainteresse. Die meisten Empfänger der amerikanischen militärischen Unterstützung werden
angefordert, die ganze es in den Vereinigten Staaten aufzuwenden, aber Israel kann twenty.five
Prozente seiner Hilfsmittelzuteilung ungefähr verwenden, um seine eigene Verteidigung
industrie zu subventionieren. Israel ist die einzige Empfänger, die wird nicht erklären
muß, wie das Hilfsmittel ausgegeben, eine Befreiung, der Marken es praktisch unmöglich
, zu verhindern, daß das Geld für Zwecke die vereinigten Zustände entgegensetzt
, wie Gebäuderegelungen in der West Bank verwendet wird.
Außerdem haben die Vereinigten Staaten Israel mit fast $3 Milliarde versehen, um
Waffesysteme wie das Lavi Flugzeug zu entwickeln, das das Pentagon wünschte
nicht oder benötigte, beim Geben des Israel Zuganges zu top.drawer US Kampfmittel mögen
Blackhawk Hubschrauber und Strahlen F.16. Schließlich geben die Vereinigten Staaten
Israel Zugang zur Intelligenz, daß sie seine NATO Verbündeten verweigert und ein
blindes Auge in Richtung zum Israels Erwerb von Kernweapons.6 2 zusätzlich
gedreht hat, Washington versehen Israel mit gleichbleibender diplomatischer
Unterstützung. Seit 1982 haben die Vereinigten Staaten vetoed 32 Nationen
Sicherheit Ratauflösungen, die gegenüber Israel kritisch waren, eine Zahl, die
grösser ist, als die kombinierte Gesamtmenge der Vetoform durch allen anderen Sicherheit
Rat members.7 es auch arabische Zustände blockiert. Bemühungen, Israel.s Kern
arsenal auf die internationale Atomenergie Agency.s agenda.8 zu setzen
die Vereinigten Staaten auch kommt zur Israel.s Rettung im Krieg und nimmt seine
Seite, wenn sie über Frieden verhandeln. Die Nixon Leitung re.supplied Israel
während des Oktober Krieges und geschütztes Israel von der Drohung der sowjetischen
Intervention. Washington wurde tief in die Vermittlungen miteinbezogen, die
diesen Krieg sowie das langatmige .step.by.step beendeten. verarbeiten Sie gefolgtes
das, gerade wie es eine Schlüsselrolle in den Vermittlungen spielte, die das
Oslo 1993 Accords.9 dort waren gelegentliche Friktionen zwischen US vorangingen
und folgten und israelische Beamte in beiden Fällen, aber die Vereinigten Staaten
koordinierten seine Positionen nah mit Israel und unterstützten durchweg die
israelische Annäherung zu den negotitions. In der Tat sagte ein amerikanischer Teilnehmer
am Lager David (2000) später, .far zu häufig, arbeiteten wir. . . als
Israel.s lawyer..10,
wie unten besprochen, hat Washington Israel breite Breite beim Beschäftigen
die besetzten Gegenden (die West Bank und der Gazastreifen) gegeben, selbst wenn
seine Tätigkeiten mit angegebenen US uneins waren Politik. Außerdem beabsichtigte die
Bush Administration.s ehrgeizige Strategie, zum des Mittlere Ostens .beginning
mit der Invasion von Iraq.is umzuwandeln mindestens teils, Israel.s strategische
Situation zu verbessern. Abgesehen von Kriegbündnissen ist es hart, an einen anderen
Fall zu denken, wo ein Land andere mit einem ähnlichen Niveau
des Materials und des diplomaticsupport während solch einer ausgedehnter Periode versehen hat.
America.s Unterstützung für Israel ist, kurz gesagt, einzigartig.
Diese außerordentliche Großzügigkeit konnte verständlich sein, wenn Israel ein lebenswichtiger
strategischer Wert waren, oder wenn es einen unwiderstehlichen mora Fall für unterstützte
US gab Schutzträger. Aber auch nicht Grundprinzip überzeugt.
EINE STRATEGISCHE VERBINDLICHKEIT
entsprechend der American.Israel Web site der öffentlichen Angelegenheiten Committee.s (AIPAC
), .the Vereinigte Staaten und Israel haben eine einzigartige Teilhaberschaft gebildet, um
die wachsenden strategischen Drohungen im Mittlere Osten zu treffen. . . . Diese
kooperative Bemühung stellt bedeutenden Nutzen für beide vereinigten
Zustände zur Verfügung und ist dieser Anspruch Israel..11 ein Artikel des Glaubens unter Israel.s
Verfechtern und wird routinemäßig von den israelischen Politikern und Pro hervorgerufen. Israel
Amerikaner.
3 Israel können ein strategischer Wert während des kalten War.12 gewesen sein, indem sie als
America.s Vollmacht nach sechstägigen War (1967) dienen, geholfenem worden Israel, sowjetische
Expansion in der Region zu enthalten und fügten demütigende Niederlagen auf sowjetischen
Klienten wie Ägypten und Syrien zu. Israel gelegentlich geholfen, andere US
zu schützen Verbündete (wie Jordan.s König Hussein) und seine militärische Fähigkeit zwangen
Moskau, um mehr Schutzträger auszugeben seine Schlussen Klienten. Israel gab den Vereinigten Staaten
nützliche Intelligenz über sowjetische Fähigkeiten auch.
Israel.s strategischer Wert während dieser Periode sollte nicht übertrieben werden,
however.13 war Schutzträger Israel nicht preiswert, und er erschwerte America.s
Relationen mit der arabischen Welt. Z.B. die US die Entscheidung, zum Israel
$2.2 Milliarde im Dringlichkeitsmilitärischen Hilfsmittel während des Oktober Krieges zu geben
löste ein OPEC ölembargo aus, das beträchtliche Beschädigung O westliche Wirtschaftssysteme
zufügte. Außerdem könnte Israel.s Militär nicht US schützen Interessen
an der Region. Z.B. konnten die Vereinigten Staaten nicht auf Israel bauen als
die iranische Revolution in 1979 angehobenen Interessen über die Sicherheit
der persischen Glf öl-Versorgungsmaterialien und mußten seine Selbst verursachen. Schnelle Entwicklung-
Kraft. stattdessen.
Selbst wenn Israel ein strategischer Wert während des kalten Krieges war, deckte der erste
Golf-Krieg (1990.91) auf, daß Israel eine strategische Belastung wurde. Die
Vereinigten Staaten konnten nicht israelische Unterseiten während des Krieges, Anti- benutzen ohne
zu brechen. Der Irak Koalition und es mußten Betriebsmittel (z.B., Patriotflug
batterien) umleiten um Tel Aviv vom Tun alles zu halten, das das
Bündnis gegen Saddam zerbrechen konnte. Geschichte wiederholte sich 2003:
obgleich Israel eifrig war, damit die Vereinigten Staaten Saddam angreifen,
könnte Präsident Bush nicht um um sie bitten, um zu helfen, ohne arabische Opposition
auszulösen. So blieb Israel auf den Nebenerwerben again.14, die
in den neunziger Jahren und besonders nach 9/11, US anfangen Unterstützung für Israel
ist durch den Anspruch, daß beide Zustände von den Terroristgruppen bedroht
werden, die in der Arabor moslemischen Welt entstehen, und durch einen Satz .rogue
Zustände gerechtfertigt worden. daß rückseitig diese Gruppen und Suchvorgang WMD. Dieses Grundprinzip deutet an,
daß Washington Israel eine freie Hand im Umgang mit den Palästinensern geben
sollte und nicht Presse Israel t Zugeständnisse bilden, bis alle palästinensischen
Terroristen oder absolut eingesperrt sind. Es deutet auch an, daß die Vereinigten Staaten
nach Ländern wie der islamischen Republik der Iran, Saddam Hussein.s der Irak
und Bashar des Als gehen sollten. Assad.s Syrien. Israel wird folglich als entscheidendes
Verbündetes im Krieg auf Terror gesehen, weil seine Feinde America.s Feinde
sind.
Dieses neue Grundprinzip scheint überzeugend, aber Israel ist tatsächlich eine Verbindlichkeit
im Krieg auf Terror und in der ausgedehnteren Bemühung, Gaunerzustände zu beschäftigen.
4 mit anfangen, .terrorism. ist eine Taktik, die durch eine breite Reihe politische
Gruppen eingesetzt wird; es ist nicht ein einzelner vereinheitlichter Gegner. Die Terrorist
organisationen, die Israel bedrohen (z.B., Hamas oder Hezbollah) bedrohen
nicht die Vereinigten Staaten, ausgenommen, wenn sie gegen sie eingreift (wie
im Libanon 1982). Außerdem ist palästinensischer Terrorismus nicht die gelegentliche Gewalttätigkeit, die
gegen Israel oder .the Westen verwiesen wird. ; es ist groß eine Antwort
zur Israel.s verlängerten Kampagne, zum der West Bank und des Gazastreifens zu kolonisieren.
Wichtiger, sagen, daß Israel und die Vereinigten Staaten durch eine geteilte Terrorist
drohung vereinigt werden, hat das verursachende Verhältnis rückwärts: eher haben
die Vereinigten Staaten ein Terrorismusproblem im guten Teil, weil sie so nah
mit Israel verbunden wird, nicht die andere Weise herum. US Unterstützung für
Israel ist nicht die einzige Quelle von Anti-. Amerikanischer Terrorismus, aber er ist ein
wichtiges, und er bildet das Gewinnen des Krieges auf Terror, den mehr difficult.15
dort keine Frage ist z.B. die vielen Al Qaeda Führern, einschließlich
das Sortierfach, das beladen ist, durch Israel.s Anwesenheit in Jerusalem und motiviert werden, Lage
der Palästinenser. Entsprechend den US 9/11 Kommission, Sortierfach beladenes
ausdrücklich gesucht zu bestrafen die Vereinigten Staaten für seine politischen Richtlinien im
Mittlere Osten, einschließlich seine Unterstützung für Israel, und er versuchte sogar, Zeit
Angriffe festzusetzen, um dieses wichtige issue.16
gleichmäßig, unbedingte US hervorzuheben Unterstützung für Israel läßt es einfacher
für Extremisten wie das Sortierfach, das populäre Unterstützung sammeln und Rekruten anziehen
beladen ist. Abstimmungen der öffentlichen Meinung bestätigen, daß arabische Bevölkerungen zur amerikanischen
Unterstützung für Israel tief feindlich sind, und die US Geben Sie an, daß Department.s
beratende Gruppe auf allgemeiner Diplomatie für die arabische und moslemische Welt, daß
.citizens in diesen Ländern echt an der Lage der Palästinenser
beunruhigt werden und an der Rolle sie die Vereinigten Staaten wahrnehmen, um playing..17
was
so.called Gaunerzustände anbetrifft im Mittlere Osten zu sein, sie sind nicht eine entsetzliche Drohung
nach lebenswichtige US fand Interessen, abgesehen von den US Verpflichtung nach Israel
selbst. Obgleich die Vereinigten Staaten eine Anzahl von Widersprüchen mit
diesen Regimen haben, würde Washington nicht fast sein, wie um den Iran, Ba.thist
der Irak oder Syrien es nicht so nah gebunden nach Israel gesorgt war. Selbst wenn
diese Zustände erwerben, ist Kernweapons.which offensichtlich nicht desirable.it
würde sein nicht ein strategischer Unfall für die Vereinigten Staaten. Weder konnten
Amerika noch Israel durch einen nuclear.armed Gauner erpreßt werden, weil der
Erpresser nicht die Drohung durchführen könnte, ohne überwältigende Vergeltung
zu empfangen. Die Gefahr einer .nuclear übergabe. zu den Terroristen ist gleichmäßig
entfernt, weil ein Gaunerzustand nicht sicher sein könnte, daß die übertragung unentdeckt sein
würde, oder das sie nicht danach getadelt und bestraft würde. 5
ausserdem, die US Verhältnis Israel wirklich zu den Marken es stark, zum
diese Zustände zu beschäftigen. Israel.s Kernarsenal ist ein Grund, warum einige
seiner Nachbarn Kernwaffen wünschen, und diese Zustände mit Regime
änderung Zunahmen bloß bedrohen, die wünschen. Noch ist Israel nicht viel eines
Wertes, wenn die Vereinigten Staaten erwägen, Kraft gegen diese Regime
aufzuwenden, weil sie nicht am Kampf teilnehmen kann.
Kurz gesagt Israel als America.s ignoriert der meiste wichtige Verbündete in der Kampagne
gegen Terrorismus und sortierte Mittlere Ostendiktaturen bothexaggerates
Israel.s Fähigkeit behandelnd, zu diesen Punkten zu helfen und die Weisen, die
Israel.s politische Richtlinien US bilden Bemühungen schwieriger.
Unquestioned Unterstützung für Israel schwächt auch die US bringen Sie außerhalb des
Mittlere Ostens in Position. Fremde Auslesen sehen durchweg die Vereinigten Staaten an, wie zu
unterstützend von Israel und denken, daß seine Toleranz der israelischen Unterdrückung in den
besetzten Gegenden moralisch stumpf und ein Handikap im Krieg auf terroism.18
im April 2004 z.B. 52 ehemalige britische Diplomaten ist, die
Premierminister Tony Blair einen Buchstabe Saying geschickt werden, daß der Israel.Palestine
Konflikt .poisoned Relationen zwischen dem Westen und den arabischen und islamischen Welten
hatte. und warnender, daß die politischen Richtlinien von Bush und von Premierminister Ariel
Sharon .one.sided und illegal..19 A
abschließender Grund waren zu fragen, Israel.s strategischer Wert ist, daß er nicht
wie ein loyaler Verbündeter fungiert. Israelische Beamte ignorieren häufig US Anträge
und renege auf den Versprechungen, die gebildet werden, um US zu übersteigen Führer (vorüber einschließlich verspricht, um
Regelung Aufbau anzuhalten und .tar zu nehmen zu nehmen geted Ermordungen.
von palästinensischen Führern) .20 außerdem, hat Israel empfindliche US zur Verfügung gestellt
militärische Technologie zum Potential US Rivalen mögen China, in, was die US
Geben Sie die Abteilung an Inspector.General, die .a systematisches und wachsendes Muster
nicht autorisierten transfers..21 entsprechend den US genannt wird Allgemeines
Buchhaltung-Büro, Israel auch .conducts die konkurrenzfähigsten Spionage
betriebe gegen die US von jedem möglichem ally..22 zusätzlich zum Kasten von
Jonathan Pollard, der Israel große Quantitäten des eingestuften Materials
in den frühen achtziger Jahren gab (die Israel angeblich geführt auf die Sowjetunion
, um mehr Ausgang Visa für sowjetische Juden zu gewinnen), brach eine neue Kontroverse
2004 aus, als es aufgedeckt wurde, daß ein Schlüsselpentagonbeamter (Larry Franklin)
einem israelischen Diplomaten eingestufte Informationen geführt hatte, angeblich geholfen
durch zwei AIPAC officials.23 Israel ist kaum das einzige Land, das auf den
Vereinigten Staaten ausspioniert, aber seine Bereitwilligkeit, auf seinen Hauptgönnerformen
auszuspionieren zweifeln weiter auf seinem strategischen Wert.
6 EIN SCHWINDENER MORALISCHER FALL
abgesehen von seinem angeblichen strategischen Wert, Israel.s Beistände argumentieren auch, daß
er unqualifizierte US verdient Unterstützung, weil 1) es schwach und durch Feinde
umgeben ist, 2) ist es eine Demokratie, die eine moralisch vorzuziehende Form der Regierung
ist; 3) the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and
therefore deserve special treatment, and 4) Israel.s conduct has been
morally superior to its adversaries. behavior.
On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive.
There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel.s existence, but that
is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, Israel.s past and present conduct
offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.
Backing the Underdog?
Israel is often portrayed as weak and besieged, a Jewish David surrounded
by a hostile Arab Goliath. This image has been carefully nurtured by
Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers, but the opposite image is closer
to the truth. Contrary to popular belief, the Zionists had larger,
better.equipped, and better.led forces during the 1947.49 War of
Independence and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won quick and easy
victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in
1967.before large.scale U.S. aid began flowing to Israel.24 These
victories offer eloquent evidence of Israeli patriotism, organizational
ability, and military prowess, but they also reveal that Israel was far
from helpless even in its earliest years.
Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its
conventional forces are far superior to its neighbors and it is the only
state in the region with nuclear weapons. Egypt and Jordan signed peace
treaties with Israel and Saudi Arabia has offered to do so as well. Syria
has lost its Soviet patron, Iraq has been decimated by three disastrous
wars, and Iran is hundreds of miles away. The Palestinians barely have
effective police, let alone a military that could threaten Israel.
According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University.s prestigious Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, .the strategic balance decidedly favors
Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own
military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neghbors..25 If
backing the underdog were a compelling rationale, the United States would
be supporting Israel.s opponents.
7 Aiding a Fellow Democracy?
American backing is often justified by the claim that Israel is a
fellow.democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships. This rationale
sounds convincing, but it cannot account for the current level of U.S.
support. After all, there are many democracies around the world, but none
receives the lavish support that Israel does. The United States has
overthrown democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when
this was thought to advance .S. interests, and it has good relations with
a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic neither justifies
nor explains America.s support for Israel.
The .shared democracy. rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli
democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is
a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are
supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded
as a Jewish state and citizenship is based on the principle of blood
kinship.26 Given this conception of citizenship, it is not surprising that
Israel.s 1.3 million Arabs are treated as second.class citizens, or that a
recent Israeli government commission found that Israel behaves in a
.neglectful and discriminatory. manner towards them.27
Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens
to become citizens themselves, and does not give these spouses the right
to live in Israel. The Israeli human rights organization B.tselem called
this restriction .a racist law that determines who can live here according
to racist criteria..28 Such laws may be understandable given Israel.s
founding principles, but they are not consistent with America.s image of
democracy.
Israel.s democratic status is also undermined by its refusal to grant the
Palestinians a viable state of their own. Israel controls the lives of
about 3.8 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, while colonizing
lands on which the Palestinians have long dwelt. Israel is formally
democratic, but the millions of Palestinians that it controls are denied
full political rights and the .shared democracy. rationale is
correspondingly weakened.
Compensation for Past Crimes
A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the
Christian West, especially the tragic episode of the Holocaust. Because
Jews were persecuted for 8 centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish
homeland, many believe that Israel deserves special treatment from the
United States.
There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy
of anti.Semitism, and that Israel.s creation was an appropriate response
to a long record of crimes. This history, as noted, provides a strong
moral case for supporting Israel.s existence. But the creation of Israel
involved additional crimes against a largely innocent third party: the
Palestinians.
The history of these events is well.understood. When political Zionism
began in earnest in the late 19th century, there were only about 15,000
Jews in Palestine.29 In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95
percent of the population, and though under Ottoman control, they had been
in continuous possession of this territory for 1300 years.30 Even when
Israel was founded, Jews were only about 35 percent of Palestine.s
population and owned 7 percent of the land.31
The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a
bi.national state or accepting a permanent partition of Palestine. The
Zionist leadership was sometimes willing to accept partition as a first
step, but this was a tactical maneuver and not their real objective. As
David Ben.Gurion put it in the late 1930s, .After the formation of a large
army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we shall abolish
partition and expand to the whole of Palestine..32
To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs
from the territory that would eventually become Israel. There was simply
no other way to accomplish their objective. Ben.Gurion saw the problem
clearly, writing in 1941 that .it is impossible to imagine general
evacuation [of the Arab population] without compulsion, and brutal
compulsion..33 Or as Israeli historian Benny Morris puts it, .the idea of
transfer is as old as modern Zionism and has accompanied its evolution and
praxis during the past century..34
This opportunity came in 1947.48, when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000
Palestinians into exile.35 Israeli officials have long claimed that the
Arabs fled because their leaders told them to, but careful scholarship
(much of it by Israeli historians like Morris) have demolished this myth.
In fact, most Arab leaders urged the Palestinian population to stay home,
but fear of violent death at the hands of Zionist forces led most of them
to flee.36 After the war, Israel barred the return of the Palestinian
exiles.
9 The fact that the creation of Israel entailed a moral crime against the
Palestinian people was well understood by Israel.s leadrs. As Ben.Gurion
told Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, .If I were an
Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have
taken their country. . . . We come from Israel, but two thousand years
ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti.Semitism, the Nazis,
Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we
have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?.37
Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the
Palestinians. national ambitions.38 Prime Minister Golda Meir famously
remarked that .there was no such thing as a Palestinian,. and even Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, nonetheless
opposed creating a full.fledged Palestinian state.39 Pressure from
extremist violence and the growing Palestinian population has forced
subsequent Israeli leaders to disengage rom some of the occupied
territories and to explore territorial compromise, but no Israeli
government has been willing to offer the Palestinians a viable state of
their own. Even Prime Minister Ehud Barak.s purportedly generous offer at
Camp David in July 2000 would only have given the Palestiniansa disarmed
and dismembered set of .Bantustans. under de facto Israeli control.40
Europe.s crimes against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for
Israel.s right to exist. But Israel.s survival is not in doubt.even if
some Islamic extremists make outrageous and unrealistic references to
.wiping it off the map..and the tragic history of the Jewish people does
not obligate the United States to help Israel no matter what it does
today.
.Virtuous Israelis. versus .Evil Arabs.
The final moral argument portrays Israel as a country that has sought
peace at every turn and showed great restraint even when rovoked. The
Arabs, by contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. This
narrative.which is endlessly repeated by Israeli leaders and American
apologists such as Alan Dershowitz.is yet another myth.41 In terms of
actual behavior, Israel.s conduct is not morally distinguishable from the
actions of its opponents.
Israeli scholarship shows that the early Zionists were far from benevolent
towards the Palestinian Arabs.42 The Arab inhabitants did resist the
Zionists. encroachments, which is hardly surprising given that the
Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab lands. The Zionists
responded vigorously, and 10 neither side owns the moral high ground
during this period. This same scholarship also reveals that the creation
of Israel in 1947.48 involved explicit acts of ethnic cleansing, including
executions, massacres, and rapes by Jews.43
Furthermore, Israel.s subsequent conduct towards its Arab adversaries and
its Palestinian subjects has often been brutal, belying any claim to
morally superior conduct. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli
security forces killed between 2,700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the
overwhelming majority of them unarmed.44 The IDF conducted numerous
cross.border raids against its neighbors in the early 1950s, and though
these actions were portrayed as defensive responses, they were actually
part of a broader effort to expand Israel.s borders. Israel.s expansionist
ambitions also led it to join Britain and France in attacking Egypt in
1956, and Israel withdrew from the lands it had conquered only in the face
of intense U.S. pressure. 45
The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners.of.war in both the
1956 and 1967 wars.46 In 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000
Palestinians from the newly.conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians
from the Golan Heights.47 It was also complicit in the massacre of 700
innocent Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps following its
invsion of Lebanon in 1982, and an Israeli investigatory commission found
then.Defence Minister Sharon .personally responsible. for these
atrocities.48
Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners,
systematically humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and
used force indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the
First Intifida (1987.1991), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to
its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian
protestors. The Swedish .Save the Children. organization estimated that
.23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating
injuries in the first two years of the intifida,. with nearly one.third
sustaining broken bones. Nearly one.third of the beaten children were aged
ten and under..49
Israel.s response to the Second Intifida (2000.2005) has been even more
violent, leading Ha.aretz to declare that .the IDF . is turning into a
killing machine whose efficiency is awe.inspiring, yet shocking..50 The
IDF fired one million bullets in the first days of the uprising, which is
far from a measured response.51 Since then, Israel has killed 3.4
Palestinians for every Israeli lost, the majority of whom have been
innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children killed
is even higher (5.7 to 1).52 Israeli forces have also killed several
foreign 11 peace activists, including a 23 year.old American woman crushed
by an Israeli bulldozer in March 2003.53
These facts about Israel.s conduct have been amply documented by numerous
human rights organizations.including prominent Israeli groups.and are not
disputed by fair.minded observers. And that is why four former officials
of Shin Bet (the Israeli domestic security organization) condemned
Israel.s conduct during the Second Intifada in November 2003. One of them
declared .we are behaving disgracefully,. and another termed Israel.s
conduct .patently immoral..54
But isn.t Israel entitled to do whatever it takes to protect its citizens?
Doesn.t the unique evil of terrorism justify continued U.S. support, even
if Israel often responds harshly?
In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either.
Palestinians have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and
their willingness to attack innocent civilians is wrong. This behavior is
not surprising, however, because the Palestinians believe they have no
other way to force Israeli concessions. As former Prime Minister Barak
once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he .would have joined a
terrorist organization..55
Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used terrorism when they
were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their on state.
Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist
bombings to drive the British from Palestine, and took the lives of many
innocent civilians along the way.56 Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N.
mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, because they opposed his proposal
to internationalize Jerusalem.57 Nor were the perpetrators of these acts
isolated extremists: the leaders of the murder plot were eventually
granted amnesty by the Israeli government and one of them was elected to
the Knsset. Another terrorist leader, who approved the murder but was not
tried, was future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, Shamir openly
argued that .neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify
terrorism as a means of combat.. Rather, terrorism had .a great part to
play . in our war against the occupier [Britain]..58 If the Palestinians.
use of terrorism is morally reprehensible today, so was Israel.s reliance
upon it in the past, and thus one cannot justify U.S. support for Israel
on the grounds that its past conduct was morally superior.59
12 Israel may not have acted worse than many other countries, but it
clearly has not acted any better. And if neither strategic nor moral
arguments can account for America.s support for Israel, how are we to
explain it?
THE ISRAEL LOBBY
The explanation lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were it
not for the Lobby.s ability to manipulate the American political system,
the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less
intimate than it is today.
What Is The Lobby?
We use .the Lobby.as a convenient short.hand term for the loose coalition
of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape U.S. foreign
policy in a pro.Israel direction. Our use of this term is not meant to
suggest that .the Lobby.is a unified movement with a central leadership,
or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues
The core of the Lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant
effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it
advances Israel.s interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for
candidates who are pro.Israel to include letter.writing, financial
contributions, and supporting pro.Israel organizations. But not all
Jewish.Americans are part of the Lobby, because Israel is not a salient
issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly 36 percent
of Jewish.Americans said they were either .not very. or .not at all.
emotionally attached to Israel.60
Jewish.Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key
organizations in the Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of
Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally
supported the expansionist policies of Israel.s Likud Party, including its
hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other
hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the
Palestinians, and a few groups.such as Jewish Voice for Peace.strongly
advocate such steps.61 Despite these differences, moderates and hardliners
both support steadfast U.S. support for Israel.
Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli
officials, so that the former can maximize their influence in the United
States. As one activist with a major Jewish organization wrote, .it is
routine for us to say: .This is our 13 policy on a certain issue, but we
must check what the Israelis think.. We as a community do it all the
time..62 There is also a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy,
and Jewish.American leaders rarely support putting pressure on Israel.
Thus, Edgar Bronfman Sr., the president of the World Jewish Congress, was
accused of .perfidy. when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid.2003
urging Bush to pressure Israel to curb construction of its controversial
.security fence..63 Critics declared that, .It would be obscene at any
time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the president
of the United States to rsist policies being promoted by the government of
Israel..
Similarly, when Israel Policy Forum president Seymour Reich advised
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pressure Israel to reopen a crtical
border crossing in the Gaza Strip in November 2005, critics denounced his
action as .irresponsible behavior,. and declared that, .There is
absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing
against the security.related policies . . . of Israel..64 Recoiling from
these attacks, Reich proclaimed that .the word pressure is not in my
vocabulary when it comes to Israel..
Jewish.Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to
influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and
well.known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their
staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington.65 AIPAC was ranked
second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP), but ahead
of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL.CIO and the National Rifle
Association. A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar
conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in the
Washington.s .muscle rankings..66
The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer,
Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and
Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They
believe Israel.s rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its
expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is contrary to God.s
will.67 In addition, the Lobby.s membership includes neoconservative
gentiles such as John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert
Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former U.N.
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and columnist George Will. 14
Sources of Power
The United States has a divided government that offers many ways to
influence the policy process. As a result, interest groups can shape
policy in many different ways.by lobbying elected representatives and
members of the executive branch, making campaign contributions, voting in
elections, molding public opinion, etc.
Furthermore, special interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when
they are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the populaton is
indifferent. Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about
the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the
rest of the population will not penalize them.
The Israel Lobby.s power flows from its unmatched ability to play this
game of interest group politics. In its basic operations, it is no
different from interest groups like the Farm Lobby, steel and textile
workers, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel Lobby apart is its
extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American
Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway U.S. policy towards
Israel. The Lobby.s activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in
anti.Semitic tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the most
part, the individuals and groups that comprise the Lobby are doing what
other special interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro.Arab
interest groups are weak to non.existent, which makes the Lobby.s task
even easier.68
Strategies for Success
The Lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel.
First, it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both
Congress and the Executive branch to support Israel down the line.
Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker.s own views, the Lobby
tries to make supporting Israel the .smart. political choice.
Second, the Lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel
portrays it in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its
founding and by publicizing Israel.s side in the policy debates of the
day. The goal is to prevent critical commentary about Israel from getting
a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential
to guaranteeing U.S. support, because a 15 candid discussion of
U.S..Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy.
Influencing Congress
A key pillar of the Lobby.s effectiveness is its influence in the U.S.
Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This is in
itself a remarkable situation, because Congress almost never shies away
from contentious issues. Whether the issue is abortion, affirmative
action, health care, or welfare, there is certain to be a lively debate on
Capitol Hill. Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall
silent and there is hardly any debate at all.
One reason for the Lobby.s success with Congress is that some key members
are Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002 that
.My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel..69 One would
think that the number 1 priority for any congressman would be to .protect
America,. but that is not what Armey said. There are also Jewish senators
and congressmen who work to make U.S. foreign policy support Israel.s
interests.
Pro.Israel congressional staffers are another source of the Lobby.s power.
As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once admitted, .There are a lot
of guys at the working level up here [on Capitol Hill] . who happen to be
Jewish, who are willing . to look at certain issues in terms of their
Jewishness .. These are all guys who are in a position to make the
decision in these areas for those senators .. You can get an awful lot
done just at the staff level..70
It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the Lobby.s influence
in Congress. AIPAC.s success is due to its ability to reward legislators
and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those
who challenge it. Money is critical to U.S. elections (as the recent
scandal over lobbyist Jack Abramoff.s various shady dealings reminds us),
and AIPAC makes sure that its friends get strong financial support from
the myriad pro.Israel political action committees. Those seen as hostile
to Israel, on the other hand, can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign
contributions to their political opponents. AIPAC also organizes
letter.writing campaigns and encourages newspaper editors to endorse
pro.Israel candidates.
There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one
example, in 1984 AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois,
who, according to one prominent Lobby figure, had .displayed insensitivity
and even hostility to 16 our concerns.. Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at
the time, explained what happened: .All the Jews in America, from coast to
coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians ..those who
hold public positions now, and those who aspire ..got the message..71
AIPAC prizes its reputation as a formidable adversary, of course, because
it discourages anyone from questioning its agenda.
AIPAC.s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further, however. According to
Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, .It is common for members
of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need
information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional
Research Service, committee staff or administration experts..72 More
importantly, he notes that AIPAC is .often called upon to draft speeches,
work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect
co.sponsors and marshal votes..
The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a foreign
government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress.73 Open debate about
U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy
has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three
main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting
Israel. As former Senator Ernest Hollings (D.SC) noted as he was leaving
office, .You can.t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you
around here..74 Small wonder that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once
told an American audience. .When people ask me how they can help Israel, I
tell them.Help AIPAC..75
Influencing the Executive
The Lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch. That
power derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on
presidential elections. Despite their small numbers in the population
(less than 3 percent), they make large campaign donations to candidates
from both parties. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic
presidential candidates .depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as
60 percent of the money..76 Furthermore, Jewish voters have high turn.out
rates and are concentrated in key states like California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania. Because they matter in close
elections, Presidential candidates go to great lengths not to antagonize
Jewish voters.
Key organizations in the Lobby also directly target the administration in
power. For example, pro.Israel forces make sure that critics of the Jewish
state do not get important foreign.policy appointments. Jimmy Carter
wanted to make George 17 Ball his first secretary of state, but he knew
that Ball was perceived as critical of Israel and that the Lobby would
oppose the appointment.77 This litmus test forces any aspiring policymaker
to become an overt supporter of Israel, which is why public critics of
Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the U.S. foreign
policy establishment.
These constraints still operate today. When 2004 presidential candidate
Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more .even.handed role.
in the Arab.Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of
selling Israel down the river and said his statement was
.irresponsible..78 Virtually all of the top Democrats in the House signed
a hard.hitting letter to Dean criticizing his comments, and the Chicago
Jewish Star reported that .anonymous attackers . are clogging the e.mail
inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning ..without much
evidence ..that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel..79
This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on
Israel.80 His campaign co.chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean
said his own views on the Middle East more closely reflected those of
AIPAC than the more moderate Americans for Peac Now. Dean had merely
suggested that to .bring the sides together,. Washington should act as an
honest broker. This is hardly a radical idea, but it is anathema to the
Lobby, which does not tolerate the idea of even.handedness when it comes
to the Arab.Israeli conflict.
The Lobby.s goals are also served when pro.Israel individuals occupy
important positions in the executive branch. During the Clinton
Administration, for example, Middle East policy was largely shaped by
officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro.Israel
organizations.including Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of
research at AIPAC and co.founder of the pro.Israel Washington Institute
for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving
government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often
visits there.81
These men were among President Clinton.s closest advisors at the Camp
David summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace
process and favored creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only
within the limits of what would be acceptable to Israel.82 In particular,
the American delegation took its cues from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak, coordinated negotiating positions in advance, and did not offer its
own independent proposals for settling the conflict. Not surprisingly,
Palestinian negotiators complained that they were 18 .negotiating with two
Israeli teams ..one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American
flag..83
The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush Administration, whose
ranks include fervently pro.Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John
Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis (.Scooter.) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials
consistently pushed for policies favored by Israel and backed by
organizations in the Lobby.
Manipulating the Media
In addition to influencing government policy directly, the Lobby strives
to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not
want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate
might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently
provide. Accordingly, pro.Israel organizations work hard to influence the
media, think tanks, and academia, because these institutions are critical
in shaping popular opinion.
The Lobby.s perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream
media in good part because most American commentators ae pro.Israel. The
debate among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is
.dominated by people who cannot imagine criticizing Israel..84 He lists 61
.columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel
reflexively and without qualification.. Conversely, Alterman found just
five pundits who consistently criticize Israeli behavior or endorse
pro.Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op.eds
challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favors the
other side.
This pro.Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers.
Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked
that, .Shamir, Sharon, Bibi . whatever those guys want is pretty much fine
by me..85 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent
newspapers like The Chicago Sun.Times and The Washington Times regularly
run editorials that are strongly pro.Israel. Magazines like Commentary,
the New Republic, and the Weekly Standard also zealously defend Israel at
every turn.
Editorial bias is also found in papers like the New York Times. The Times
occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes concedes that the
Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even.handed. In his
memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel
acknowledged 19 the impact his own pro.Israel attitude had on his
editorial choices. In his words: .I was much more deeply devoted to Israel
than I dared to assert.. He goes on: .Fortified by my knowledge of Israel
and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East
commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them
from a pro.Israel perspective.. 86
The media.s reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more
even.handed than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive
to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the
occupied territories without acknowledging Israel.s actual behavior. To
discourage unfavorable reporting on Israel, the Lobby organizes letter
writing campaigns, demonstrations, and boycotts against news outlets whose
content it considers anti.Israel. One CNN executive has said that he
sometimes gets 6,000 e.mail messages in a single day complaining that a
story is anti.Israel.87 Similarly, the pro.Israel Committee for Accurate
Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organized demonstrations outside
National Public Radio stations in 33 cities in May 2003, and it also tried
to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle
East coverage became more sympatheticto Israel.88 Boston.s NPR station,
WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of
these efforts. Pressure on NPR has also come from Israel.s friends in
Congress, who have asked NPR for an internal audit as well as more
oversight of its Middle East coverage.
These factors help explain why the American media contains few criticisms
of Israeli policy, rarely questions Washington.s relationship with Israel,
and only occasionally discusses the Lobby.s profound influence on U.S.
policy.
Think Tanks That Think One Way
Pro.Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important
role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The Lobby created
its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped found WINEP.89
Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel and claims instead that it
provides a .balanced and realistic. perspective on Middle East issues,
this is not the case.90 In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals
who are deeply committed to advancing Israel.s agenda.
The Lobby.s influence in the think tank world extends well beyond WINEP.
Over the past 25 years, pro.Israel forces have established a commanding
presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution,
the 20 Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute,
the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro.Israel, and include few, if
any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.
A good indicator of the Lobby.s influence in the think tank world is the
evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert
on Middle East issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and
former NSC official with a well.deserved reputation for evenhandedness
regarding the Arab.Israeli conflict. Today, however, Brookings.s work on
these issues is conducted through its Saban Center for Middle East
Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, a wealthy Israeli.American
businessman and ardent Zionist.91 The director of the Saban Center is the
ubiquitous Martin Indyk. Thus, what was once a non.partisan policy
institute on Middle East matters is now part of the chorus of largely
pro.Israel think tanks.
Policing Academia
The Lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about Israel on
college campuses, because academic freedom is a core value and because
tenured professors are hard to threaten or silence. Even so, there was
only mild criticism of Israel in the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process
was underway. Criticism rose after that process collapsed and Ariel Sharon
came to power in early 2001, and it became especially intense when the IDF
re.occupied the West Bank in spring 2002 and employed massive force
against the Second Intifada.
The Lobby moved aggressively to .take back the campuses.. New groups
sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers
to U.S. colleges.92 Established groups like the Jewish Council for Public
Affairs and Hillel jumped into the fray, and a new group.the Israel on
Campus Coalition.was formed to coordinate the many groups that now sought
to make Israel.s case on campus. Finally, AIPAC more than tripled its
spending for programs to monitor university activities and to train young
advocates for Israel, in order to .vastly expand the number of students
involved on campus . . . in the national pro.Israel effort..93
The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September
2002, for example, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately
pro.Israel neoconservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that
posted dossiers on 21 suspect academics and encouraged students to report
comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel.94 This
transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted a harsh
reaction and Pipes and Kramer later removed he dossiers, but the website
still invites students to report alleged anti.Israel behavior at U.S.
colleges.
Groups in the Lobby also direct their fire at particular professors and
the universities that hire them. Columbia University, which had the late
Palestinian scholar Edward Said on its faculty, has been a frequent target
of pro.Israel forces. Jonathan Cole, the former Columbia provost, reported
that, .One can be sure that any public statement in support of the
Palestinian people by the preeminent literary critic Edward Said wil
elicit hundreds of e.mails, letters, and journalistic accounts that call
on us to denounce Said and to either sanction or fire him..95 When
Columbia recruited historian Rashid Khalidi from the University of
Chicago, Cole says that .the complaints started flowing in from people who
disagreed with the content of his political views.. Princeton faced the
same problem a few years later when it considered wooing Khalidi away from
Columbia.96
A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late
2004, when the .David Project. produced a propaganda film alleging that
faculty in Columbia University.s Middle East studies program were
anti.Semitic and were intimidating Jewish students who defended Israel.97
Columbia was raked over the coals in pro.Israel circles, but a faculty
committee assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of
anti.Semitism and the only incident worth noting was the possibility that
one professor had .responded heatedly. to a student.s question.98 The
committee also discovered that the accused professors had been the target
of an overt intimidation campaign.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this campaign to eliminate criticism
of Israel from college campuses is the effort by Jewsh groups to push
Congress to establish mechanisms that monitor what professors say about
Israel.99 Schools judged to have an anti.Israel bias would be denied
Federal funding. This effort to get the U.S. government to police campuses
have not yet succeeded, but the attempt illustrates the importance
pro.Israel groups place on controlling debate on these issues.
Finally, a number of Jewish philanthropists have established Israel
studies programs (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programs
that already exist) so as to increase the number of Israel.friendly
scholars on campus.100 NYU 22 announced the establishment of the Taub
Center for Israel Studies on May 1, 2003, and similar programs have been
established at other schools like Berkeley, Brandeis, and Emory. Academic
administrators emphasize the pedagogical value of these programs, but the
truth is that they are intended in good part to promote Israel.s image on
campus. Fred Laffer, the head of the Taub Foundation, makes clear that his
foundation funded the NYU center to help counter the .Arabic [sic] point
of view. that he thinks is prevalent in NYU.s Middle East programs.101
In sum, the Lobby has gone to considerable lengths to insulate Israel from
criticism on college campuses. It has not been as successful in academia
as it has been on Capitol Hill, but it has worked hard to stifle criticism
of Israel by professors and students and there is much less of it on
campuses today102
The Great Silencer
No discussion of how the Lobby operates would be complete without
examining one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of anti.Semitism.
Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro.Israel groups have
significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy.an influence that AIPAC
celebrates.stands a good chance of getting labeled an anti.Semite. In
fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel Lobby runs the risk of being
charged with anti.Semitism, even though the Israeli media themselves refer
to America.s .Jewish Lobby.. In effect, the Lobby boasts of its own power
and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it. This tactic is very
effective, because anti.Semitism is loathsome and no responsible person
wants to be accused of it.
Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticize Israeli
policy in recent years, which some attribute to a resurgence of
anti.Semitism in Europe. We are .getting to a point,. the U.S. Ambassador
to the European Union said in early 2004, .where it is as bad as it was in
the 1930s..103 Measuring anti.Semitism is a complicated matter, but the
weight of evidence points in the opposite direction. For example, in the
spring of 2004, when accusations of European anti.Semitism filled the air
in America, separate surveys of European public opinion conducted by the
Anti.Defamation League and the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press showed that it was actually declining.104
Consider France, which pro.Israel forces often portray as the most
anti.Semitic state in Europe. A poll of French citizens in 2002 found
that: 89 percent could envisage living with a Jew; 97 percent believe
making anti.Semitic graffiti is a 23 serious crime; 87 percent think
attacks on French synagogues are scandalous; and 85 percent of practicing
French Catholics reject the charge that Jews have too much influence in
business and finance.105 It is unsurprising that the head of the French
Jewish community declared in the summer of 2003 that .France is not more
anti.Semitic than America..106 According to a recent article in Ha.aretz,
the French police report that anti.Semitic incidents in France declined by
almost 50 per cent in 2005; and this despite the fact that France has the
largest Muslim population of any country in Europe.107
Finally, when a French Jew was brutally murdered last month by a Muslim
gang, tens of thousands of French demonstrators poured into the streets to
condemn anti.Semitism. Moreover, President Jacques Chirac and Prime
Minister Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim.s memorial service
in a public showof solidarity with French Jewry.108 It is also worth
noting that in 2002 more Jews immigrated to Germany than Israel, making it
.the fastest growing Jewish community in the world,. according to an
article in the Jewish newspaper Forward.109 If Europe were really heading
back to the 1930s, it is hard to imagine that Jews would be moving there
in large numbers.
We recognize, however, that Europe is not free of the scourge of
anti.Semitism. No one would deny that there are still some virulent
autochthonous anti.Semites in Europe (as there are in the United States)
but their numbers are small and their extreme views are rejected by the
vast majority of Europeans. Nor would one deny that there is anti.Semitism
among European Muslims, some of it provoked by Israel.s behavior towards
the Palestinians and some of it straightforwardly racist. 110 This problem
is worrisome, but it is hardly out of control. Muslims constitute less
than five percent of Europe.s total population, and European governments
are working hard to combat the problem. Why? Because most Europeans reject
such hateful views.111 In short, when it comes to anti.Semitism, Europe
today bears hardly any resemblance to Europe in the 1930s.
This is why pro.Israel forces, when pressed to go beyond assertion, claim
that there is a .new anti.Semitism., which they equate with criticism of
Israel.112 In other words criticize Israeli policy and you are by
definition an anti.Semite. When the synod of the Church of England
recently voted to divest from Caterpillar Inc on the grounds that
Caterpillar manufacures the bulldozers used to demolish Palestinian homes,
the Chief Rabbi complained that it would .have the most adverse
repercussions on ... Jewish.Christian relations in Britain., while Rabbi
Tony Bayfield, the head of the Reform movement, said: ..There is a clear
problem of anti.Zionist .verging on anti.Semitic .attitudes emerging in
the grass 24 roots, and even in the middle ranks of the Church..113
However, the Church was neither guilty of anti.Zionism nor anti.Semitism;
it was merely protesting Israeli policy.114
Critics are also accused of holding Israel to an unfair standard or
questioning its right to exist. But these are bogus charges too. Western
critics of Israel hardly ever question its right to exist. Instead, they
question its behavior towards the Palestinians, which is a legitimate
criticism: Israelis question it themselves. Nor is Israel being judged
unfairly. Rather, Israeli treatment of the Palestinians elicits criticism
because it is contrary to widely.accepted human rights norms and
international law, as well as the principle of national

Porque América não mudará é política extrangeira de MiddleEast
Automatically translated into Portuguese thanks to WorldLingo
Estudo de Harvard: O Lobby e os ESTADOS UNIDOS de Israel. A página printable
da política extrangeira
sentou-se, 2006-03-18 14:34 - admin
John J. Mearsheimer e
Stephen M. Walt
John F. Escola de Kennedy da universidade de Harvard março
do governo 2006
ESTADOS UNIDOS. a política extrangeira dá forma a eventos em cada canto do globo. A nenhumaa parte é
esta mais verdadeira do que em o Oriente Médio, uma região da instabilidade retornando e
da importância estratégica enorme. O mais recentemente, a tentativa de Bush
Administration.s de transformar a região em uma comunidade das democracias ajudou
ao produto um insurency resilient em Iraq, uma ascensão afiada em preços de óleo do mundo,
e em bombardeios do terrorista em Madrid, em Londres, e em Amman. Com tanto na estaca
para assim muitos, todos os países necessitam compreender as forças que dirigem ESTADOS UNIDOS.
Política do leste médio.
Os ESTADOS UNIDOS. o interesse nacional deve ser o objeto preliminar da política
extrangeira americana. Para o passado diversas décadas, entretanto, e especialmente
desde a guerra em 1967, o centerpiece de seis dias de ESTADOS UNIDOS. A política do leste médio
foi seu relacionamento com Israel. A combinação de ESTADOS UNIDOS unwavering.
a sustentação para que Israel e o esforço relacionado espalhe a democracia durante todo
a região inflamed a opinião árabe e Islamic e eopardized ESTADOS UNIDOS.
segurança.
Esta situação não tem nenhum igual na história política americana. Por que
os Estados Unidos foram dispostos reservar sua própria segurança a fim
avançar os interesses de um outro estado? Se pôde supor que a ligação
entre os dois países está baseada em interesses estratégicos compartilhados ou
em imperativs morais compelindo. Como nós mostramos abaixo, entretanto, nenhumas daquelas
explanações podem esclarecer o nível notável da sustentação material
e diplomatic essa os povides de Estados Unidos a Israel.
Instead, a pressão total de ESTADOS UNIDOS. a política na região é devida quase
inteiramente a ESTADOS UNIDOS. política doméstica, e especialmente às atividades
do. Lobby de Israel. Outros grupos de interesse especial controlaram enviesar
ESTADOS UNIDOS. política extrangeira nos sentidos que favoreceram, mas nenhum lobby controlou
desviar ESTADOS UNIDOS. política extrangeira como longe de o que o interesse nacional
americano sugeriria de outra maneira, ao simultaneamente convencer
os americanos que ESTADOS UNIDOS. e os interesses Israeli são essencialmente identical.1
nas páginas que seguem, nós descrevem como o Lobby realizou este
feat, e como suas atividades deram forma a ações de America.s nesta
região crítica. Dado a importância estratégica de o Oriente Médio e de seu
impacto potencial em outro, ambos os americanos e non. Os americanos necessitam
compreender e dirigir-se à influência de Lobby.s em ESTADOS UNIDOS. política. 1
alguns leitores encontrará esta análise perturbar, mas os fatos recounted
aqui não estão na disputa séria entre scholars. Certamente, nosso cliente confia
pesadamente no trabalho dos scholars e dos journalists Israeli, que merecem o crédito
grande para a luz do derramamento nestas edições. Nós confiamos também na evidência
fornecida por organizações Israeli e internacionais respeitadas das direitas
humanas. Similarmente, nossas reivindicações sobre o impacto de Lobby.s confiam
no testimony do Lobby.s possuem membros, as well as o testimony
dos políticos que trabalharam com eles. Os leitores podem rejeitar nossas conclusões,
naturalmente, mas a evidência em que elas descansa não é controverso.
O BENFEITOR GRANDE
desde a guerra de outubro em 1973, Washington forneceu Israel com um nível
da sustentação que dwarfing as quantidades fornecidas a todo o outro estado. Foi
o receptor anual o maior de ESTADOS UNIDOS diretos. auxílio econômico e
militar desde 1976 e o receptor total o maior desde a segunda guerra mundial.
Total ESTADOS UNIDOS diretos. o dae (dispositivo automático de entrada) às quantidades de Israel a bem sobre $140 bilhões em 2003
dollars.2 Israel recebe aproximadamente $3 bilhões no auxílio extrangeiro direto
todos os anos, que é aproximadamente one.fifth do orçamento do dae (dispositivo automático de entrada) extrangeiro de America.s.
Per capita em termos, os Estados Unidos dão a cada um Israeli um valor direto
do subsídio aproximadamente $500 por year.3 que este largesse está golpeando especialmente quando se
realiza que Israel é agora um estado industrial rico com per capita
um incom aproximadamente igual a Coreia sul ou Spain.4
Israel começa também a outros negócios especiais de Washington.5 o outro dae (dispositivo automático de entrada)
os receptores começam seu dinheiro em prestações trimestrais, mas Israel recebe
sua apropriação inteira no começo de cada ano fiscal e ganha
assim o interesse extra. A maioria de receptores do auxílio militar americano
são requeridos gastar todo o ele nos Estados Unidos, mas Israel pode usar
aproximadamente por cento de twenty.five de seu allotment do dae (dispositivo automático de entrada) subsidize sua própria
indústria da defesa. Israel é o único receptor que não tem que
esclarecer como o dae (dispositivo automático de entrada) é gastado, uma isenção que os makes ele virtualmente
impossível impedir que o dinheiro esteja usado para finalidades os estados
unidos oponham, como estabelecimentos do edifício no banco ocidental.
Além disso, os Estados Unidos forneceram Israel com os quase $3 bilhões
para desenvolver sistemas de armas como o avião de Lavi que o Pentagon
não quis nem não necessitou, ao dar o acesso de Israel a top.drawer ESTADOS UNIDOS. o weaponry gosta
de helicópteros de Blackhawk e de jatos F.16. Finalmente, os Estados Unidos dão
o acesso de Israel à inteligência que negam seus aliados da OTAN e
giraram um olho cego para a aquisição de Israels de weapons.6 nuclear
2 além, Washington fornecem Israel com a sustentação diplomatic
consistente. Desde 1982, os Estados Unidos têm vetoed 32 definições unidas
que eram críticas de Israel, um número do conselho de segurança das nações
mais grande do que o total combinado do molde dos vetoes por todo o outro conselho
de segurança members.7 ele obstrui também estados árabes. os esforços pôr o arsenal
nuclear de Israel.s sobre a energia atômica internacional Agency.s agenda.8
os Estados Unidos também vêm ao salvamento de Israel.s no wartime e fazem exame de seu
lado ao negociar a paz. A administração re.supplied Israel durante
a guerra de outubro e Israel protegida de Nixon da ameaça da intervenção
soviética. Washington foi envolvido profundamente nas negociações que
terminaram essa guerra as well as o .step.by.step longo. processe isso
seguido, apenas como jogou um papel chave nas negociações que precederam
e seguiram o Oslo 1993 Accords.9 lá eram fricções ocasionais
entre ESTADOS UNIDOS. e os oficiais Israeli em ambos os casos, mas os Estados Unidos
coordenaram suas posições pròxima com Israel e suportaram consistentemente
a aproximação Israeli aos negotitions. Certamente, um participant americano
no acampamento David (2000) disse mais tarde, .far demasiado frequentemente, nós funcionamos. . . como
Israel.s lawyer..10
como discutido abaixo, Washington deu a Israel a latitude larga em tratar
dos territórios ocupados (o banco ocidental e a tira de Gaza), mesmo quando
suas ações estavam em probabilidades com ESTADOS UNIDOS indicados. política. Além disso, a estratégia
ambiciosa de Bush Administration.s para transformar o Oriente Médio .beginning
com a invasão de Iraq.is pelo menos pretendeu em parte melhorar a situação
estratégica de Israel.s. Aparte dos alliances do wartime, é duro pensar
de um outro exemplo de onde um país forneceu outro com um nível
similar do material e do diplomaticsupport por um período tão prolongado.
A sustentação de America.s para Israel está, no short, original.
Este generosity extraordinário pôde ser compreensível se Israel fosse
um recurso estratégico vital ou se houvesse um exemplo compelindo do mora para
ESTADOS UNIDOS sustentados. revestimento protetor. Mas nenhum rationale está convencendo.
UMA RESPONSABILIDADE ESTRATÉGICA
de acordo com o Web site dos casos públicos Committee.s de American.Israel (AIPAC
), .the Estados Unidos e Israel deram forma a uma parceria original
para encontrar-se com as ameaças estratégicas crescentes em o Oriente Médio. . . . Este
esforço cooperativo fornece benefícios significativos para ambos os estados
unidos e esta reivindicação Israel..11 é um artigo da fé entre supporters
de Israel.s e é invocada rotineiramente por políticos Israeli e pro. Americanos
de Israel.
3 Israel podem ter sido um recurso estratégico durante o War.12 frio servindo
como o proxy de America.s após o dia seis Guerra (1967), Israel ajudada conter
a expansão soviética na região e inflicted derrotas humilhando em clientes
soviéticos como Egipto e Syria. Israel ajudada ocasionalmente proteger outros
ESTADOS UNIDOS. os aliados (como o rei Hussein de Jordan.s) e seu prowess militar forçaram
Moscow para gastar mais revestimento protetor seus clientes perdedores. Israel deu também
aos Estados Unidos a inteligência útil sobre potencialidades soviéticas.
O valor estratégico de Israel.s durante este período não deve ser exagerado,
however.13 o revestimento protetor Israel não era barato, e complicou relações
de America.s com o mundo árabe. Por exemplo, os ESTADOS UNIDOS. a decisão para dar
a Israel $2.2 bilhões no dae (dispositivo automático de entrada) militar da emergência durante a guerra de outubro
provocou um embargo do óleo do OPEC que inflicted economias ocidentais consideráveis dos danos
o. Além disso, as forças armadas de Israel.s não poderiam proteger ESTADOS UNIDOS. interesses
na região. Por exemplo, os Estados Unidos não podiam confiar em Israel quando
a volta Iranian em 1979 interesses levantados sobre a segurança
de fontes de óleo persas de Glf, e tinham que criar seus próprios. Força rápida
da distribuição. instead.
Mesmo se Israel fosse um recurso estratégico durante a guerra fria, a primeira guerra
de golfo (1990.91) revelou que Israel se estava transformando um burden estratégico.
Os Estados Unidos não podiam usar bases Israeli durante a guerra sem romper
anti. O coalition de Iraq, e tiveram que desviar recursos (por exemplo, baterias
do míssil do Patriot) para manter Telavive de fazer qualquer coisa que pôde
fraturar o alliance de encontro a Saddam. A história repetiu-se em 2003:
embora Israel estivesse ansiosa para que os Estados Unidos ataquem Saddam,
o presidente Bush não poderia pedi-los para ajudar sem provocar a oposição
árabe. Assim Israel permaneceu nos sidelines again.14
que começam nos 1990s, e especialmente após 9/11, ESTADOS UNIDOS. a sustentação para Israel
foi justificada pela reivindicação que ambos os estados estão ameaçados
pelos grupos do terrorista que originam no mundo muçulmano de Arabor, e por um jogo
de estados de .rogue. que traseiro estes grupos e busca WMD. Este rationale implica
que Washington deve dar a Israel uma mão livre em tratar
dos Palestinians e não a imprensa Israel t faz concessões até que todos os terroristas
Palestinian imprisoned ou absolutamente. Implica também que os Estados Unidos
devem ir após países como a república Islamic do al de Irã,
de Saddam Hussein.s Iraq, e de Bashar. Assad.s Syria. Israel é vista assim como
um aliado crucial na guerra no terror, porque seus inimigos são inimigos
de America.s.
Este rationale novo parece persuasive, mas Israel é no fato uma responsabilidade
na guerra no terror e no esforço mais largo tratar dos estados do rogue.
4 para começar com, .terrorism. é uma tática empregada por uma disposição larga
de grupos políticos; não é um único adversário unified. As organizações
do terrorista que ameaçam Israel (por exemplo, Hamas ou Hezbollah)
não ameaçam os Estados Unidos, exceto quando intervêm de encontro a eles (como
em Líbano em 1982). Além disso, o terrorismo Palestinian não é violência aleatória
dirigida de encontro a Israel ou a oeste de .the. ; é pela maior parte uma resposta
à campanha prolongada Israel.s para colonize o banco ocidental e a tira de Gaza.
Mais importante, dig que Israel e os Estados Unidos estão unidos
por uma ameaça compartilhada do terrorista tem o relacionamento causal para trás: rather,
os Estados Unidos têm um problema na parte boa porque são aliados assim
pròxima com a Israel, não a outra maneira do terrorismo ao redor. ESTADOS UNIDOS. a sustentação para
Israel não é a única fonte de anti. Terrorismo americano, mas é
importante, e faz ganhar a guerra no terror que mais difficult.15
lá não é nenhuma pergunta, por exemplo, que muitos líderes de Qaeda do al, including
o escaninho Laden, motivated pela presença de Israel.s em Jerusalem e plight
dos Palestinians. De acordo com os ESTADOS UNIDOS. 9/11 de Commission, Laden do escaninho
procurado explicitamente a pune os Estados Unidos para suas políticas
no leste médio, including sua sustentação para Israel, e tentou mesmo cronometrar
os ataques para destacar este issue.16
ingualmente importante, ESTADOS UNIDOS incondicionais. a sustentação para Israel faz mais fácil
para extremists como o escaninho Laden para rally a sustentação popular e para atrair
recrutas. As votações de opinião pública confirmam que as populações árabes são profundamente
hostis à sustentação americana para Israel, e os ESTADOS UNIDOS. Indique que grupo
consultivo de Department.s no Diplomacy público para o mundo árabe e muçulmano encontrou
que .citizens nestes países estão afligidos genuìna no plight
dos Palestinians e no papel percebem os Estados Unidos para ser
playing..17
quanto para aos estados do rogue de so.called em o Oriente Médio, ele não é uma ameaça
dire a ESTADOS UNIDOS vitais. interesses, aparte dos ESTADOS UNIDOS. compromisso a Israel
próprio. Embora os Estados Unidos tivessem um número de disagreements
com estes regimes, Washington não seria quase como preocupado sobre Irã,
Ba.thist Iraq, ou Syria era amarrado não assim pròxima a Israel. Mesmo se
estes estados adquirirem weapons.which nuclear não é obviamente desirable.it
não seria um disastre estratégico para os Estados Unidos. Nem América
nem Israel poderiam blackmailed por um rogue de nuclear.armed, porque
o chantagista não poderia realizar a ameaça sem receber a retaliação
oprimindo. O perigo de um handoff de .nuclear. aos terroristas é ingualmente
remoto, porque um estado do rogue não poderia ser certo que transferência seria
undetected ou isso não estaria responsabilizada e não estêve punida mais tarde. 5
além disso, os ESTADOS UNIDOS. relacionamento com de Israel makes realmente ele mais duramente
a tratar destes estados. O arsenal nuclear de Israel.s é uma razão porque alguns
de seus vizinhos querem armas nucleares, e ameaçar estes estados com
os aumentos da mudança do regime meramente que desejam. Contudo Israel não é muito
de um recurso quando os Estados Unidos contemplam usar a força de encontro a estes
regimes, porque não podem participar na luta.
Em curto, tratando Israel como America.s a maioria de aliado importante na campanha
de encontro ao terrorismo e à abilidade assorted dos bothexaggerates Israel.s dos dictatorships
do leste médio ajudar nestas edições e ignora as maneiras que
as políticas de Israel.s fazem a ESTADOS UNIDOS. esforços mais difíceis.
A sustentação de Unquestioned para Israel enfraquece também os ESTADOS UNIDOS. posicione fora
do leste médio. Os elites extrangeiros vêem consistentemente os Estados Unidos como demasiado
de suporte de Israel, e pensam que sua tolerância do repression Israeli
nos territórios ocupados é moral obtuse e um handicap na guerra
em terroism.18 em abril 2004, por exemplo, 52 diplomatas britânicos anteriores emitidos
ministro principal Tony Blair um provérbio da letra que o conflito
de Israel.Palestine teve relações de .poisoned entre o oeste e os mundos árabes e
Islamic. e que as políticas de Bush e do ministro principal Ariel Sharon
eram razão final de .one.sided e
de illegal..19 A questionar o valor estratégico advertindo de Israel.s é que
não age como um aliado leal. Os oficiais Israeli ignoram freqüentemente ESTADOS UNIDOS. os pedidos
e renege nas promessas feitas para cobrir ESTADOS UNIDOS. líderes (incluir após pledges
para parar a construção do estabelecimento e para refrain de .tar geted assassinations.
dos líderes Palestinian) .20 além disso, Israel forneceu ESTADOS UNIDOS sensíveis.
tecnologia militar a ESTADOS UNIDOS potenciais. os rivais gostam de China, em que os ESTADOS UNIDOS.
Indique o departamento Inspector.General chamado teste padrão sistemático e crescente
de .a de transfers..21 desautorizado de acordo com os ESTADOS UNIDOS. Escritório
geral da contabilidade, Israel também .conducts as operações as mais aggressive
do espionage de encontro aos ESTADOS UNIDOS. de todo o ally..22 além à caixa
de Jonathan Pollard, que deu a Israel quantidades grandes do material classificado
nos 1980s adiantados (que Israel passada reportedly na União Soviética
para ganhar mais vistos da saída para Jews soviéticos), uma controvérsia nova erupted
em 2004 em que se revelou que um oficial chave do Pentagon (Larry Franklin)
tinha passado a informação classificada a um diplomata Israeli, ajudado alegada
por dois AIPAC officials.23 Israel é mal o único país que espía
nos Estados Unidos, mas seu voluntariedade espiar em seus moldes principais
do patron duvida mais mais em seu valor estratégico.
6 UM CASO MORAL DWINDLING
aparte de seu valor estratégico alegado, suportes de Israel.s discutem também que
merece ESTADOS UNIDOS unqualified. a sustentação porque 1) ele é fraco e cercado
por inimigos, 2) é uma democracia, que seja um formulário moral preferível
do governo; 3) the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and
therefore deserve special treatment, and 4) Israel.s conduct has been
morally superior to its adversaries. behavior.
On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive.
There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel.s existence, but that
is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, Israel.s past and present conduct
offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.
Backing the Underdog?
Israel is often portrayed as weak and besieged, a Jewish David surrounded
by a hostile Arab Goliath. This image has been carefully nurtured by
Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers, but the opposite image is closer
to the truth. Contrary to popular belief, the Zionists had larger,
better.equipped, and better.led forces during the 1947.49 War of
Independence and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won quick and easy
victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in
1967.before large.scale U.S. aid began flowing to Israel.24 These
victories offer eloquent evidence of Israeli patriotism, organizational
ability, and military prowess, but they also reveal that Israel was far
from helpless even in its earliest years.
Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its
conventional forces are far superior to its neighbors and it is the only
state in the region with nuclear weapons. Egypt and Jordan signed peace
treaties with Israel and Saudi Arabia has offered to do so as well. Syria
has lost its Soviet patron, Iraq has been decimated by three disastrous
wars, and Iran is hundreds of miles away. The Palestinians barely have
effective police, let alone a military that could threaten Israel.
According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University.s prestigious Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, .the strategic balance decidedly favors
Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own
military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neghbors..25 If
backing the underdog were a compelling rationale, the United States would
be supporting Israel.s opponents.
7 Aiding a Fellow Democracy?
American backing is often justified by the claim that Israel is a
fellow.democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships. This rationale
sounds convincing, but it cannot account for the current level of U.S.
support. After all, there are many democracies around the world, but none
receives the lavish support that Israel does. The United States has
overthrown democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when
this was thought to advance .S. interests, and it has good relations with
a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic neither justifies
nor explains America.s support for Israel.
The .shared democracy. rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli
democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is
a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are
supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded
as a Jewish state and citizenship is based on the principle of blood
kinship.26 Given this conception of citizenship, it is not surprising that
Israel.s 1.3 million Arabs are treated as second.class citizens, or that a
recent Israeli government commission found that Israel behaves in a
.neglectful and discriminatory. manner towards them.27
Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens
to become citizens themselves, and does not give these spouses the right
to live in Israel. The Israeli human rights organization B.tselem called
this restriction .a racist law that determines who can live here according
to racist criteria..28 Such laws may be understandable given Israel.s
founding principles, but they are not consistent with America.s image of
democracy.
Israel.s democratic status is also undermined by its refusal to grant the
Palestinians a viable state of their own. Israel controls the lives of
about 3.8 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, while colonizing
lands on which the Palestinians have long dwelt. Israel is formally
democratic, but the millions of Palestinians that it controls are denied
full political rights and the .shared democracy. rationale is
correspondingly weakened.
Compensation for Past Crimes
A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the
Christian West, especially the tragic episode of the Holocaust. Because
Jews were persecuted for 8 centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish
homeland, many believe that Israel deserves special treatment from the
United States.
There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy
of anti.Semitism, and that Israel.s creation was an appropriate response
to a long record of crimes. This history, as noted, provides a strong
moral case for supporting Israel.s existence. But the creation of Israel
involved additional crimes against a largely innocent third party: the
Palestinians.
The history of these events is well.understood. When political Zionism
began in earnest in the late 19th century, there were only about 15,000
Jews in Palestine.29 In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95
percent of the population, and though under Ottoman control, they had been
in continuous possession of this territory for 1300 years.30 Even when
Israel was founded, Jews were only about 35 percent of Palestine.s
population and owned 7 percent of the land.31
The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a
bi.national state or accepting a permanent partition of Palestine. The
Zionist leadership was sometimes willing to accept partition as a first
step, but this was a tactical maneuver and not their real objective. As
David Ben.Gurion put it in the late 1930s, .After the formation of a large
army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we shall abolish
partition and expand to the whole of Palestine..32
To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs
from the territory that would eventually become Israel. There was simply
no other way to accomplish their objective. Ben.Gurion saw the problem
clearly, writing in 1941 that .it is impossible to imagine general
evacuation [of the Arab population] without compulsion, and brutal
compulsion..33 Or as Israeli historian Benny Morris puts it, .the idea of
transfer is as old as modern Zionism and has accompanied its evolution and
praxis during the past century..34
This opportunity came in 1947.48, when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000
Palestinians into exile.35 Israeli officials have long claimed that the
Arabs fled because their leaders told them to, but careful scholarship
(much of it by Israeli historians like Morris) have demolished this myth.
In fact, most Arab leaders urged the Palestinian population to stay home,
but fear of violent death at the hands of Zionist forces led most of them
to flee.36 After the war, Israel barred the return of the Palestinian
exiles.
9 The fact that the creation of Israel entailed a moral crime against the
Palestinian people was well understood by Israel.s leadrs. As Ben.Gurion
told Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, .If I were an
Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have
taken their country. . . . We come from Israel, but two thousand years
ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti.Semitism, the Nazis,
Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we
have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?.37
Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the
Palestinians. national ambitions.38 Prime Minister Golda Meir famously
remarked that .there was no such thing as a Palestinian,. and even Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, nonetheless
opposed creating a full.fledged Palestinian state.39 Pressure from
extremist violence and the growing Palestinian population has forced
subsequent Israeli leaders to disengage rom some of the occupied
territories and to explore territorial compromise, but no Israeli
government has been willing to offer the Palestinians a viable state of
their own. Even Prime Minister Ehud Barak.s purportedly generous offer at
Camp David in July 2000 would only have given the Palestiniansa disarmed
and dismembered set of .Bantustans. under de facto Israeli control.40
Europe.s crimes against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for
Israel.s right to exist. But Israel.s survival is not in doubt.even if
some Islamic extremists make outrageous and unrealistic references to
.wiping it off the map..and the tragic history of the Jewish people does
not obligate the United States to help Israel no matter what it does
today.
.Virtuous Israelis. versus .Evil Arabs.
The final moral argument portrays Israel as a country that has sought
peace at every turn and showed great restraint even when rovoked. The
Arabs, by contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. This
narrative.which is endlessly repeated by Israeli leaders and American
apologists such as Alan Dershowitz.is yet another myth.41 In terms of
actual behavior, Israel.s conduct is not morally distinguishable from the
actions of its opponents.
Israeli scholarship shows that the early Zionists were far from benevolent
towards the Palestinian Arabs.42 The Arab inhabitants did resist the
Zionists. encroachments, which is hardly surprising given that the
Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab lands. The Zionists
responded vigorously, and 10 neither side owns the moral high ground
during this period. This same scholarship also reveals that the creation
of Israel in 1947.48 involved explicit acts of ethnic cleansing, including
executions, massacres, and rapes by Jews.43
Furthermore, Israel.s subsequent conduct towards its Arab adversaries and
its Palestinian subjects has often been brutal, belying any claim to
morally superior conduct. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli
security forces killed between 2,700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the
overwhelming majority of them unarmed.44 The IDF conducted numerous
cross.border raids against its neighbors in the early 1950s, and though
these actions were portrayed as defensive responses, they were actually
part of a broader effort to expand Israel.s borders. Israel.s expansionist
ambitions also led it to join Britain and France in attacking Egypt in
1956, and Israel withdrew from the lands it had conquered only in the face
of intense U.S. pressure. 45
The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners.of.war in both the
1956 and 1967 wars.46 In 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000
Palestinians from the newly.conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians
from the Golan Heights.47 It was also complicit in the massacre of 700
innocent Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps following its
invsion of Lebanon in 1982, and an Israeli investigatory commission found
then.Defence Minister Sharon .personally responsible. for these
atrocities.48
Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners,
systematically humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and
used force indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the
First Intifida (1987.1991), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to
its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian
protestors. The Swedish .Save the Children. organization estimated that
.23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating
injuries in the first two years of the intifida,. with nearly one.third
sustaining broken bones. Nearly one.third of the beaten children were aged
ten and under..49
Israel.s response to the Second Intifida (2000.2005) has been even more
violent, leading Ha.aretz to declare that .the IDF . is turning into a
killing machine whose efficiency is awe.inspiring, yet shocking..50 The
IDF fired one million bullets in the first days of the uprising, which is
far from a measured response.51 Since then, Israel has killed 3.4
Palestinians for every Israeli lost, the majority of whom have been
innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children killed
is even higher (5.7 to 1).52 Israeli forces have also killed several
foreign 11 peace activists, including a 23 year.old American woman crushed
by an Israeli bulldozer in March 2003.53
These facts about Israel.s conduct have been amply documented by numerous
human rights organizations.including prominent Israeli groups.and are not
disputed by fair.minded observers. And that is why four former officials
of Shin Bet (the Israeli domestic security organization) condemned
Israel.s conduct during the Second Intifada in November 2003. One of them
declared .we are behaving disgracefully,. and another termed Israel.s
conduct .patently immoral..54
But isn.t Israel entitled to do whatever it takes to protect its citizens?
Doesn.t the unique evil of terrorism justify continued U.S. support, even
if Israel often responds harshly?
In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either.
Palestinians have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and
their willingness to attack innocent civilians is wrong. This behavior is
not surprising, however, because the Palestinians believe they have no
other way to force Israeli concessions. As former Prime Minister Barak
once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he .would have joined a
terrorist organization..55
Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used terrorism when they
were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their on state.
Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist
bombings to drive the British from Palestine, and took the lives of many
innocent civilians along the way.56 Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N.
mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, because they opposed his proposal
to internationalize Jerusalem.57 Nor were the perpetrators of these acts
isolated extremists: the leaders of the murder plot were eventually
granted amnesty by the Israeli government and one of them was elected to
the Knsset. Another terrorist leader, who approved the murder but was not
tried, was future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, Shamir openly
argued that .neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify
terrorism as a means of combat.. Rather, terrorism had .a great part to
play . in our war against the occupier [Britain]..58 If the Palestinians.
use of terrorism is morally reprehensible today, so was Israel.s reliance
upon it in the past, and thus one cannot justify U.S. support for Israel
on the grounds that its past conduct was morally superior.59
12 Israel may not have acted worse than many other countries, but it
clearly has not acted any better. And if neither strategic nor moral
arguments can account for America.s support for Israel, how are we to
explain it?
THE ISRAEL LOBBY
The explanation lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were it
not for the Lobby.s ability to manipulate the American political system,
the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less
intimate than it is today.
What Is The Lobby?
We use .the Lobby.as a convenient short.hand term for the loose coalition
of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape U.S. foreign
policy in a pro.Israel direction. Our use of this term is not meant to
suggest that .the Lobby.is a unified movement with a central leadership,
or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues
The core of the Lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant
effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it
advances Israel.s interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for
candidates who are pro.Israel to include letter.writing, financial
contributions, and supporting pro.Israel organizations. But not all
Jewish.Americans are part of the Lobby, because Israel is not a salient
issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly 36 percent
of Jewish.Americans said they were either .not very. or .not at all.
emotionally attached to Israel.60
Jewish.Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key
organizations in the Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of
Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally
supported the expansionist policies of Israel.s Likud Party, including its
hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other
hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the
Palestinians, and a few groups.such as Jewish Voice for Peace.strongly
advocate such steps.61 Despite these differences, moderates and hardliners
both support steadfast U.S. support for Israel.
Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli
officials, so that the former can maximize their influence in the United
States. As one activist with a major Jewish organization wrote, .it is
routine for us to say: .This is our 13 policy on a certain issue, but we
must check what the Israelis think.. We as a community do it all the
time..62 There is also a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy,
and Jewish.American leaders rarely support putting pressure on Israel.
Thus, Edgar Bronfman Sr., the president of the World Jewish Congress, was
accused of .perfidy. when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid.2003
urging Bush to pressure Israel to curb construction of its controversial
.security fence..63 Critics declared that, .It would be obscene at any
time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the president
of the United States to rsist policies being promoted by the government of
Israel..
Similarly, when Israel Policy Forum president Seymour Reich advised
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pressure Israel to reopen a crtical
border crossing in the Gaza Strip in November 2005, critics denounced his
action as .irresponsible behavior,. and declared that, .There is
absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing
against the security.related policies . . . of Israel..64 Recoiling from
these attacks, Reich proclaimed that .the word pressure is not in my
vocabulary when it comes to Israel..
Jewish.Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to
influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and
well.known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their
staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington.65 AIPAC was ranked
second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP), but ahead
of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL.CIO and the National Rifle
Association. A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar
conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in the
Washington.s .muscle rankings..66
The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer,
Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and
Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They
believe Israel.s rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its
expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is contrary to God.s
will.67 In addition, the Lobby.s membership includes neoconservative
gentiles such as John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert
Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former U.N.
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and columnist George Will. 14
Sources of Power
The United States has a divided government that offers many ways to
influence the policy process. As a result, interest groups can shape
policy in many different ways.by lobbying elected representatives and
members of the executive branch, making campaign contributions, voting in
elections, molding public opinion, etc.
Furthermore, special interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when
they are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the populaton is
indifferent. Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about
the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the
rest of the population will not penalize them.
The Israel Lobby.s power flows from its unmatched ability to play this
game of interest group politics. In its basic operations, it is no
different from interest groups like the Farm Lobby, steel and textile
workers, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel Lobby apart is its
extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American
Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway U.S. policy towards
Israel. The Lobby.s activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in
anti.Semitic tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the most
part, the individuals and groups that comprise the Lobby are doing what
other special interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro.Arab
interest groups are weak to non.existent, which makes the Lobby.s task
even easier.68
Strategies for Success
The Lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel.
First, it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both
Congress and the Executive branch to support Israel down the line.
Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker.s own views, the Lobby
tries to make supporting Israel the .smart. political choice.
Second, the Lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel
portrays it in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its
founding and by publicizing Israel.s side in the policy debates of the
day. The goal is to prevent critical commentary about Israel from getting
a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential
to guaranteeing U.S. support, because a 15 candid discussion of
U.S..Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy.
Influencing Congress
A key pillar of the Lobby.s effectiveness is its influence in the U.S.
Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This is in
itself a remarkable situation, because Congress almost never shies away
from contentious issues. Whether the issue is abortion, affirmative
action, health care, or welfare, there is certain to be a lively debate on
Capitol Hill. Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall
silent and there is hardly any debate at all.
One reason for the Lobby.s success with Congress is that some key members
are Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002 that
.My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel..69 One would
think that the number 1 priority for any congressman would be to .protect
America,. but that is not what Armey said. There are also Jewish senators
and congressmen who work to make U.S. foreign policy support Israel.s
interests.
Pro.Israel congressional staffers are another source of the Lobby.s power.
As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once admitted, .There are a lot
of guys at the working level up here [on Capitol Hill] . who happen to be
Jewish, who are willing . to look at certain issues in terms of their
Jewishness .. These are all guys who are in a position to make the
decision in these areas for those senators .. You can get an awful lot
done just at the staff level..70
It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the Lobby.s influence
in Congress. AIPAC.s success is due to its ability to reward legislators
and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those
who challenge it. Money is critical to U.S. elections (as the recent
scandal over lobbyist Jack Abramoff.s various shady dealings reminds us),
and AIPAC makes sure that its friends get strong financial support from
the myriad pro.Israel political action committees. Those seen as hostile
to Israel, on the other hand, can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign
contributions to their political opponents. AIPAC also organizes
letter.writing campaigns and encourages newspaper editors to endorse
pro.Israel candidates.
There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one
example, in 1984 AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois,
who, according to one prominent Lobby figure, had .displayed insensitivity
and even hostility to 16 our concerns.. Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at
the time, explained what happened: .All the Jews in America, from coast to
coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians ..those who
hold public positions now, and those who aspire ..got the message..71
AIPAC prizes its reputation as a formidable adversary, of course, because
it discourages anyone from questioning its agenda.
AIPAC.s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further, however. According to
Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, .It is common for members
of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need
information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional
Research Service, committee staff or administration experts..72 More
importantly, he notes that AIPAC is .often called upon to draft speeches,
work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect
co.sponsors and marshal votes..
The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a foreign
government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress.73 Open debate about
U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy
has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three
main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting
Israel. As former Senator Ernest Hollings (D.SC) noted as he was leaving
office, .You can.t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you
around here..74 Small wonder that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once
told an American audience. .When people ask me how they can help Israel, I
tell them.Help AIPAC..75
Influencing the Executive
The Lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch. That
power derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on
presidential elections. Despite their small numbers in the population
(less than 3 percent), they make large campaign donations to candidates
from both parties. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic
presidential candidates .depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as
60 percent of the money..76 Furthermore, Jewish voters have high turn.out
rates and are concentrated in key states like California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania. Because they matter in close
elections, Presidential candidates go to great lengths not to antagonize
Jewish voters.
Key organizations in the Lobby also directly target the administration in
power. For example, pro.Israel forces make sure that critics of the Jewish
state do not get important foreign.policy appointments. Jimmy Carter
wanted to make George 17 Ball his first secretary of state, but he knew
that Ball was perceived as critical of Israel and that the Lobby would
oppose the appointment.77 This litmus test forces any aspiring policymaker
to become an overt supporter of Israel, which is why public critics of
Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the U.S. foreign
policy establishment.
These constraints still operate today. When 2004 presidential candidate
Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more .even.handed role.
in the Arab.Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of
selling Israel down the river and said his statement was
.irresponsible..78 Virtually all of the top Democrats in the House signed
a hard.hitting letter to Dean criticizing his comments, and the Chicago
Jewish Star reported that .anonymous attackers . are clogging the e.mail
inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning ..without much
evidence ..that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel..79
This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on
Israel.80 His campaign co.chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean
said his own views on the Middle East more closely reflected those of
AIPAC than the more moderate Americans for Peac Now. Dean had merely
suggested that to .bring the sides together,. Washington should act as an
honest broker. This is hardly a radical idea, but it is anathema to the
Lobby, which does not tolerate the idea of even.handedness when it comes
to the Arab.Israeli conflict.
The Lobby.s goals are also served when pro.Israel individuals occupy
important positions in the executive branch. During the Clinton
Administration, for example, Middle East policy was largely shaped by
officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro.Israel
organizations.including Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of
research at AIPAC and co.founder of the pro.Israel Washington Institute
for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving
government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often
visits there.81
These men were among President Clinton.s closest advisors at the Camp
David summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace
process and favored creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only
within the limits of what would be acceptable to Israel.82 In particular,
the American delegation took its cues from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak, coordinated negotiating positions in advance, and did not offer its
own independent proposals for settling the conflict. Not surprisingly,
Palestinian negotiators complained that they were 18 .negotiating with two
Israeli teams ..one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American
flag..83
The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush Administration, whose
ranks include fervently pro.Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John
Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis (.Scooter.) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials
consistently pushed for policies favored by Israel and backed by
organizations in the Lobby.
Manipulating the Media
In addition to influencing government policy directly, the Lobby strives
to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not
want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate
might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently
provide. Accordingly, pro.Israel organizations work hard to influence the
media, think tanks, and academia, because these institutions are critical
in shaping popular opinion.
The Lobby.s perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream
media in good part because most American commentators ae pro.Israel. The
debate among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is
.dominated by people who cannot imagine criticizing Israel..84 He lists 61
.columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel
reflexively and without qualification.. Conversely, Alterman found just
five pundits who consistently criticize Israeli behavior or endorse
pro.Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op.eds
challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favors the
other side.
This pro.Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers.
Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked
that, .Shamir, Sharon, Bibi . whatever those guys want is pretty much fine
by me..85 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent
newspapers like The Chicago Sun.Times and The Washington Times regularly
run editorials that are strongly pro.Israel. Magazines like Commentary,
the New Republic, and the Weekly Standard also zealously defend Israel at
every turn.
Editorial bias is also found in papers like the New York Times. The Times
occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes concedes that the
Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even.handed. In his
memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel
acknowledged 19 the impact his own pro.Israel attitude had on his
editorial choices. In his words: .I was much more deeply devoted to Israel
than I dared to assert.. He goes on: .Fortified by my knowledge of Israel
and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East
commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them
from a pro.Israel perspective.. 86
The media.s reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more
even.handed than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive
to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the
occupied territories without acknowledging Israel.s actual behavior. To
discourage unfavorable reporting on Israel, the Lobby organizes letter
writing campaigns, demonstrations, and boycotts against news outlets whose
content it considers anti.Israel. One CNN executive has said that he
sometimes gets 6,000 e.mail messages in a single day complaining that a
story is anti.Israel.87 Similarly, the pro.Israel Committee for Accurate
Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organized demonstrations outside
National Public Radio stations in 33 cities in May 2003, and it also tried
to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle
East coverage became more sympatheticto Israel.88 Boston.s NPR station,
WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of
these efforts. Pressure on NPR has also come from Israel.s friends in
Congress, who have asked NPR for an internal audit as well as more
oversight of its Middle East coverage.
These factors help explain why the American media contains few criticisms
of Israeli policy, rarely questions Washington.s relationship with Israel,
and only occasionally discusses the Lobby.s profound influence on U.S.
policy.
Think Tanks That Think One Way
Pro.Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important
role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The Lobby created
its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped found WINEP.89
Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel and claims instead that it
provides a .balanced and realistic. perspective on Middle East issues,
this is not the case.90 In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals
who are deeply committed to advancing Israel.s agenda.
The Lobby.s influence in the think tank world extends well beyond WINEP.
Over the past 25 years, pro.Israel forces have established a commanding
presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution,
the 20 Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute,
the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro.Israel, and include few, if
any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.
A good indicator of the Lobby.s influence in the think tank world is the
evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert
on Middle East issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and
former NSC official with a well.deserved reputation for evenhandedness
regarding the Arab.Israeli conflict. Today, however, Brookings.s work on
these issues is conducted through its Saban Center for Middle East
Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, a wealthy Israeli.American
businessman and ardent Zionist.91 The director of the Saban Center is the
ubiquitous Martin Indyk. Thus, what was once a non.partisan policy
institute on Middle East matters is now part of the chorus of largely
pro.Israel think tanks.
Policing Academia
The Lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about Israel on
college campuses, because academic freedom is a core value and because
tenured professors are hard to threaten or silence. Even so, there was
only mild criticism of Israel in the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process
was underway. Criticism rose after that process collapsed and Ariel Sharon
came to power in early 2001, and it became especially intense when the IDF
re.occupied the West Bank in spring 2002 and employed massive force
against the Second Intifada.
The Lobby moved aggressively to .take back the campuses.. New groups
sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers
to U.S. colleges.92 Established groups like the Jewish Council for Public
Affairs and Hillel jumped into the fray, and a new group.the Israel on
Campus Coalition.was formed to coordinate the many groups that now sought
to make Israel.s case on campus. Finally, AIPAC more than tripled its
spending for programs to monitor university activities and to train young
advocates for Israel, in order to .vastly expand the number of students
involved on campus . . . in the national pro.Israel effort..93
The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September
2002, for example, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately
pro.Israel neoconservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that
posted dossiers on 21 suspect academics and encouraged students to report
comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel.94 This
transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted a harsh
reaction and Pipes and Kramer later removed he dossiers, but the website
still invites students to report alleged anti.Israel behavior at U.S.
colleges.
Groups in the Lobby also direct their fire at particular professors and
the universities that hire them. Columbia University, which had the late
Palestinian scholar Edward Said on its faculty, has been a frequent target
of pro.Israel forces. Jonathan Cole, the former Columbia provost, reported
that, .One can be sure that any public statement in support of the
Palestinian people by the preeminent literary critic Edward Said wil
elicit hundreds of e.mails, letters, and journalistic accounts that call
on us to denounce Said and to either sanction or fire him..95 When
Columbia recruited historian Rashid Khalidi from the University of
Chicago, Cole says that .the complaints started flowing in from people who
disagreed with the content of his political views.. Princeton faced the
same problem a few years later when it considered wooing Khalidi away from
Columbia.96
A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late
2004, when the .David Project. produced a propaganda film alleging that
faculty in Columbia University.s Middle East studies program were
anti.Semitic and were intimidating Jewish students who defended Israel.97
Columbia was raked over the coals in pro.Israel circles, but a faculty
committee assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of
anti.Semitism and the only incident worth noting was the possibility that
one professor had .responded heatedly. to a student.s question.98 The
committee also discovered that the accused professors had been the target
of an overt intimidation campaign.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this campaign to eliminate criticism
of Israel from college campuses is the effort by Jewsh groups to push
Congress to establish mechanisms that monitor what professors say about
Israel.99 Schools judged to have an anti.Israel bias would be denied
Federal funding. This effort to get the U.S. government to police campuses
have not yet succeeded, but the attempt illustrates the importance
pro.Israel groups place on controlling debate on these issues.
Finally, a number of Jewish philanthropists have established Israel
studies programs (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programs
that already exist) so as to increase the number of Israel.friendly
scholars on campus.100 NYU 22 announced the establishment of the Taub
Center for Israel Studies on May 1, 2003, and similar programs have been
established at other schools like Berkeley, Brandeis, and Emory. Academic
administrators emphasize the pedagogical value of these programs, but the
truth is that they are intended in good part to promote Israel.s image on
campus. Fred Laffer, the head of the Taub Foundation, makes clear that his
foundation funded the NYU center to help counter the .Arabic [sic] point
of view. that he thinks is prevalent in NYU.s Middle East programs.101
In sum, the Lobby has gone to considerable lengths to insulate Israel from
criticism on college campuses. It has not been as successful in academia
as it has been on Capitol Hill, but it has worked hard to stifle criticism
of Israel by professors and students and there is much less of it on
campuses today102
The Great Silencer
No discussion of how the Lobby operates would be complete without
examining one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of anti.Semitism.
Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro.Israel groups have
significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy.an influence that AIPAC
celebrates.stands a good chance of getting labeled an anti.Semite. In
fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel Lobby runs the risk of being
charged with anti.Semitism, even though the Israeli media themselves refer
to America.s .Jewish Lobby.. In effect, the Lobby boasts of its own power
and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it. This tactic is very
effective, because anti.Semitism is loathsome and no responsible person
wants to be accused of it.
Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticize Israeli
policy in recent years, which some attribute to a resurgence of
anti.Semitism in Europe. We are .getting to a point,. the U.S. Ambassador
to the European Union said in early 2004, .where it is as bad as it was in
the 1930s..103 Measuring anti.Semitism is a complicated matter, but the
weight of evidence points in the opposite direction. For example, in the
spring of 2004, when accusations of European anti.Semitism filled the air
in America, separate surveys of European public opinion conducted by the
Anti.Defamation League and the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press showed that it was actually declining.104
Consider France, which pro.Israel forces often portray as the most
anti.Semitic state in Europe. A poll of French citizens in 2002 found
that: 89 percent could envisage living with a Jew; 97 percent believe
making anti.Semitic graffiti is a 23 serious crime; 87 percent think
attacks on French synagogues are scandalous; and 85 percent of practicing
French Catholics reject the charge that Jews have too much influence in
business and finance.105 It is unsurprising that the head of the French
Jewish community declared in the summer of 2003 that .France is not more
anti.Semitic than America..106 According to a recent article in Ha.aretz,
the French police report that anti.Semitic incidents in France declined by
almost 50 per cent in 2005; and this despite the fact that France has the
largest Muslim population of any country in Europe.107
Finally, when a French Jew was brutally murdered last month by a Muslim
gang, tens of thousands of French demonstrators poured into the streets to
condemn anti.Semitism. Moreover, President Jacques Chirac and Prime
Minister Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim.s memorial service
in a public showof solidarity with French Jewry.108 It is also worth
noting that in 2002 more Jews immigrated to Germany than Israel, making it
.the fastest growing Jewish community in the world,. according to an
article in the Jewish newspaper Forward.109 If Europe were really heading
back to the 1930s, it is hard to imagine that Jews would be moving there
in large numbers.
We recognize, however, that Europe is not free of the scourge of
anti.Semitism. No one would deny that there are still some virulent
autochthonous anti.Semites in Europe (as there are in the United States)
but their numbers are small and their extreme views are rejected by the
vast majority of Europeans. Nor would one deny that there is anti.Semitism
among European Muslims, some of it provoked by Israel.s behavior towards
the Palestinians and some of it straightforwardly racist. 110 This problem
is worrisome, but it is hardly out of control. Muslims constitute less
than five percent of Europe.s total population, and European governments
are working hard to combat the problem. Why? Because most Europeans reject
such hateful views.111 In short, when it comes to anti.Semitism, Europe
today bears hardly any resemblance to Europe in the 1930s.
This is why pro.Israel forces, when pressed to go beyond assertion, claim
that there is a .new anti.Semitism., which they equate with criticism of
Israel.112 In other words criticize Israeli policy and you are by
definition an anti.Semite. When the synod of the Church of England
recently voted to divest from Caterpillar Inc on the grounds that
Caterpillar manufacures the bulldozers used to demolish Palestinian homes,
the Chief Rabbi complained that it would .have the most adverse
repercussions on ... Jewish.Christian relations in Britain., while Rabbi
Tony Bayfield, the head of the Reform movement, said: ..There is a clear
problem of anti.Zionist .verging on anti.Semitic .attitudes emerging in
the grass 24 roots, and even in the middle ranks of the Church..113
However, the Church was neither guilty of anti.Zionism nor anti.Semitism;
it was merely protesting Israeli policy.114
Critics are also accused of holding Israel to an unfair standard or
questioning its right to exist. But these are bogus charges too. Western
critics of Israel hardly ever question its right to exist. Instead, they
question its behavior towards the Palestinians, which is a legitimate
criticism: Israelis question it themselves. Nor is Israel being judged
unfairly. Rather, Israeli treatment of the Palestinians elicits criticism
because it is contrary to widely.accepted human rights norms and
international law, as well as the principle of national
self.determination. And it is hardly the only state that has faced sharp
criticism on these grounds.
In sum, other ethnic lobbies can only dream of having the political muscle
that pro.Israel organizations possess. The question, therefore, is what
effect does the Lobby have on U.S. foreign policy?
THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG
If the Lobby.s impact were confined to U.S. economic aid to Israel, its
influence might not be that worrisome. Foreign aid is valuable, but not as
useful as having the world.s only superpower bring its vast capabilities

Varför Amerika ska inte ändring det är MiddleEast utrikespolitik
Automatically translated into Swedish thanks to WorldLingo
Harvard studie: Den Israel lobbyen och U.S.NA. Satt
den tryckbara sidan
för utrikespolitik, 2006-03-18 14:34 - admin
John J. Mearsheimer och
Stephen M. Walt
John F. Kennedy skolar av den regerings- Harvarduniversitetet
mars 2006
U.S. utrikespolitik formar händelser i varje tränga någon av jordklotet. Ingenstans är
denna som är riktigare än i Mellanösten, en region av återkommande ostadighet och
jättelik strategisk betydelse. För en tid sedan, har det Bush Administration.s
försök att omforma regionen in i en gemenskap av demokratier hjälpt
jordbruksprodukter en elastisk insurency i Irak, en korlöneförhöjning i världsoljepriser
och terroristbombningar i Madrid, London och Amman. Med så mycket på insatsen
för så många behöver alla länder att förstå styrkorna som kör U.S.
Mellanösten politik.
U.S.NA. medborgare intresserar bör vara det primärt anmärker av amerikan
utrikespolitik. För förflutnan kriger flera årtionden, emellertid och
speciellt efter dagen sex i 1967, höjdpunkten av U.S. Mellanösten politik
har varit dess förhållande med Israel. Kombinationen av unwavering U.S.
service för Israel och det släkta försöket till den spridda demokratialltigenom
regionen har förvärrat arabisk och islamisk åsikt och eopardized U.S.
säkerhet.
Detta läge har ingen jämlike i politisk historia för amerikan. Why
påstår har det enigt varit villigt till uppsättningen åt sidan dess egna säkerhet, för att som
för- intresserar av ett annat statligt? En styrka antar att förbindelsen
mellan de två länderna baseras på delat strategiskt intresserar eller
tvinga moraliska imperativs. Jämna av materiell och diplomatisk service som är den Förenta staterna povides till
Israel, som vi visar nedanfört, emellertid neither av
de förklaringar kan redogöra för det anmärkningsvärt.
I stället den total- framstöten av U.S. politik i regionen är rakt nästan
helt till U.S. inhemsk politik, och speciellt till aktiviteterna av
. Israel lobby. Andra specialintressegrupper har klarat av för att köra
U.S. skevt. utrikespolitik i riktningar som de favoriserade, men ingen lobby har klarat av
för att avleda U.S. utrikespolitik som vad amerikanmedborgare intresserar
skulle annars, föreslår långtifrån, stunder som övertygar samtidigt
amerikaner som U.S. och israelen intresserar är i grunden identical.1
i sidorna, som följer, oss beskriver hur lobbyen har fulländat denna
bedrift, och hur dess aktiviteter har format America.s-handlingar i denna
kritiska region. Givet den strategiska betydelsen av Mellanösten och dess
potentiellt få effekt på andra, båda amerikaner och non. Amerikaner behöver
att förstå och tilltala Lobby.s-påverkan på U.S. politik. 1
några ska avläsare finner denna analys som störer, men fakta som här
räknas om, är inte i allvarlig tvist bland forskare. Sannerligen relies vårt konto
tungt på arbetet av israeliska forskare, och journalister, som förtjänar store,
krediterar för utgjutelsen på dessa utfärdar lätt. Vi rely också bevisar på
förutsatt att av respekterade israel- och landskampmänsklig rättighet
organisationar. På motsvarande sätt vårt fordrar om Lobby.sen får effekt rely på
vittnesbörd från de egna medlemmarna för Lobby.s, as well as vittnesbörd från
politikar som har fungerat med dem. Avläsare kan utskottsvaran våra avslutningar,
naturligtvis bara bevisa på som dem vilar, är inte kontroversiellt.
DEN STORA VÄLGÖRAREN
efter Oktober kriger i 1973, Washington har git Israel med ett jämnt
av service som ställa i skuggan beloppen förutsatt att till något annat statligt. Det har varit
det största årliga mottagareare av riktar U.S. ekonomisk och militär
hjälp efter 1976 och det största sammanlagda mottagareare, sedan världen kriger II.
Slutsumman riktar U.S. bistå till Israel belopp till brunnen över $140 miljard i 2003
dollars.2 Israel mottar omkring $3 miljard riktar in utländsk hjälp
varje år, som är ungefärligt one.fifth av America.s-utlandsbiståndbudgeten. I
per capita benämner, ger Förenta staterna varje israel en riktasubvention
värd om $500 per denna largesse year.3 är speciellt slå, när man
realiserar, att Israel är ett förmöget industriellt påstår nu med en per capita
incom ungefärligt lika till Sydkorea eller Spain.4
Israel får också andra speciala avtal från Washington.5 som annan bistår
mottagare får deras pengar i quarterly amorteringar, men Israel mottar
dess hela anslag på början av varje räkenskapsår och tjänar
thus extrahjälpen intresserar. Mest mottagare av militär hjälp för amerikanen
krävs att spendera allt det i Förenta staterna, men Israel kan använda
ungefärligt twenty.five-procent av dess bistår odlingslott för att subventionera dess egna
försvarsindustri. Israel är det enda mottagareare som inte måste
att redogöra för, hur bistå spenderas, en befrielse, som makes det som faktiskt
är omöjligt att förhindra pengarna från att användas för, ämnar det enigt
påstår motsätter, lika byggnadsbosättningar i det västra packar ihop.
Dessutom har Förenta staterna git Israel med nästan $3 miljard
för att framkalla vapensystem för att gilla det Lavi flygplanet, som pentagonen inte
önskade eller behövde, stunden som ger Israel, tar fram till top.drawer U.S. sprutar ut lika
Blackhawk för weaponry helikoptrar och F.16. Slutligen ger Förenta staterna
Israel tar fram till intelligens, att den förnekar dess NATO-bundsförvanter och
har vänt en rullgardin synar in mot det Israels förvärvet av kärn- weapons.6
2 i tillägg, Washington ger Israel med jämn diplomatisk
service. Efter 1982 har Förenta staterna vetoed 32 Förenta nation
säkerhetsrådetupplösningar, som var kritiska av Israel, en mer stor
numrera, än den kombinerade slutsumman av vetoescasten av alla annat säkerhets
råd members.7 det arabiska kvarter påstår också. försök att sätta den kärn-
arsenalen för Israel.s på landskampatomenergin Agency.s agenda.8
Förenta staterna kommer till Israel.s-räddningsaktionen i krigstid och tar också dess
sida, när de förhandlar fred. Den Nixon administrationen re.supplied Israel
under Oktober kriger och skyddade Israel från hot av sovjetiskt
ingripande. Washington var djupt involverad i förhandlingarna som
avslutade det kriger, såväl som den långa .step.by.stepen. bearbeta följd
det, precis, som den lekte en huvudroll i avtalsförhandlingen som kom före
och följde Oslo 1993 Accords.9 där var tillfälliga friktioner
mellan U.S. och israeliska representanter i båda fall, men Förenta staterna
koordinerade dess placerar nära med Israel, och konsekvent drog tillbaka
israelen att närma sig till negotitionsna. Sannerligen en amerikandeltagare på
lägerDavid (2000) mer sistnämnda said, .far för ofta, fungerade vi. . . som
Israel.s lawyer..10
som diskuterat nedanfört har Washington givit Israel bred frihet, i att handla
med de upptagna territorierna (det västra packar ihop och Gazaremsan), även om
dess handlingar var på odds med påstod U.S. politik. Dessutom Bush
Administration.s ämnade den ambitiösa strategin som omformar en mitt
East.beginning med invasionen av Iraq.is åtminstone delvis, förbättra strategiskt
läge för Israel.s. Frånsett krigstidallianser, är det hårt till funderare av
another anföra som exempel var ett land har git another med ett liknande
jämnar av materiellt och diplomaticsupport för en sådan extended period.
America.s-service för Israel är, i kort stavelse som är unik.
Denna utöver det vanliga generositet kan är begriplig, om Israel var
en livsviktig strategisk tillgång, eller om det fanns ett tvinga morafall för
tålde U.S. täckning. Men ingen av logisk grund övertygar.
ETT STRATEGISKT ANSVAR
enligt websiten för American.Israel-statlig affär Committee.s (AIPAC
), förenad .the påstår, och Israel har bildat ett unikt partnerskap
för att möta de växande strategiska hoten i Mellanösten. . . . Detta
kooperativ som försök ger viktigt, gynnar för det båda enigt
påstår, och Israel..11 denna fordrar, är en artikel av tro bland Israel.s-
supportrar och åkallas rutinmässigt av Israel politikar och pro. Israel
amerikaner.
3 Israel kan ha varit en strategisk tillgång under förkylningen War.12 av portion
, som America.s-närståenden efter dagen sex kriger (1967), Israel som hjälps för att innehålla
sovjetisk utvidgning i regionen och tillfogas förödmjuka nederlag på sovjetiska
beställare lika Egypten och Syrien. Israel som hjälps tillfälligt för att skydda andra
U.S. bundsförvanter (lik Jordan.s-konung Hussein) och dess militära prowess tvingade
Moscow för att spendera mer täckning dess losing beställare. Israel gav också
det enigt påstår användbar intelligens om sovjetiska kapaciteter.
Strategiska Israel.s värderar under denna period bör inte overstateds,
however.13 var täckningen Israel inte billig, och den försvårade America.s-
förbindelse med den arabiska världen. Till exempel U.S.NA. beslutet som ger
Israel $2.2 miljard i nöd- militär, bistår under Oktober kriger
startade en OPEC-oljahandelsförbud som tillfogade västra ekonomier för betydlig skade
nolla. Dessutom kunde Israel.s-militären inte skydda U.S. intresserar i
regionen. Till exempel kunde måste Förenta staterna inte rely på Israel
när den iranska rotationen i 1979 lyftta bekymmer om säkerheten
av persiska Glf oljatillförsel och att skapa dess eget. Forutplacering
styrka. i stället.
Om även Israel var en strategisk tillgång under kalla kriget, kriger den första
golfen (1990.91) avslöjt att Israel var passande en strategisk börda.
Det enigt påstår kunde inte använda israeliska baser under kriga, utan att brista
anti. Irak förening och den måste att avleda resurser (e.g., patriot
missilbatterier) till uppehälletelefon Aviv från att göra något att styrkan
bryter alliansen mot Saddam. Historia upprepade sig i 2003:
även om Israel var ivrig för att Förenta staterna ska anfalla Saddam,
kunde presidenten Bush inte fråga den för att hjälpa, utan att starta arabisk
opposition. Så blev Israel på början för sidlinjer
again.14 i 90-tal och speciellt efter 9/11, U.S. service för Israel
har varit befogad vid fordra att båda påstår hotas av
terroristgrupper som påbörjar i Arabor den Muslim världen, och vid en uppsättning av
.rogue påstår. den baksida dessa grupper och sökanden WMD. Denna logisk grund antyder
att Washington bör ge Israel en fria händer i att handla med
palestinierna och inte pressen Israel t gör medgivanden, tills alla palestinska
terrorister fängslas eller dead. Det antyder också att Förenta staterna
bör gå, efter länder har gillat Islamiska republiken Iran, Saddam
Hussein.s Irak och Bashar al. Assad.s Syrien. Israel ses thus som
en avgörande bundsförvant i kriga på skräck, därför att dess fiender är America.s-
fiender.
Denna nya logisk grund verkar övertalande, men Israel är i faktum ett ansvar i
kriga på skräck, och det mer breda försöket att handla med skälm påstår.
4 att börja med, .terrorism. är en taktik som används av en bred samling av
politiska grupper; det är inte singeln enad adversary. Terrorist
organisationarna, som hotar Israel (e.g., Hamas eller Hezbollah) hotar
inte Förenta staterna, undantar, när den ingriper mot dem (som i
Libanon i 1982). Dessutom är palestinsk terrorism inte slumpmässigt våld som
riktas mot västra Israel eller .the. ; det är i hög grad ett svar till
den långvariga aktionen för Israel.s att kolonisera det västra packar ihop och Gazaremsan.
Huvudsakligen, har ordstävet, som Israel och Förenta staterna förenas av
ett delat terroristhot, en tillfällig bekantskap tillbaka: ganska
påstår det enigt har ett terrorismproblem i bra del, därför att den förenas
så nära med Israel, inte annat långt omkring. U.S. service för
Israel är inte den enda källan av anti. Amerikanterrorism, men den är
viktig, och den gör att segra kriga på skräck som mer difficult.15
där är ingen ifrågasätter, till exempel, att många alQaeda ledare, slänga i soptunnan
däribland Laden, motiveras av Israel.s-närvaro i Jerusalem och, svår situation
av palestinierna. Enligt U.S.NA. 9/11 kommission, slänga i soptunnan Laden som
söks tydligt till, bestraffar Förenta staterna för dess politik i
Mellanösten som är inklusive dess service för Israel, och han försökte även att tajma
attackerna för att markera denna lika
viktiga issue.16, ovillkorliga U.S. service för Israel gör det lättare
för extremistnågot liknande att slänga i soptunnan Laden för att samla populär service och för att tilldra
rekryt. Allmän opinionröstningar bekräftar, att arabiska befolkningar är djupt
fientliga till amerikanservice för Israel, och U.S.NA. Den statliga rådgivande
gruppen för Department.s på offentlig diplomati för den arabiska och Muslim världen grundar
, att .citizens i dessa länder bedrövas genuint på svår situation
av palestinierna och på rollen de märker Förenta staterna för att vara
playing..17,
som för so.called-skälm påstår i Mellanösten, dem är inte ett förfärligt
hot till livsviktiga U.S. intresserar frånsett U.S.NA. förpliktelse till Israel
sig själv. Även om Förenta staterna har ett nummer av motsättningar
med dessa styren, var Washington som skulle för att inte vara nästan som oroad om Iran
, Ba.thist Irak eller Syrien det som inte bands så nära till Israel. Om få
kärn- weapons.which är självfallet inte desirable.it som skulle för att inte vara
en strategisk katastrof för Förenta staterna, även dessa påstår. Neither Amerika
nor Israel kunde utövas utpressning mot av en nuclear.armed-skälm, därför att
blackmaileren inte kunde bära ut hot utan överväldigande vedergällning
för häleri. Faran av en .nuclear-handoff. till terrorister är lika
avlägset, därför att beröva statligt inte kunde vara säkert att den skulle överföringen är
oupptäckt eller det som den skulle för att inte klandras och bestraffas därefter. 5
dessutom, U.S.NA. förhållandet med Israel faktiskt makes påstår det som är mer hård
att handla med dessa. Är den kärn- arsenalen för Israel.s en resonerar varför några av
dess grann önskar kärnvapen, och hota dessa påstår med
förhöjningar för styreändring bara som lust. Yet Israel är inte mycket av
en tillgång, när Förenta staterna beskådar genom att använda styrka mot dessa
styren, därför att den kan inte delta i slagsmål.
I kort stavelse som behandlar Israel som viktigaste bundsförvanten för America.s den i aktionen
mot terrorism och blandad kapacitet för Mellanösten diktatur
bothexaggerates Israel.s för att hjälpa på dessa, utfärdar och ignorerar vägen som
Israel.s-politik gör U.S. svårare försök.
Unquestioned service för Israel försvagar också U.S.NA. placera utanför
Mellanösten. Konsekvent utländska eliter beskådar Förenta staterna som för
understöd av Israel, och funderare dess tolerans av israelisk repression i
de upptagna territorierna är morally obtuse och ett handikapp i kriga på
terroism.18 i April 2004, till exempel, 52 tidigare brittiska diplomats som överförs
premiärministern Tony Blair ett märkaordstäv, som Israel.Palestine-
konflikten hade .poisoned-förbindelse mellan de västra och arabiska och islamiska
världarna. och den varnande, att politiken av Bush och premiärministern Ariel
Sharon var, .one.sided- och för illegal..19
A finalen resonerar för att ifrågasätta strategisk Israel.s värderar är att den inte
agerar något liknande en lojal bundsförvant. Israeliska representanter ignorerar vanligt U.S. förfrågan
och bryta ett löfte på löften som göras för att överträffa U.S. ledare (inklusive förgångna löften till
stoppbosättningkonstruktion och till refrängen från .tar geted lönnmord.
av palestinska ledare) .20 dessutom, har Israel git känsliga U.S.
militär teknologi till potentiella U.S. rivaler gillar Kina, i vad U.S.NA.
Utrikesdepartementet Inspector.General som kallas .a som är systematisk och växer,
mönstrar av obehörig transfers..21 enligt U.S.NA. Allmänt
redogöra kontor, Israel också .conducts de mest aggressiva spionage
funktionerna mot U.S.NA. av någon ally..22 förutom fallet av
Jonathan Pollard, som gav Israel stort antal av hemligt materiellt
i tidig sort80-tal (som Israel passerade enligt rapporten på den sovjetiska unionen
för att nå mer går ut visas för sovjetiska judar), fick utbrott en ny tvist i
2004, då det avslöjdes att en nyckel- Pentagonrepresentant (Larry Franklin)
hade passerat hemlig information till en israelisk diplomat som bistods allegedly
av två AIPAC officials.23 Israel är knappt det enda landet som spionerar på
Förenta staterna, men dess villighet som spionerar på dess främsta beskyddare
casts tvivlar vidare, på dess strategiskt värderar.
6 ETT FÖRMINSKAS MORALISKT FALL
dess föregav strategiskt värderar frånsett som, Israel.s-hjälpare argumenterar också att
det förtjänar okvalificerade U.S. service, därför att 1) det är svag och omgiven
av fiender, 2) är det en demokrati, som är ett morally helst bildar av
regering; 3) the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and
therefore deserve special treatment, and 4) Israel.s conduct has been
morally superior to its adversaries. behavior.
On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive.
There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel.s existence, but that
is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, Israel.s past and present conduct
offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.
Backing the Underdog?
Israel is often portrayed as weak and besieged, a Jewish David surrounded
by a hostile Arab Goliath. This image has been carefully nurtured by
Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers, but the opposite image is closer
to the truth. Contrary to popular belief, the Zionists had larger,
better.equipped, and better.led forces during the 1947.49 War of
Independence and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won quick and easy
victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in
1967.before large.scale U.S. aid began flowing to Israel.24 These
victories offer eloquent evidence of Israeli patriotism, organizational
ability, and military prowess, but they also reveal that Israel was far
from helpless even in its earliest years.
Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its
conventional forces are far superior to its neighbors and it is the only
state in the region with nuclear weapons. Egypt and Jordan signed peace
treaties with Israel and Saudi Arabia has offered to do so as well. Syria
has lost its Soviet patron, Iraq has been decimated by three disastrous
wars, and Iran is hundreds of miles away. The Palestinians barely have
effective police, let alone a military that could threaten Israel.
According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University.s prestigious Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, .the strategic balance decidedly favors
Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own
military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neghbors..25 If
backing the underdog were a compelling rationale, the United States would
be supporting Israel.s opponents.
7 Aiding a Fellow Democracy?
American backing is often justified by the claim that Israel is a
fellow.democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships. This rationale
sounds convincing, but it cannot account for the current level of U.S.
support. After all, there are many democracies around the world, but none
receives the lavish support that Israel does. The United States has
overthrown democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when
this was thought to advance .S. interests, and it has good relations with
a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic neither justifies
nor explains America.s support for Israel.
The .shared democracy. rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli
democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is
a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are
supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded
as a Jewish state and citizenship is based on the principle of blood
kinship.26 Given this conception of citizenship, it is not surprising that
Israel.s 1.3 million Arabs are treated as second.class citizens, or that a
recent Israeli government commission found that Israel behaves in a
.neglectful and discriminatory. manner towards them.27
Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens
to become citizens themselves, and does not give these spouses the right
to live in Israel. The Israeli human rights organization B.tselem called
this restriction .a racist law that determines who can live here according
to racist criteria..28 Such laws may be understandable given Israel.s
founding principles, but they are not consistent with America.s image of
democracy.
Israel.s democratic status is also undermined by its refusal to grant the
Palestinians a viable state of their own. Israel controls the lives of
about 3.8 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, while colonizing
lands on which the Palestinians have long dwelt. Israel is formally
democratic, but the millions of Palestinians that it controls are denied
full political rights and the .shared democracy. rationale is
correspondingly weakened.
Compensation for Past Crimes
A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the
Christian West, especially the tragic episode of the Holocaust. Because
Jews were persecuted for 8 centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish
homeland, many believe that Israel deserves special treatment from the
United States.
There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy
of anti.Semitism, and that Israel.s creation was an appropriate response
to a long record of crimes. This history, as noted, provides a strong
moral case for supporting Israel.s existence. But the creation of Israel
involved additional crimes against a largely innocent third party: the
Palestinians.
The history of these events is well.understood. When political Zionism
began in earnest in the late 19th century, there were only about 15,000
Jews in Palestine.29 In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95
percent of the population, and though under Ottoman control, they had been
in continuous possession of this territory for 1300 years.30 Even when
Israel was founded, Jews were only about 35 percent of Palestine.s
population and owned 7 percent of the land.31
The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a
bi.national state or accepting a permanent partition of Palestine. The
Zionist leadership was sometimes willing to accept partition as a first
step, but this was a tactical maneuver and not their real objective. As
David Ben.Gurion put it in the late 1930s, .After the formation of a large
army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we shall abolish
partition and expand to the whole of Palestine..32
To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs
from the territory that would eventually become Israel. There was simply
no other way to accomplish their objective. Ben.Gurion saw the problem
clearly, writing in 1941 that .it is impossible to imagine general
evacuation [of the Arab population] without compulsion, and brutal
compulsion..33 Or as Israeli historian Benny Morris puts it, .the idea of
transfer is as old as modern Zionism and has accompanied its evolution and
praxis during the past century..34
This opportunity came in 1947.48, when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000
Palestinians into exile.35 Israeli officials have long claimed that the
Arabs fled because their leaders told them to, but careful scholarship
(much of it by Israeli historians like Morris) have demolished this myth.
In fact, most Arab leaders urged the Palestinian population to stay home,
but fear of violent death at the hands of Zionist forces led most of them
to flee.36 After the war, Israel barred the return of the Palestinian
exiles.
9 The fact that the creation of Israel entailed a moral crime against the
Palestinian people was well understood by Israel.s leadrs. As Ben.Gurion
told Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, .If I were an
Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have
taken their country. . . . We come from Israel, but two thousand years
ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti.Semitism, the Nazis,
Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we
have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?.37
Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the
Palestinians. national ambitions.38 Prime Minister Golda Meir famously
remarked that .there was no such thing as a Palestinian,. and even Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, nonetheless
opposed creating a full.fledged Palestinian state.39 Pressure from
extremist violence and the growing Palestinian population has forced
subsequent Israeli leaders to disengage rom some of the occupied
territories and to explore territorial compromise, but no Israeli
government has been willing to offer the Palestinians a viable state of
their own. Even Prime Minister Ehud Barak.s purportedly generous offer at
Camp David in July 2000 would only have given the Palestiniansa disarmed
and dismembered set of .Bantustans. under de facto Israeli control.40
Europe.s crimes against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for
Israel.s right to exist. But Israel.s survival is not in doubt.even if
some Islamic extremists make outrageous and unrealistic references to
.wiping it off the map..and the tragic history of the Jewish people does
not obligate the United States to help Israel no matter what it does
today.
.Virtuous Israelis. versus .Evil Arabs.
The final moral argument portrays Israel as a country that has sought
peace at every turn and showed great restraint even when rovoked. The
Arabs, by contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. This
narrative.which is endlessly repeated by Israeli leaders and American
apologists such as Alan Dershowitz.is yet another myth.41 In terms of
actual behavior, Israel.s conduct is not morally distinguishable from the
actions of its opponents.
Israeli scholarship shows that the early Zionists were far from benevolent
towards the Palestinian Arabs.42 The Arab inhabitants did resist the
Zionists. encroachments, which is hardly surprising given that the
Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab lands. The Zionists
responded vigorously, and 10 neither side owns the moral high ground
during this period. This same scholarship also reveals that the creation
of Israel in 1947.48 involved explicit acts of ethnic cleansing, including
executions, massacres, and rapes by Jews.43
Furthermore, Israel.s subsequent conduct towards its Arab adversaries and
its Palestinian subjects has often been brutal, belying any claim to
morally superior conduct. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli
security forces killed between 2,700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the
overwhelming majority of them unarmed.44 The IDF conducted numerous
cross.border raids against its neighbors in the early 1950s, and though
these actions were portrayed as defensive responses, they were actually
part of a broader effort to expand Israel.s borders. Israel.s expansionist
ambitions also led it to join Britain and France in attacking Egypt in
1956, and Israel withdrew from the lands it had conquered only in the face
of intense U.S. pressure. 45
The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners.of.war in both the
1956 and 1967 wars.46 In 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000
Palestinians from the newly.conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians
from the Golan Heights.47 It was also complicit in the massacre of 700
innocent Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps following its
invsion of Lebanon in 1982, and an Israeli investigatory commission found
then.Defence Minister Sharon .personally responsible. for these
atrocities.48
Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners,
systematically humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and
used force indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the
First Intifida (1987.1991), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to
its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian
protestors. The Swedish .Save the Children. organization estimated that
.23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating
injuries in the first two years of the intifida,. with nearly one.third
sustaining broken bones. Nearly one.third of the beaten children were aged
ten and under..49
Israel.s response to the Second Intifida (2000.2005) has been even more
violent, leading Ha.aretz to declare that .the IDF . is turning into a
killing machine whose efficiency is awe.inspiring, yet shocking..50 The
IDF fired one million bullets in the first days of the uprising, which is
far from a measured response.51 Since then, Israel has killed 3.4
Palestinians for every Israeli lost, the majority of whom have been
innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children killed
is even higher (5.7 to 1).52 Israeli forces have also killed several
foreign 11 peace activists, including a 23 year.old American woman crushed
by an Israeli bulldozer in March 2003.53
These facts about Israel.s conduct have been amply documented by numerous
human rights organizations.including prominent Israeli groups.and are not
disputed by fair.minded observers. And that is why four former officials
of Shin Bet (the Israeli domestic security organization) condemned
Israel.s conduct during the Second Intifada in November 2003. One of them
declared .we are behaving disgracefully,. and another termed Israel.s
conduct .patently immoral..54
But isn.t Israel entitled to do whatever it takes to protect its citizens?
Doesn.t the unique evil of terrorism justify continued U.S. support, even
if Israel often responds harshly?
In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either.
Palestinians have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and
their willingness to attack innocent civilians is wrong. This behavior is
not surprising, however, because the Palestinians believe they have no
other way to force Israeli concessions. As former Prime Minister Barak
once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he .would have joined a
terrorist organization..55
Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used terrorism when they
were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their on state.
Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist
bombings to drive the British from Palestine, and took the lives of many
innocent civilians along the way.56 Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N.
mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, because they opposed his proposal
to internationalize Jerusalem.57 Nor were the perpetrators of these acts
isolated extremists: the leaders of the murder plot were eventually
granted amnesty by the Israeli government and one of them was elected to
the Knsset. Another terrorist leader, who approved the murder but was not
tried, was future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, Shamir openly
argued that .neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify
terrorism as a means of combat.. Rather, terrorism had .a great part to
play . in our war against the occupier [Britain]..58 If the Palestinians.
use of terrorism is morally reprehensible today, so was Israel.s reliance
upon it in the past, and thus one cannot justify U.S. support for Israel
on the grounds that its past conduct was morally superior.59
12 Israel may not have acted worse than many other countries, but it
clearly has not acted any better. And if neither strategic nor moral
arguments can account for America.s support for Israel, how are we to
explain it?
THE ISRAEL LOBBY
The explanation lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were it
not for the Lobby.s ability to manipulate the American political system,
the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less
intimate than it is today.
What Is The Lobby?
We use .the Lobby.as a convenient short.hand term for the loose coalition
of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape U.S. foreign
policy in a pro.Israel direction. Our use of this term is not meant to
suggest that .the Lobby.is a unified movement with a central leadership,
or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues
The core of the Lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant
effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it
advances Israel.s interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for
candidates who are pro.Israel to include letter.writing, financial
contributions, and supporting pro.Israel organizations. But not all
Jewish.Americans are part of the Lobby, because Israel is not a salient
issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly 36 percent
of Jewish.Americans said they were either .not very. or .not at all.
emotionally attached to Israel.60
Jewish.Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key
organizations in the Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of
Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally
supported the expansionist policies of Israel.s Likud Party, including its
hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other
hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the
Palestinians, and a few groups.such as Jewish Voice for Peace.strongly
advocate such steps.61 Despite these differences, moderates and hardliners
both support steadfast U.S. support for Israel.
Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli
officials, so that the former can maximize their influence in the United
States. As one activist with a major Jewish organization wrote, .it is
routine for us to say: .This is our 13 policy on a certain issue, but we
must check what the Israelis think.. We as a community do it all the
time..62 There is also a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy,
and Jewish.American leaders rarely support putting pressure on Israel.
Thus, Edgar Bronfman Sr., the president of the World Jewish Congress, was
accused of .perfidy. when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid.2003
urging Bush to pressure Israel to curb construction of its controversial
.security fence..63 Critics declared that, .It would be obscene at any
time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the president
of the United States to rsist policies being promoted by the government of
Israel..
Similarly, when Israel Policy Forum president Seymour Reich advised
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pressure Israel to reopen a crtical
border crossing in the Gaza Strip in November 2005, critics denounced his
action as .irresponsible behavior,. and declared that, .There is
absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing
against the security.related policies . . . of Israel..64 Recoiling from
these attacks, Reich proclaimed that .the word pressure is not in my
vocabulary when it comes to Israel..
Jewish.Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to
influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and
well.known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their
staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington.65 AIPAC was ranked
second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP), but ahead
of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL.CIO and the National Rifle
Association. A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar
conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in the
Washington.s .muscle rankings..66
The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer,
Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and
Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They
believe Israel.s rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its
expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is contrary to God.s
will.67 In addition, the Lobby.s membership includes neoconservative
gentiles such as John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert
Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former U.N.
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and columnist George Will. 14
Sources of Power
The United States has a divided government that offers many ways to
influence the policy process. As a result, interest groups can shape
policy in many different ways.by lobbying elected representatives and
members of the executive branch, making campaign contributions, voting in
elections, molding public opinion, etc.
Furthermore, special interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when
they are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the populaton is
indifferent. Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about
the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the
rest of the population will not penalize them.
The Israel Lobby.s power flows from its unmatched ability to play this
game of interest group politics. In its basic operations, it is no
different from interest groups like the Farm Lobby, steel and textile
workers, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel Lobby apart is its
extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American
Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway U.S. policy towards
Israel. The Lobby.s activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in
anti.Semitic tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the most
part, the individuals and groups that comprise the Lobby are doing what
other special interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro.Arab
interest groups are weak to non.existent, which makes the Lobby.s task
even easier.68
Strategies for Success
The Lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel.
First, it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both
Congress and the Executive branch to support Israel down the line.
Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker.s own views, the Lobby
tries to make supporting Israel the .smart. political choice.
Second, the Lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel
portrays it in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its
founding and by publicizing Israel.s side in the policy debates of the
day. The goal is to prevent critical commentary about Israel from getting
a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential
to guaranteeing U.S. support, because a 15 candid discussion of
U.S..Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy.
Influencing Congress
A key pillar of the Lobby.s effectiveness is its influence in the U.S.
Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This is in
itself a remarkable situation, because Congress almost never shies away
from contentious issues. Whether the issue is abortion, affirmative
action, health care, or welfare, there is certain to be a lively debate on
Capitol Hill. Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall
silent and there is hardly any debate at all.
One reason for the Lobby.s success with Congress is that some key members
are Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002 that
.My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel..69 One would
think that the number 1 priority for any congressman would be to .protect
America,. but that is not what Armey said. There are also Jewish senators
and congressmen who work to make U.S. foreign policy support Israel.s
interests.
Pro.Israel congressional staffers are another source of the Lobby.s power.
As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once admitted, .There are a lot
of guys at the working level up here [on Capitol Hill] . who happen to be
Jewish, who are willing . to look at certain issues in terms of their
Jewishness .. These are all guys who are in a position to make the
decision in these areas for those senators .. You can get an awful lot
done just at the staff level..70
It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the Lobby.s influence
in Congress. AIPAC.s success is due to its ability to reward legislators
and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those
who challenge it. Money is critical to U.S. elections (as the recent
scandal over lobbyist Jack Abramoff.s various shady dealings reminds us),
and AIPAC makes sure that its friends get strong financial support from
the myriad pro.Israel political action committees. Those seen as hostile
to Israel, on the other hand, can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign
contributions to their political opponents. AIPAC also organizes
letter.writing campaigns and encourages newspaper editors to endorse
pro.Israel candidates.
There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one
example, in 1984 AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois,
who, according to one prominent Lobby figure, had .displayed insensitivity
and even hostility to 16 our concerns.. Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at
the time, explained what happened: .All the Jews in America, from coast to
coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians ..those who
hold public positions now, and those who aspire ..got the message..71
AIPAC prizes its reputation as a formidable adversary, of course, because
it discourages anyone from questioning its agenda.
AIPAC.s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further, however. According to
Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, .It is common for members
of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need
information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional
Research Service, committee staff or administration experts..72 More
importantly, he notes that AIPAC is .often called upon to draft speeches,
work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect
co.sponsors and marshal votes..
The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a foreign
government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress.73 Open debate about
U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy
has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three
main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting
Israel. As former Senator Ernest Hollings (D.SC) noted as he was leaving
office, .You can.t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you
around here..74 Small wonder that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once
told an American audience. .When people ask me how they can help Israel, I
tell them.Help AIPAC..75
Influencing the Executive
The Lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch. That
power derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on
presidential elections. Despite their small numbers in the population
(less than 3 percent), they make large campaign donations to candidates
from both parties. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic
presidential candidates .depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as
60 percent of the money..76 Furthermore, Jewish voters have high turn.out
rates and are concentrated in key states like California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania. Because they matter in close
elections, Presidential candidates go to great lengths not to antagonize
Jewish voters.
Key organizations in the Lobby also directly target the administration in
power. For example, pro.Israel forces make sure that critics of the Jewish
state do not get important foreign.policy appointments. Jimmy Carter
wanted to make George 17 Ball his first secretary of state, but he knew
that Ball was perceived as critical of Israel and that the Lobby would
oppose the appointment.77 This litmus test forces any aspiring policymaker
to become an overt supporter of Israel, which is why public critics of
Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the U.S. foreign
policy establishment.
These constraints still operate today. When 2004 presidential candidate
Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more .even.handed role.
in the Arab.Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of
selling Israel down the river and said his statement was
.irresponsible..78 Virtually all of the top Democrats in the House signed
a hard.hitting letter to Dean criticizing his comments, and the Chicago
Jewish Star reported that .anonymous attackers . are clogging the e.mail
inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning ..without much
evidence ..that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel..79
This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on
Israel.80 His campaign co.chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean
said his own views on the Middle East more closely reflected those of
AIPAC than the more moderate Americans for Peac Now. Dean had merely
suggested that to .bring the sides together,. Washington should act as an
honest broker. This is hardly a radical idea, but it is anathema to the
Lobby, which does not tolerate the idea of even.handedness when it comes
to the Arab.Israeli conflict.
The Lobby.s goals are also served when pro.Israel individuals occupy
important positions in the executive branch. During the Clinton
Administration, for example, Middle East policy was largely shaped by
officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro.Israel
organizations.including Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of
research at AIPAC and co.founder of the pro.Israel Washington Institute
for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving
government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often
visits there.81
These men were among President Clinton.s closest advisors at the Camp
David summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace
process and favored creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only
within the limits of what would be acceptable to Israel.82 In particular,
the American delegation took its cues from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak, coordinated negotiating positions in advance, and did not offer its
own independent proposals for settling the conflict. Not surprisingly,
Palestinian negotiators complained that they were 18 .negotiating with two
Israeli teams ..one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American
flag..83
The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush Administration, whose
ranks include fervently pro.Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John
Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis (.Scooter.) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials
consistently pushed for policies favored by Israel and backed by
organizations in the Lobby.
Manipulating the Media
In addition to influencing government policy directly, the Lobby strives
to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not
want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate
might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently
provide. Accordingly, pro.Israel organizations work hard to influence the
media, think tanks, and academia, because these institutions are critical
in shaping popular opinion.
The Lobby.s perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream
media in good part because most American commentators ae pro.Israel. The
debate among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is
.dominated by people who cannot imagine criticizing Israel..84 He lists 61
.columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel
reflexively and without qualification.. Conversely, Alterman found just
five pundits who consistently criticize Israeli behavior or endorse
pro.Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op.eds
challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favors the
other side.
This pro.Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers.
Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked
that, .Shamir, Sharon, Bibi . whatever those guys want is pretty much fine
by me..85 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent
newspapers like The Chicago Sun.Times and The Washington Times regularly
run editorials that are strongly pro.Israel. Magazines like Commentary,
the New Republic, and the Weekly Standard also zealously defend Israel at
every turn.
Editorial bias is also found in papers like the New York Times. The Times
occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes concedes that the
Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even.handed. In his
memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel
acknowledged 19 the impact his own pro.Israel attitude had on his
editorial choices. In his words: .I was much more deeply devoted to Israel
than I dared to assert.. He goes on: .Fortified by my knowledge of Israel
and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East
commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them
from a pro.Israel perspective.. 86
The media.s reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more
even.handed than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive
to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the
occupied territories without acknowledging Israel.s actual behavior. To
discourage unfavorable reporting on Israel, the Lobby organizes letter
writing campaigns, demonstrations, and boycotts against news outlets whose
content it considers anti.Israel. One CNN executive has said that he
sometimes gets 6,000 e.mail messages in a single day complaining that a
story is anti.Israel.87 Similarly, the pro.Israel Committee for Accurate
Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organized demonstrations outside
National Public Radio stations in 33 cities in May 2003, and it also tried
to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle
East coverage became more sympatheticto Israel.88 Boston.s NPR station,
WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of
these efforts. Pressure on NPR has also come from Israel.s friends in
Congress, who have asked NPR for an internal audit as well as more
oversight of its Middle East coverage.
These factors help explain why the American media contains few criticisms
of Israeli policy, rarely questions Washington.s relationship with Israel,
and only occasionally discusses the Lobby.s profound influence on U.S.
policy.
Think Tanks That Think One Way
Pro.Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important
role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The Lobby created
its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped found WINEP.89
Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel and claims instead that it
provides a .balanced and realistic. perspective on Middle East issues,
this is not the case.90 In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals
who are deeply committed to advancing Israel.s agenda.
The Lobby.s influence in the think tank world extends well beyond WINEP.
Over the past 25 years, pro.Israel forces have established a commanding
presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution,
the 20 Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute,
the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro.Israel, and include few, if
any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.
A good indicator of the Lobby.s influence in the think tank world is the
evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert
on Middle East issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and
former NSC official with a well.deserved reputation for evenhandedness
regarding the Arab.Israeli conflict. Today, however, Brookings.s work on
these issues is conducted through its Saban Center for Middle East
Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, a wealthy Israeli.American
businessman and ardent Zionist.91 The director of the Saban Center is the
ubiquitous Martin Indyk. Thus, what was once a non.partisan policy
institute on Middle East matters is now part of the chorus of largely
pro.Israel think tanks.
Policing Academia
The Lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about Israel on
college campuses, because academic freedom is a core value and because
tenured professors are hard to threaten or silence. Even so, there was
only mild criticism of Israel in the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process
was underway. Criticism rose after that process collapsed and Ariel Sharon
came to power in early 2001, and it became especially intense when the IDF
re.occupied the West Bank in spring 2002 and employed massive force
against the Second Intifada.
The Lobby moved aggressively to .take back the campuses.. New groups
sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers
to U.S. colleges.92 Established groups like the Jewish Council for Public
Affairs and Hillel jumped into the fray, and a new group.the Israel on
Campus Coalition.was formed to coordinate the many groups that now sought
to make Israel.s case on campus. Finally, AIPAC more than tripled its
spending for programs to monitor university activities and to train young
advocates for Israel, in order to .vastly expand the number of students
involved on campus . . . in the national pro.Israel effort..93
The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September
2002, for example, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately
pro.Israel neoconservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that
posted dossiers on 21 suspect academics and encouraged students to report
comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel.94 This
transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted a harsh
reaction and Pipes and Kramer later removed he dossiers, but the website
still invites students to report alleged anti.Israel behavior at U.S.
colleges.
Groups in the Lobby also direct their fire at particular professors and
the universities that hire them. Columbia University, which had the late
Palestinian scholar Edward Said on its faculty, has been a frequent target
of pro.Israel forces. Jonathan Cole, the former Columbia provost, reported
that, .One can be sure that any public statement in support of the
Palestinian people by the preeminent literary critic Edward Said wil
elicit hundreds of e.mails, letters, and journalistic accounts that call
on us to denounce Said and to either sanction or fire him..95 When
Columbia recruited historian Rashid Khalidi from the University of
Chicago, Cole says that .the complaints started flowing in from people who
disagreed with the content of his political views.. Princeton faced the
same problem a few years later when it considered wooing Khalidi away from
Columbia.96
A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late
2004, when the .David Project. produced a propaganda film alleging that
faculty in Columbia University.s Middle East studies program were
anti.Semitic and were intimidating Jewish students who defended Israel.97
Columbia was raked over the coals in pro.Israel circles, but a faculty
committee assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of
anti.Semitism and the only incident worth noting was the possibility that
one professor had .responded heatedly. to a student.s question.98 The
committee also discovered that the accused professors had been the target
of an overt intimidation campaign.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this campaign to eliminate criticism
of Israel from college campuses is the effort by Jewsh groups to push
Congress to establish mechanisms that monitor what professors say about
Israel.99 Schools judged to have an anti.Israel bias would be denied
Federal funding. This effort to get the U.S. government to police campuses
have not yet succeeded, but the attempt illustrates the importance
pro.Israel groups place on controlling debate on these issues.
Finally, a number of Jewish philanthropists have established Israel
studies programs (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programs
that already exist) so as to increase the number of Israel.friendly
scholars on campus.100 NYU 22 announced the establishment of the Taub
Center for Israel Studies on May 1, 2003, and similar programs have been
established at other schools like Berkeley, Brandeis, and Emory. Academic
administrators emphasize the pedagogical value of these programs, but the
truth is that they are intended in good part to promote Israel.s image on
campus. Fred Laffer, the head of the Taub Foundation, makes clear that his
foundation funded the NYU center to help counter the .Arabic [sic] point
of view. that he thinks is prevalent in NYU.s Middle East programs.101
In sum, the Lobby has gone to considerable lengths to insulate Israel from
criticism on college campuses. It has not been as successful in academia
as it has been on Capitol Hill, but it has worked hard to stifle criticism
of Israel by professors and students and there is much less of it on
campuses today102
The Great Silencer
No discussion of how the Lobby operates would be complete without
examining one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of anti.Semitism.
Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro.Israel groups have
significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy.an influence that AIPAC
celebrates.stands a good chance of getting labeled an anti.Semite. In
fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel Lobby runs the risk of being
charged with anti.Semitism, even though the Israeli media themselves refer
to America.s .Jewish Lobby.. In effect, the Lobby boasts of its own power
and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it. This tactic is very
effective, because anti.Semitism is loathsome and no responsible person
wants to be accused of it.
Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticize Israeli
policy in recent years, which some attribute to a resurgence of
anti.Semitism in Europe. We are .getting to a point,. the U.S. Ambassador
to the European Union said in early 2004, .where it is as bad as it was in
the 1930s..103 Measuring anti.Semitism is a complicated matter, but the
weight of evidence points in the opposite direction. For example, in the
spring of 2004, when accusations of European anti.Semitism filled the air
in America, separate surveys of European public opinion conducted by the
Anti.Defamation League and the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press showed that it was actually declining.104
Consider France, which pro.Israel forces often portray as the most
anti.Semitic state in Europe. A poll of French citizens in 2002 found
that: 89 percent could envisage living with a Jew; 97 percent believe
making anti.Semitic graffiti is a 23 serious crime; 87 percent think
attacks on French synagogues are scandalous; and 85 percent of practicing
French Catholics reject the charge that Jews have too much influence in
business and finance.105 It is unsurprising that the head of the French
Jewish community declared in the summer of 2003 that .France is not more
anti.Semitic than America..106 According to a recent article in Ha.aretz,
the French police report that anti.Semitic incidents in France declined by
almost 50 per cent in 2005; and this despite the fact that France has the
largest Muslim population of any country in Europe.107
Finally, when a French Jew was brutally murdered last month by a Muslim
gang, tens of thousands of French demonstrators poured into the streets to
condemn anti.Semitism. Moreover, President Jacques Chirac and Prime
Minister Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim.s memorial service
in a public showof solidarity with French Jewry.108 It is also worth
noting that in 2002 more Jews immigrated to Germany than Israel, making it
.the fastest growing Jewish community in the world,. according to an
article in the Jewish newspaper Forward.109 If Europe were really heading
back to the 1930s, it is hard to imagine that Jews would be moving there
in large numbers.
We recognize, however, that Europe is not free of the scourge of
anti.Semitism. No one would deny that there are still some virulent
autochthonous anti.Semites in Europe (as there are in the United States)
but their numbers are small and their extreme views are rejected by the
vast majority of Europeans. Nor would one deny that there is anti.Semitism
among European Muslims, some of it provoked by Israel.s behavior towards
the Palestinians and some of it straightforwardly racist. 110 This problem
is worrisome, but it is hardly out of control. Muslims constitute less
than five percent of Europe.s total population, and European governments
are working hard to combat the problem. Why? Because most Europeans reject
such hateful views.111 In short, when it comes to anti.Semitism, Europe
today bears hardly any resemblance to Europe in the 1930s.
This is why pro.Israel forces, when pressed to go beyond assertion, claim
that there is a .new anti.Semitism., which they equate with criticism of
Israel.112 In other words criticize Israeli policy and you are by
definition an anti.Semite. When the synod of the Church of England
recently voted to divest from Caterpillar Inc on the grounds that
Caterpillar manufacures the bulldozers used to demolish Palestinian homes,
the Chief Rabbi complained that it would .have the most adverse
repercussions on ... Jewish.Christian relations in Britain., while Rabbi
Tony Bayfield, the head of the Reform movement, said: ..There is a clear
problem of anti.Zionist .verging on anti.Semitic .attitudes emerging in
the grass 24 roots, and even in the middle ranks of the Church..113
However, the Church was neither guilty of anti.Zionism nor anti.Semitism;
it was merely protesting Israeli policy.114
Critics are also accused of holding Israel to an unfair standard or
questioning its right to exist. But these are bogus charges too. Western
critics of Israel hardly ever question its right to exist. Instead, they
question its behavior towards the Palestinians, which is a legitimate
criticism: Israelis question it themselves. Nor is Israel being judged
unfairly. Rather, Israeli treatment of the Palestinians elicits criticism
because it is contrary to widely.accepted human rights norms and
international law, as well as the principle of national
self.determination. And it is hardly the only state that has faced sharp
criticism on these grounds.
In sum, other ethnic lobbies can only dream of having the political muscle
that pro.Israel organizations possess. The question, therefore, is what
effect does the Lobby have on U.S. foreign policy?
THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG
If the Lobby.s impact were confined to U.S. economic aid to Israel, its
influence might not be that worrisome. Foreign aid is valuable, but not as
useful as having the world.s only superpower bring its vast capabilities
to bear on Israel.s behalf. Accordingly, the Lobby has also sought to
shape the core elements of U.S. Middle East policy. In particular, it has
worked successfully to convince American leaders to back Israel.s
continued repression of the Palestinians and to take im at Israel.s
primary regional adversaries: Iran, Iraq, and Syria.
Demonizing the Palestinians
It is now largely forgotten, but in the fall of 2001, and especially in
the spring of 2002, the Bush Administration tried to reduce anti.American
sentiment in the Arab world and undermine support for terrorist groups
like al Qaeda, by halting Israel.s expansionist policies in the occupied
territories and advocating the creation of a Palestinian state.
Bush had enormous potential leverage at his disposal. He could have
threatened to reduce U.S. economic and diplomatic support for Israel, and
the American people would almos

Почему америка не изменит будет международной политикой MiddleEast
Automatically translated into Russian thanks to WorldLingo
Изучение Harvard: Лоббио Израиля и США. Страница
международной политики printable
сидела, 2006-03-18 14:34 - J.
admin Джон. Mearsheimer и
Стефан M. F.
Walt Джон. Школа Kennedy университета марта 2006 США
Harvard
правительства. международная политика формирует случаи в каждом угле глобуса. Nowhere
это более поистине чем в The Middle East, зоне рецидивируя нестабильности и
преогромного стратегическое значение. Само недавн, попытка кустика
Administration.s преобразовать зону в общину народовластий помогала
продукции resilient insurency в Ираке, острый подъем в цены масла мира,
и бомбометания террориста в Madrid, лондоне, и Amman. С so much at stake
для настолько много, всем странам нужно понять усилия которые управляют США.
Политика Ближнего Востока.
США. общегосударственные интересы должно быть главным образом предмет американского
международной политики. На прошлый несколько декад, однако, и специально
с войны в 1967, centerpiece 6 дней США. Политикой Ближнего Востока
было свое отношение с Израилем. Комбинация unwavering США.
поддержка для Израиля и родственного усилия распространить народовластие в течении
зоны воспламеняла арабское и исламское мнение и eopardized США.
обеспеченность.
Эта ситуация не имеет никакой равный в американской политической истории. Почему
Соединенные Штаты охотно готовы set aside своя собственная обеспеченность
для того чтобы выдвинуть интересы другого положения? Одно могло предположить скрепление
между 2 странами основано на, котор делят стратегические интересы или
вынуждать нравственных imperativs. По мере того как мы показываем ниже, однако, ни то из тех
объяснений могут определить замечательный уровень материальной и
дипломатической поддержки той povides Соединенных Штатов к Израилю.
Вместо, общая тяга США. политика в зоне должна почти
вс к США. отечественная политика, и специально к RABOTам
. Лоббио Израиля. Другие группы по интересам управляли уклонить
США. международная политика в направлениях, котор они благоволили к, но никакое лоббио не управляло
отвлечь США. международная политика как far from американский
общегосударственныа интересы в противном случае предложил бы, пока одновременно убеждающ
американцов которые США. и израильскими интересами будут необходимо identical.1
в страницах следуют за, мы описывают как лоббио выполняло этот
feat, и как свои деятельности формировали действия America.s в этой
критически зоне. Дали стратегическое значение The Middle East и своего
потенциального удара на других, оба американца и non. Американцам нужно
понять и адресовать влияние Lobby.s на США. политика. 1
некоторые читатели найдет, что этот анализ нарушил, но факты переучтенные
здесь не находятся в серьезном споре среди эрудитов. Деиствительно, наш учет полагается
тяжело на работе израильских эрудитов и журналистов, которые заслуживают большой
кредит для света осыпания на этих вопросах. Мы также полагаемся на доказательстве
обеспеченном уважаемыми израильскими и международными организациями
прав человека. Подобно, наши заявки о ударе Lobby.s полагаются на
свидетельствовании от Lobby.s имеют члены, также, как свидетельствование от
политиканов которые работали с ими. Читатели могут излучить наши заключения,
of course, только доказательство на которых они отдыхает не будет состязательно.
БОЛЬШОЙ БЛАГОДЕТЕЛЬ
с войны в октябре в 1973, вашингтон обеспечивал Израиль при уровень
поддержки dwarfing количество снабженное любое другое положение. Это было
самым большим однолетним получателем сразу США. хозяйственная и воинская
помощь с 1976 и самый большой полный получатель с Второй Мировой Войны.
Итог сразу США. помощь к количеству Израиля к наилучшим образом над $140 миллиардов в 2003
dollars.2 Израиле получает около $3 миллиарда в сразу чужой помощью
each year, которая будет грубо one.fifth бюджети помощи другого государства America.s. В
per capita термины, Соединенные Штаты дают каждому израильскому сразу стоимость
субсидии о $500 в year.3 это, котор largesse специально поражает когда одно
осуществляет что Израиль будет теперь состоятельным промышленным положением с per capita
incom грубо равным к Южная Корее или Spain.4
Израиль также получает другим специальным делам от Washington.5 другую помощь
получатели получают их деньг в ежеквартальных рассрочках, но Израиль получает
свое все ассигнование на начале каждого отчетного года и таким образом
зарабатывает экстренный интерес. Требуют, что тратят большинств получатели американской
воинской помощи все из его в Соединенных Штатах, но Израиль может использовать
грубо проценты twenty.five своего уделения помощи для того чтобы субсидировать свое собственное
оборонную отрасль. Израиль будет единственным получателем не должен
определить как помощь потрачена, exemption который модели оно фактически
невозможное для того чтобы предотвратить деньг от быть использованным для целей соединенные
положени положения сопротивляются, как выселки здания в западном крене.
Сверх того, Соединенные Штаты обеспечивали Израиль с почти $3 миллиарда
для того чтобы начать система оружия как самолет Lavi который пентагону
не хотел или не было нужно, пока дающ доступ Израиля к top.drawer США. weaponry любит
вертолеты Blackhawk и двигатели F.16. Окончательно, Соединенные Штаты дают
доступ Израиля к сведении что они отказывают своих союзников НАТО и
поворачивали слепой глаз к приему Israels ядерного weapons.6
2 in addition, вашингтону обеспечивают Израиль с последовательной дипломатической
поддержкой. С 1982, Соединенные Штаты имеют vetoed 32 разрешения
которое были критически Израиля, номер Совета безопасности Организации Объединенных Наций
greater than совмещенный итог бросания вет полностью другим Советом безопасности
members.7, котор оно также преграждает арабские положения. усилия одеть в ядерный арсенал
Israel.s международная атомная энергия Agency.s agenda.8
Соединенные Штаты также приходят к спасению Israel.s в wartime и принимают свою
сторону обсуждая мир. Администрация re.supplied Израиль во время
войны в октябре и защищенный Израиль Nixon от угрозы советской
интервенции. Вашингтон глубоки включилось в переговоры
закончили то войну также, как длинномерное .step.by.step. обрабатывайте последованное за
то, как раз по мере того как оно сыграло ключевую роль в переговорами которые предшествовали
и следовали за Осло 1993 Accords.9 там были случайные frictions
между США. и израильские должностные лица в оба случая, но Соединенные Штаты
координировали свои положения близко с Израилем и последовательно подпирали
израильский подход к negotitions. Деиствительно, один американский участник на
Camp David (2000) более поздно сказал, .far слишком часто, мы действовали. . . как
Israel.s lawyer..10
как обсужено ниже, вашингтон давало Израилю широкую широту в общаться
с занятыми территориями (западные крен и прокладка Gaza), even when
свои действия были at odds с заявленными США. политика. Сверх того, стратегия
кустика Administration.s честолюбивая для того чтобы преобразовать The Middle East .beginning
с нашествием Iraq.is по крайней мере отчасти предназначила улучшить ситуацию
Israel.s стратегическую. Отдельно от союзничеств wartime, трудно думать
другого примера где одна страна обеспечивает другие с подобным
уровнем материала и diplomaticsupport на такой выдвинутый период.
Поддержка America.s для Израиля, вкратце, уникально.
Эта внесметная шедрость могла быть постижима если Израиль был
существенным стратегическим имуществом или если были compelling mora США
вытерпели аргументы за, котор. затыловка. Но никакое рассуждение не убеждает.
СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКИЙ ПАССИВ
согласно web site общественных дел Committee.s American.Israel (AIPAC
), .the Соединенные Штаты и Израиль формировали уникально партнерство
для того чтобы встретить стратегические угрозы в The Middle East. . . . Это
совместное усилие обеспечивает значительно преимущества для обоих соединенных
положени положений и этой заявкой Israel..11 будет статья веры среди сторонниц
Israel.s и по заведенному порядку invoked израильскими политиканами и pro. Американцы
Израиля.
3 Израиль могут быть стратегическим имуществом во время холодного War.12 путем служение
как полномочие America.s после дня 6 Война (1967), Израиль, котор помогли содержать
советское расширение в зоне и inflicted humiliating поражения на советских
клиентах как Египт и Швеция. Израиль случайн помогаемый защитить другие
США. союзники (как король Hussein Jordan.s) и свой воинский prowess принудили
Moscow для того чтобы потратить больше затыловки свои losing клиенты. Израиль также дал
Соединенным Штатам полезную сведению о советских возможностях.
Значение Israel.s стратегическое в это время не должно быть завышено,
however.13 затыловка Израиль не была дешева, и она осложнила отношения
America.s с арабским миром. Например, США. решение для того чтобы дать
Израилю $2.2 миллиарда в помощи аварийной ситуации воинской во время войны в октябре
вызвало нефтяное эмбарго OPEC inflicted значительные экономии повреждения o
западные. Сверх того, воискаа Israel.s не смогли защитить США. интересы в
зоне. Например, Соединенные Штаты не были в состоянии положиться на Израиле когда
иранский виток в 1979 поднятых заботах о обеспеченности
перских поставк масла Glf, и должны создать свои. Сила оперативного развертывания
. вместо.
Even if Израиль был стратегическим имуществом во время холодной войны, первый
войнаа в персидском заливе (1990.91) показал что Израиль был стратегической тяготой.
Соединенные Штаты не были в состоянии использовать израильские основания во время войны без повреждать
anti. Коалиция Ирака, и он должны отвлечь ресурсы (например, батареи
реактивного снаряда патриота) для того чтобы держать Tel Aviv от делать что-нибыдь которое могло
сломать союзничество против Saddam. История повторила в 2003:
хотя Израиль был полн страстного желания для Соединенных Штатов атаковать Saddam,
президент Кустик не смог спросить его для того чтобы помочь без вызывать арабское
противовключение. Так Израиль остался на sidelines again.14
начиная в 1990s, и специально после 9/11, США. поддержка для Израиля
была оправдана заявкой что оба положения угрожаются
группами террориста возникая в мире Arabor мусульманском, и комплектом
положений .rogue. что задне эти группы и seek WMD. Это рассуждение подразумевает
что вашингтон должно дать Израилю свободно руку in dealing with
палестинцы и не давление Израиль t делает уступки до тех пор пока не заключить в турьму все
палестинские террористы или мертво. Оно также подразумевает что Соединенные Штаты
должны пойти после стран как исламская республика al Ирана,
Saddam Hussein.s Ирака, и Bashar. Assad.s Швеция. Израиль таким образом увиден как
критический союзник в войне на терроре, потому что своими противниками будут противники
America.s.
Это новое рассуждение кажется persuasive, но Израиль будет в действительности пассивом в
войне на терроре и более обширном усилии общаться с положениями rogue.
4 начать с, .terrorism. тактика используемая широким массивом
политических групп; это не будет одиночным унифицированным adversary. Организации
террориста угрожают Израиля (например, Hamas или Hezbollah)
не угрожают Соединенных Штатов, за исключением когда они вмешиваются против их (как в
Ливане в 1982). Сверх того, палестинским террорисмом не будет случайно расправа
сразу против Израиля или запада .the. ; будет больш реакцией к
кампании увеличиваемой Israel.s для того чтобы колонизировать западные крен и прокладку Gaza.
Важно, говорить что Израиль и Соединенные Штаты соединены, котор
делят угрозой террориста имеет причинное отношение ОН назад: довольно,
Соединенные Штаты имеют проблему в хорошей части потому что они настолько близко
соединены с Израилем, не другую дорогу террорисма вокруг. США. поддержкой для
Израиля не будет единственный источник anti. Американский террорисм, но он
важное одним, и он делает выигрывать войну на терроре больше, котор difficult.15
там будет никаким вопросом, например, который много руководителей Qaeda al, включая
ящик Laden, motivated присутсвием Israel.s в Иерусалиме и plight
палестинцев. Согласно США. 9/11 комиссий, Laden ящика
точно изыскиваемого к репрессирует Соединенные Штаты для своих политик в
Ближнем Востоке, включая свою поддержку для Израиля, и он даже попытался приурочить
нападения для того чтобы выделить это issue.16
равн важное, безусловные США. поддержка для Израиля делает его легко
для экстремистов как ящик Laden для того чтобы вновь собраться популярная поддержка и привлечься
рекруты. Списки избирателей общественного мнения подтверждают что арабские населенности глубоки
вражески к американской поддержке для Израиля, и США. Заявите консультативная группа
Department.s на публичная дипломатия для арабского и мусульманского мира нашло
что .citizens в этих странах неподдельно огорчены на plight
палестинцев и на роли они воспринимают Соединенные Штаты для того чтобы быть
playing..17
как для положений rogue so.called в The Middle East, они не будет dire
угрозой к существенным США. интересы, отдельно от США. принятие окончательного решения само к
Израилю. Хотя Соединенные Штаты имеют несколько рассогласования
с этими режимами, вашингтон не было бы близко как потревожено о Иране,
Ba.thist Ираке, или близко связанной Швеции было оно настолько к Израилю. Even if
эти положения приобретают ядерное weapons.which не будет очевидно desirable.it
не было бы стратегическим бедствием для Соединенных Штатов. Ни америка
ни Израиль смогли быть шантажированы rogue nuclear.armed, потому что
шантажист не смог унести угрозу без получать overwhelming
retaliation. Опасность handoff .nuclear. к террористам будет равн
дистанционно, потому что положение rogue не смогло быть уверенн переход был
undetected или то ему не обвинил и не репрессировал потом. 5
Furthermore, США. отношение с Израиля моделями фактическ оно более крепко, котор
нужно общаться с этими положениями. Ядерный арсенал Israel.s одна причина почему некоторые из
своих соседей хотят ядерные оружия, и угрожать этих положений с
увеличениями изменения режима просто которые желают. Но Израиль не много из
имущества когда Соединенные Штаты предусматривают использовать усилие против этих
режимов, потому что они не могут участвовать в драке.
Вкратце, обрабатывающ Израиль как America.s большинств важный союзник в кампании
против террорисма и сортированной способности bothexaggerates Israel.s диктатур
Ближнего Востока помочь на этих вопросах и игнорирует дороги которые
политики Israel.s делают США. усилия более трудные.
Поддержка Unquestioned для Израиля также слабеет США. расположите вне
Ближнего Востока. Чужие элиты последовательно осматривают Соединенные Штаты как слишком
supportive Израиля, и думают своим допуском израильской репрессии в
занятых территориях будет нравственно тупоконечн и гандикапы в войне на
terroism.18 в апреле 2004, например, 52 бывших великобританских дипломата посланного
премьер-министром Тони Блэр высказывание письма что конфликт
Israel.Palestine имел отношения .poisoned между западом и арабскими и исламскими
мирами. и предупреждая что политиками кустика и премьер-министра Ariel
Шерон была причина .one.sided и
illegal..19 a окончательная спросить значение Israel.s стратегическое что оно
не действует как верноподданический союзник. Израильские должностные лица част игнорируют США. запросы
и renege на посылах сделанных для того чтобы покрыть США. руководители (вклюать за pledges
для того чтобы остановить конструкцию выселка и refrain от .tar geted assassinations.
палестинских руководителей) .20 сверх того, Израиль обеспечивал чувствительные США.
воинская технология к потенциалу США. соперники любят Китай, в США.
Государственный департамент Inspector.General вызвало .a систематическая и
картина unauthorized transfers..21 согласно США.
Главня бюджетно-контрольное управление, Израиль также .conducts самые завоевательные деятельности
шпионства против США. VSех ally..22 в дополнение к случаю
Джонатан Pollard, который дал Израилю большие количества расклассифицированного материала
в начале 1980-ых годов (которые Израиль сообщено прошел на советский союз
к увеличению больше виз выхода для советских еврейств), новая полемика извергла в
2004 когда было показано что ключевое должностное лицо пентагона (Ларри Франклин)
передало расклассифицированную информаци информацию к израильскому allegedly помогать дипломату,
2 AIPAC officials.23 Израилем будет трудно единственной страной которая шпионит на
Соединенных Штатах, но своя готовность шпионить на своих главным образом бросаниях
покровителя более добавочно сомневается на своем стратегическом значении.
6 DWINDLING НРАВСТВЕННЫЙ СЛУЧАЙ
отдельно от своего alleged стратегического значения, backers Israel.s также спорят что
оно заслуживает unqualified США. поддержка потому что 1) оно слабо и окружено
противниками, 2) будет народовластием, которое будет нравственно предпочтительное форма правления
; 3) the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and
therefore deserve special treatment, and 4) Israel.s conduct has been
morally superior to its adversaries. behavior.
On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive.
There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel.s existence, but that
is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, Israel.s past and present conduct
offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.
Backing the Underdog?
Israel is often portrayed as weak and besieged, a Jewish David surrounded
by a hostile Arab Goliath. This image has been carefully nurtured by
Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers, but the opposite image is closer
to the truth. Contrary to popular belief, the Zionists had larger,
better.equipped, and better.led forces during the 1947.49 War of
Independence and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won quick and easy
victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in
1967.before large.scale U.S. aid began flowing to Israel.24 These
victories offer eloquent evidence of Israeli patriotism, organizational
ability, and military prowess, but they also reveal that Israel was far
from helpless even in its earliest years.
Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its
conventional forces are far superior to its neighbors and it is the only
state in the region with nuclear weapons. Egypt and Jordan signed peace
treaties with Israel and Saudi Arabia has offered to do so as well. Syria
has lost its Soviet patron, Iraq has been decimated by three disastrous
wars, and Iran is hundreds of miles away. The Palestinians barely have
effective police, let alone a military that could threaten Israel.
According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University.s prestigious Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, .the strategic balance decidedly favors
Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own
military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neghbors..25 If
backing the underdog were a compelling rationale, the United States would
be supporting Israel.s opponents.
7 Aiding a Fellow Democracy?
American backing is often justified by the claim that Israel is a
fellow.democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships. This rationale
sounds convincing, but it cannot account for the current level of U.S.
support. After all, there are many democracies around the world, but none
receives the lavish support that Israel does. The United States has
overthrown democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when
this was thought to advance .S. interests, and it has good relations with
a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic neither justifies
nor explains America.s support for Israel.
The .shared democracy. rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli
democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is
a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are
supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded
as a Jewish state and citizenship is based on the principle of blood
kinship.26 Given this conception of citizenship, it is not surprising that
Israel.s 1.3 million Arabs are treated as second.class citizens, or that a
recent Israeli government commission found that Israel behaves in a
.neglectful and discriminatory. manner towards them.27
Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens
to become citizens themselves, and does not give these spouses the right
to live in Israel. The Israeli human rights organization B.tselem called
this restriction .a racist law that determines who can live here according
to racist criteria..28 Such laws may be understandable given Israel.s
founding principles, but they are not consistent with America.s image of
democracy.
Israel.s democratic status is also undermined by its refusal to grant the
Palestinians a viable state of their own. Israel controls the lives of
about 3.8 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, while colonizing
lands on which the Palestinians have long dwelt. Israel is formally
democratic, but the millions of Palestinians that it controls are denied
full political rights and the .shared democracy. rationale is
correspondingly weakened.
Compensation for Past Crimes
A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the
Christian West, especially the tragic episode of the Holocaust. Because
Jews were persecuted for 8 centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish
homeland, many believe that Israel deserves special treatment from the
United States.
There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy
of anti.Semitism, and that Israel.s creation was an appropriate response
to a long record of crimes. This history, as noted, provides a strong
moral case for supporting Israel.s existence. But the creation of Israel
involved additional crimes against a largely innocent third party: the
Palestinians.
The history of these events is well.understood. When political Zionism
began in earnest in the late 19th century, there were only about 15,000
Jews in Palestine.29 In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95
percent of the population, and though under Ottoman control, they had been
in continuous possession of this territory for 1300 years.30 Even when
Israel was founded, Jews were only about 35 percent of Palestine.s
population and owned 7 percent of the land.31
The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a
bi.national state or accepting a permanent partition of Palestine. The
Zionist leadership was sometimes willing to accept partition as a first
step, but this was a tactical maneuver and not their real objective. As
David Ben.Gurion put it in the late 1930s, .After the formation of a large
army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we shall abolish
partition and expand to the whole of Palestine..32
To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs
from the territory that would eventually become Israel. There was simply
no other way to accomplish their objective. Ben.Gurion saw the problem
clearly, writing in 1941 that .it is impossible to imagine general
evacuation [of the Arab population] without compulsion, and brutal
compulsion..33 Or as Israeli historian Benny Morris puts it, .the idea of
transfer is as old as modern Zionism and has accompanied its evolution and
praxis during the past century..34
This opportunity came in 1947.48, when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000
Palestinians into exile.35 Israeli officials have long claimed that the
Arabs fled because their leaders told them to, but careful scholarship
(much of it by Israeli historians like Morris) have demolished this myth.
In fact, most Arab leaders urged the Palestinian population to stay home,
but fear of violent death at the hands of Zionist forces led most of them
to flee.36 After the war, Israel barred the return of the Palestinian
exiles.
9 The fact that the creation of Israel entailed a moral crime against the
Palestinian people was well understood by Israel.s leadrs. As Ben.Gurion
told Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, .If I were an
Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have
taken their country. . . . We come from Israel, but two thousand years
ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti.Semitism, the Nazis,
Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we
have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?.37
Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the
Palestinians. national ambitions.38 Prime Minister Golda Meir famously
remarked that .there was no such thing as a Palestinian,. and even Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, nonetheless
opposed creating a full.fledged Palestinian state.39 Pressure from
extremist violence and the growing Palestinian population has forced
subsequent Israeli leaders to disengage rom some of the occupied
territories and to explore territorial compromise, but no Israeli
government has been willing to offer the Palestinians a viable state of
their own. Even Prime Minister Ehud Barak.s purportedly generous offer at
Camp David in July 2000 would only have given the Palestiniansa disarmed
and dismembered set of .Bantustans. under de facto Israeli control.40
Europe.s crimes against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for
Israel.s right to exist. But Israel.s survival is not in doubt.even if
some Islamic extremists make outrageous and unrealistic references to
.wiping it off the map..and the tragic history of the Jewish people does
not obligate the United States to help Israel no matter what it does
today.
.Virtuous Israelis. versus .Evil Arabs.
The final moral argument portrays Israel as a country that has sought
peace at every turn and showed great restraint even when rovoked. The
Arabs, by contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. This
narrative.which is endlessly repeated by Israeli leaders and American
apologists such as Alan Dershowitz.is yet another myth.41 In terms of
actual behavior, Israel.s conduct is not morally distinguishable from the
actions of its opponents.
Israeli scholarship shows that the early Zionists were far from benevolent
towards the Palestinian Arabs.42 The Arab inhabitants did resist the
Zionists. encroachments, which is hardly surprising given that the
Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab lands. The Zionists
responded vigorously, and 10 neither side owns the moral high ground
during this period. This same scholarship also reveals that the creation
of Israel in 1947.48 involved explicit acts of ethnic cleansing, including
executions, massacres, and rapes by Jews.43
Furthermore, Israel.s subsequent conduct towards its Arab adversaries and
its Palestinian subjects has often been brutal, belying any claim to
morally superior conduct. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli
security forces killed between 2,700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the
overwhelming majority of them unarmed.44 The IDF conducted numerous
cross.border raids against its neighbors in the early 1950s, and though
these actions were portrayed as defensive responses, they were actually
part of a broader effort to expand Israel.s borders. Israel.s expansionist
ambitions also led it to join Britain and France in attacking Egypt in
1956, and Israel withdrew from the lands it had conquered only in the face
of intense U.S. pressure. 45
The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners.of.war in both the
1956 and 1967 wars.46 In 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000
Palestinians from the newly.conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians
from the Golan Heights.47 It was also complicit in the massacre of 700
innocent Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps following its
invsion of Lebanon in 1982, and an Israeli investigatory commission found
then.Defence Minister Sharon .personally responsible. for these
atrocities.48
Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners,
systematically humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and
used force indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the
First Intifida (1987.1991), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to
its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian
protestors. The Swedish .Save the Children. organization estimated that
.23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating
injuries in the first two years of the intifida,. with nearly one.third
sustaining broken bones. Nearly one.third of the beaten children were aged
ten and under..49
Israel.s response to the Second Intifida (2000.2005) has been even more
violent, leading Ha.aretz to declare that .the IDF . is turning into a
killing machine whose efficiency is awe.inspiring, yet shocking..50 The
IDF fired one million bullets in the first days of the uprising, which is
far from a measured response.51 Since then, Israel has killed 3.4
Palestinians for every Israeli lost, the majority of whom have been
innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children killed
is even higher (5.7 to 1).52 Israeli forces have also killed several
foreign 11 peace activists, including a 23 year.old American woman crushed
by an Israeli bulldozer in March 2003.53
These facts about Israel.s conduct have been amply documented by numerous
human rights organizations.including prominent Israeli groups.and are not
disputed by fair.minded observers. And that is why four former officials
of Shin Bet (the Israeli domestic security organization) condemned
Israel.s conduct during the Second Intifada in November 2003. One of them
declared .we are behaving disgracefully,. and another termed Israel.s
conduct .patently immoral..54
But isn.t Israel entitled to do whatever it takes to protect its citizens?
Doesn.t the unique evil of terrorism justify continued U.S. support, even
if Israel often responds harshly?
In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either.
Palestinians have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and
their willingness to attack innocent civilians is wrong. This behavior is
not surprising, however, because the Palestinians believe they have no
other way to force Israeli concessions. As former Prime Minister Barak
once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he .would have joined a
terrorist organization..55
Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used terrorism when they
were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their on state.
Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist
bombings to drive the British from Palestine, and took the lives of many
innocent civilians along the way.56 Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N.
mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, because they opposed his proposal
to internationalize Jerusalem.57 Nor were the perpetrators of these acts
isolated extremists: the leaders of the murder plot were eventually
granted amnesty by the Israeli government and one of them was elected to
the Knsset. Another terrorist leader, who approved the murder but was not
tried, was future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, Shamir openly
argued that .neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify
terrorism as a means of combat.. Rather, terrorism had .a great part to
play . in our war against the occupier [Britain]..58 If the Palestinians.
use of terrorism is morally reprehensible today, so was Israel.s reliance
upon it in the past, and thus one cannot justify U.S. support for Israel
on the grounds that its past conduct was morally superior.59
12 Israel may not have acted worse than many other countries, but it
clearly has not acted any better. And if neither strategic nor moral
arguments can account for America.s support for Israel, how are we to
explain it?
THE ISRAEL LOBBY
The explanation lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were it
not for the Lobby.s ability to manipulate the American political system,
the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less
intimate than it is today.
What Is The Lobby?
We use .the Lobby.as a convenient short.hand term for the loose coalition
of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape U.S. foreign
policy in a pro.Israel direction. Our use of this term is not meant to
suggest that .the Lobby.is a unified movement with a central leadership,
or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues
The core of the Lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant
effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it
advances Israel.s interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for
candidates who are pro.Israel to include letter.writing, financial
contributions, and supporting pro.Israel organizations. But not all
Jewish.Americans are part of the Lobby, because Israel is not a salient
issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly 36 percent
of Jewish.Americans said they were either .not very. or .not at all.
emotionally attached to Israel.60
Jewish.Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key
organizations in the Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of
Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally
supported the expansionist policies of Israel.s Likud Party, including its
hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other
hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the
Palestinians, and a few groups.such as Jewish Voice for Peace.strongly
advocate such steps.61 Despite these differences, moderates and hardliners
both support steadfast U.S. support for Israel.
Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli
officials, so that the former can maximize their influence in the United
States. As one activist with a major Jewish organization wrote, .it is
routine for us to say: .This is our 13 policy on a certain issue, but we
must check what the Israelis think.. We as a community do it all the
time..62 There is also a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy,
and Jewish.American leaders rarely support putting pressure on Israel.
Thus, Edgar Bronfman Sr., the president of the World Jewish Congress, was
accused of .perfidy. when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid.2003
urging Bush to pressure Israel to curb construction of its controversial
.security fence..63 Critics declared that, .It would be obscene at any
time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the president
of the United States to rsist policies being promoted by the government of
Israel..
Similarly, when Israel Policy Forum president Seymour Reich advised
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pressure Israel to reopen a crtical
border crossing in the Gaza Strip in November 2005, critics denounced his
action as .irresponsible behavior,. and declared that, .There is
absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing
against the security.related policies . . . of Israel..64 Recoiling from
these attacks, Reich proclaimed that .the word pressure is not in my
vocabulary when it comes to Israel..
Jewish.Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to
influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and
well.known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their
staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington.65 AIPAC was ranked
second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP), but ahead
of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL.CIO and the National Rifle
Association. A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar
conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in the
Washington.s .muscle rankings..66
The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer,
Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and
Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They
believe Israel.s rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its
expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is contrary to God.s
will.67 In addition, the Lobby.s membership includes neoconservative
gentiles such as John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert
Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former U.N.
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and columnist George Will. 14
Sources of Power
The United States has a divided government that offers many ways to
influence the policy process. As a result, interest groups can shape
policy in many different ways.by lobbying elected representatives and
members of the executive branch, making campaign contributions, voting in
elections, molding public opinion, etc.
Furthermore, special interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when
they are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the populaton is
indifferent. Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about
the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the
rest of the population will not penalize them.
The Israel Lobby.s power flows from its unmatched ability to play this
game of interest group politics. In its basic operations, it is no
different from interest groups like the Farm Lobby, steel and textile
workers, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel Lobby apart is its
extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American
Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway U.S. policy towards
Israel. The Lobby.s activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in
anti.Semitic tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the most
part, the individuals and groups that comprise the Lobby are doing what
other special interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro.Arab
interest groups are weak to non.existent, which makes the Lobby.s task
even easier.68
Strategies for Success
The Lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel.
First, it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both
Congress and the Executive branch to support Israel down the line.
Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker.s own views, the Lobby
tries to make supporting Israel the .smart. political choice.
Second, the Lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel
portrays it in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its
founding and by publicizing Israel.s side in the policy debates of the
day. The goal is to prevent critical commentary about Israel from getting
a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential
to guaranteeing U.S. support, because a 15 candid discussion of
U.S..Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy.
Influencing Congress
A key pillar of the Lobby.s effectiveness is its influence in the U.S.
Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This is in
itself a remarkable situation, because Congress almost never shies away
from contentious issues. Whether the issue is abortion, affirmative
action, health care, or welfare, there is certain to be a lively debate on
Capitol Hill. Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall
silent and there is hardly any debate at all.
One reason for the Lobby.s success with Congress is that some key members
are Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002 that
.My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel..69 One would
think that the number 1 priority for any congressman would be to .protect
America,. but that is not what Armey said. There are also Jewish senators
and congressmen who work to make U.S. foreign policy support Israel.s
interests.
Pro.Israel congressional staffers are another source of the Lobby.s power.
As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once admitted, .There are a lot
of guys at the working level up here [on Capitol Hill] . who happen to be
Jewish, who are willing . to look at certain issues in terms of their
Jewishness .. These are all guys who are in a position to make the
decision in these areas for those senators .. You can get an awful lot
done just at the staff level..70
It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the Lobby.s influence
in Congress. AIPAC.s success is due to its ability to reward legislators
and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those
who challenge it. Money is critical to U.S. elections (as the recent
scandal over lobbyist Jack Abramoff.s various shady dealings reminds us),
and AIPAC makes sure that its friends get strong financial support from
the myriad pro.Israel political action committees. Those seen as hostile
to Israel, on the other hand, can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign
contributions to their political opponents. AIPAC also organizes
letter.writing campaigns and encourages newspaper editors to endorse
pro.Israel candidates.
There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one
example, in 1984 AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois,
who, according to one prominent Lobby figure, had .displayed insensitivity
and even hostility to 16 our concerns.. Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at
the time, explained what happened: .All the Jews in America, from coast to
coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians ..those who
hold public positions now, and those who aspire ..got the message..71
AIPAC prizes its reputation as a formidable adversary, of course, because
it discourages anyone from questioning its agenda.
AIPAC.s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further, however. According to
Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, .It is common for members
of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need
information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional
Research Service, committee staff or administration experts..72 More
importantly, he notes that AIPAC is .often called upon to draft speeches,
work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect
co.sponsors and marshal votes..
The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a foreign
government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress.73 Open debate about
U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy
has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three
main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting
Israel. As former Senator Ernest Hollings (D.SC) noted as he was leaving
office, .You can.t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you
around here..74 Small wonder that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once
told an American audience. .When people ask me how they can help Israel, I
tell them.Help AIPAC..75
Influencing the Executive
The Lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch. That
power derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on
presidential elections. Despite their small numbers in the population
(less than 3 percent), they make large campaign donations to candidates
from both parties. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic
presidential candidates .depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as
60 percent of the money..76 Furthermore, Jewish voters have high turn.out
rates and are concentrated in key states like California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania. Because they matter in close
elections, Presidential candidates go to great lengths not to antagonize
Jewish voters.
Key organizations in the Lobby also directly target the administration in
power. For example, pro.Israel forces make sure that critics of the Jewish
state do not get important foreign.policy appointments. Jimmy Carter
wanted to make George 17 Ball his first secretary of state, but he knew
that Ball was perceived as critical of Israel and that the Lobby would
oppose the appointment.77 This litmus test forces any aspiring policymaker
to become an overt supporter of Israel, which is why public critics of
Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the U.S. foreign
policy establishment.
These constraints still operate today. When 2004 presidential candidate
Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more .even.handed role.
in the Arab.Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of
selling Israel down the river and said his statement was
.irresponsible..78 Virtually all of the top Democrats in the House signed
a hard.hitting letter to Dean criticizing his comments, and the Chicago
Jewish Star reported that .anonymous attackers . are clogging the e.mail
inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning ..without much
evidence ..that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel..79
This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on
Israel.80 His campaign co.chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean
said his own views on the Middle East more closely reflected those of
AIPAC than the more moderate Americans for Peac Now. Dean had merely
suggested that to .bring the sides together,. Washington should act as an
honest broker. This is hardly a radical idea, but it is anathema to the
Lobby, which does not tolerate the idea of even.handedness when it comes
to the Arab.Israeli conflict.
The Lobby.s goals are also served when pro.Israel individuals occupy
important positions in the executive branch. During the Clinton
Administration, for example, Middle East policy was largely shaped by
officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro.Israel
organizations.including Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of
research at AIPAC and co.founder of the pro.Israel Washington Institute
for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving
government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often
visits there.81
These men were among President Clinton.s closest advisors at the Camp
David summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace
process and favored creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only
within the limits of what would be acceptable to Israel.82 In particular,
the American delegation took its cues from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak, coordinated negotiating positions in advance, and did not offer its
own independent proposals for settling the conflict. Not surprisingly,
Palestinian negotiators complained that they were 18 .negotiating with two
Israeli teams ..one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American
flag..83
The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush Administration, whose
ranks include fervently pro.Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John
Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis (.Scooter.) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials
consistently pushed for policies favored by Israel and backed by
organizations in the Lobby.
Manipulating the Media
In addition to influencing government policy directly, the Lobby strives
to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not
want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate
might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently
provide. Accordingly, pro.Israel organizations work hard to influence the
media, think tanks, and academia, because these institutions are critical
in shaping popular opinion.
The Lobby.s perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream
media in good part because most American commentators ae pro.Israel. The
debate among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is
.dominated by people who cannot imagine criticizing Israel..84 He lists 61
.columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel
reflexively and without qualification.. Conversely, Alterman found just
five pundits who consistently criticize Israeli behavior or endorse
pro.Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op.eds
challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favors the
other side.
This pro.Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers.
Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked
that, .Shamir, Sharon, Bibi . whatever those guys want is pretty much fine
by me..85 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent
newspapers like The Chicago Sun.Times and The Washington Times regularly
run editorials that are strongly pro.Israel. Magazines like Commentary,
the New Republic, and the Weekly Standard also zealously defend Israel at
every turn.
Editorial bias is also found in papers like the New York Times. The Times
occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes concedes that the
Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even.handed. In his
memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel
acknowledged 19 the impact his own pro.Israel attitude had on his
editorial choices. In his words: .I was much more deeply devoted to Israel
than I dared to assert.. He goes on: .Fortified by my knowledge of Israel
and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East
commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them
from a pro.Israel perspective.. 86
The media.s reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more
even.handed than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive
to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the
occupied territories without acknowledging Israel.s actual behavior. To
discourage unfavorable reporting on Israel, the Lobby organizes letter
writing campaigns, demonstrations, and boycotts against news outlets whose
content it considers anti.Israel. One CNN executive has said that he
sometimes gets 6,000 e.mail messages in a single day complaining that a
story is anti.Israel.87 Similarly, the pro.Israel Committee for Accurate
Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organized demonstrations outside
National Public Radio stations in 33 cities in May 2003, and it also tried
to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle
East coverage became more sympatheticto Israel.88 Boston.s NPR station,
WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of
these efforts. Pressure on NPR has also come from Israel.s friends in
Congress, who have asked NPR for an internal audit as well as more
oversight of its Middle East coverage.
These factors help explain why the American media contains few criticisms
of Israeli policy, rarely questions Washington.s relationship with Israel,
and only occasionally discusses the Lobby.s profound influence on U.S.
policy.
Think Tanks That Think One Way
Pro.Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important
role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The Lobby created
its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped found WINEP.89
Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel and claims instead that it
provides a .balanced and realistic. perspective on Middle East issues,
this is not the case.90 In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals
who are deeply committed to advancing Israel.s agenda.
The Lobby.s influence in the think tank world extends well beyond WINEP.
Over the past 25 years, pro.Israel forces have established a commanding
presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution,
the 20 Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute,
the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro.Israel, and include few, if
any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.
A good indicator of the Lobby.s influence in the think tank world is the
evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert
on Middle East issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and
former NSC official with a well.deserved reputation for evenhandedness
regarding the Arab.Israeli conflict. Today, however, Brookings.s work on
these issues is conducted through its Saban Center for Middle East
Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, a wealthy Israeli.American
businessman and ardent Zionist.91 The director of the Saban C

Waarom Amerika niet zal veranderen is het het Buitenlandse Beleid van het Midden-Oosten
Automatically translated into Dutch thanks to WorldLingo
De Studie van Harvard: De hal van Israël en de V.S. Printable Gezeten
pagina van het buitenlandse
Beleid, 2006-03-18 14:34 - admin
John J. Mearsheimer en
Stephen M. Walt
John F. De School van Kennedy van Overheid Harvard Universitair
Maart 2006
de V.S. het buitenlandse beleid geeft gebeurtenissen in elke hoek van de bol gestalte. Nergens is
dit waarder dan in het Midden-Oosten, een gebied van terugkomende instabiliteit en
enorm strategisch belang. Onlangs, heeft de poging van Bush
Administration.s om het gebied in een gemeenschap van democratieën om te zetten opbrengst
een veerkrachtige insurency in Irak, een scherpe stijging van wereldolieprijzen, en
terrorist het bombarderen in Madrid, Londen, en Amman geholpen. Met zo veel op het spel
voor zo velen, moeten alle landen de krachten begrijpen die de V.S. drijven.
Het beleid van het Midden-Oosten.
De V.S. de nationale rente zou het primaire voorwerp van Amerikaans buitenlands beleid
moeten zijn. In de afgelopen verscheidene decennia, echter, en vooral
sinds de Zesdaagse Oorlog in 1967, het belangrijkste voorwerp van de V.S. Het beleid van het Midden-Oosten is
zijn verhouding met Israël geweest. De combinatie van de standvastige V.S.
de steun voor Israël en de verwante inspanning om democratie door het
gebied uit te spreiden heeft ontstoken Arabisch en Islamitisch advies en eopardized de V.S.
veiligheid.
Deze situatie heeft geen gelijke in Amerikaanse politieke geschiedenis. Waarom de
Verenigde Staten bereid zijn geweest om zijn eigen veiligheid om de
belangen van een andere staat vooruit te gaan terzijde te leggen? Men zou kunnen veronderstellen dat de band
tussen de twee landen op gedeelde strategische belangen of dwingende moraal
imperativs gebaseerd is. Zoals wij hieronder tonen, echter, kunnen geen van beiden van
die verklaringen van het opmerkelijke niveau van materiële en diplomatieke
steun rekenschap geven die de Verenigde Staten povides aan Israël.
In plaats daarvan, de algemene duw van de V.S. het beleid in het gebied is toe te schrijven bijna
volledig aan de V.S. binnenlandse politiek, en vooral aan de activiteiten van
. De Hal van Israël. Andere speciale belangengroepen zijn erin geslaagd om de V.S.
af te schuinen. buitenlands beleid in richtingen die zij geke goed hebben urd, maar geen hal is erin geslaagd
om de V.S. af te leiden. buitenlands beleid zoals verre van wat de Amerikaanse nationale
rente anders, terwijl gelijktijdig het overtuigen van Amerikanen
die de V.S. zou voorstellen. en de Israëlische belangen zijn hoofdzakelijk identical.1
in de pagina's die volgen, beschrijven wij hoe de Hal deze prestatie
heeft verwezenlijkt, en hoe zijn activiteiten acties America.s in dit kritieke
gebied gestalte hebben gegeven. Gezien het strategische belang van het Midden-Oosten en zijn
potentieel effect op anderen, zowel Amerikanen en niet. Amerikanen moeten
de invloed Lobby.s op de V.S. begrijpen en richten. beleid. 1
sommige lezers zullen dit analyse het storen vinden, maar de hier verhaalde
feiten zijn niet in ernstig geschil onder geleerden. Onze rekening baseert namelijkzich
zwaar op het werk van Israëlische geleerden en journalisten, die groot krediet
voor het afwerpen van licht op deze kwesties verdienen. Wij baseren ons ook op bewijs
dat door geëerbiedigdei Israëlische en internationale rechten van de mensorganisaties
wordt geleverd. Op dezelfde manier baseren onze eisen zich over het effect Lobby.s op
verklaring van de eigen leden Lobby.s, evenals verklaring van
politici die met hen hebben gewerkt. De lezers kunnen onze conclusies verwerpen,
natuurlijk, maar het bewijsmateriaal waarop zij rusten is niet controversieel.
De GROTE WELDOENER
sinds de Oorlog van Oktober in 1973, Washington heeft Israël van een niveau
van steun voorzien die de bedragen verkleint die aan een andere staat worden verstrekt. Het is de
grootste jaarlijkse ontvanger van de directe V.S. geweest. economische en militaire
hulp sinds 1976 en de grootste totale ontvanger sinds Wereldoorlog II.
De totale directe V.S. de hulp aan de bedragen van Israël aan goed meer dan $140 miljard in 2003
dollars.2 Israël ontvangt ongeveer $3 miljard in directe buitenlandse hulp
elk jaar, die ruwweg one.fifth van America.s buitenlandse hulpbegroting zijn. In
termen per hoofd, geven de Verenigde Staten elke Israëliër een directe subsidie
met een waarde van ongeveer $500 per year.3 Dit largesse vooral slaand is wanneer één
realiseert dat Israël nu een rijke industriële staat met een incom per hoofd
ruwweg gelijk aan Zuid-Korea is of Spain.4
Israël ook andere speciale overeenkomsten van Washington.5 wordt Andere hulp
ontvangers hun geld in driemaandelijkse voorschotten krijgen, maar Israël ontvangt
zijn volledig krediet begin elk fiscaal jaar en verdient
zo extra rente. De meeste ontvangers Amerikaanse militaire hulp worden
vereist om elk van te besteden het in de Verenigde Staten, maar Israël kan percenten
twenty.five van zijn hulptoewijzing ruwweg gebruiken om zijn eigen defensie
industrie te subsidiëren. Israël is de enige ontvanger die niet van
hoe moet rekenschap geven de hulp wordt besteed, een vrijstelling die het vrijwel onmogelijk
maakt om het geld voor doeleinden te verhinderen worden gebruikt de Verenigde
Staten zich, als de bouw van regelingen in Cisjordanië verzet.
Voorts hebben de Verenigde Staten Israël van bijna $3 miljard voorzien om
wapenssystemen zoals de vliegtuigen te ontwikkelen Lavi geen die het Pentagoon
wilde of, terwijl het geven van de toegang van Israël tot top.drawer de V.S. vergde. bewapening zoals
helikopters Blackhawk en F.16 stralen. Tot slot geven de Verenigde Staten
de toegang van Israël tot intelligentie dat het ontkent zijn bondgenoten van de NAVO en
een blind oog naar aanwinst Israels van kernweapons.6 2
daarnaast gedraaid, voorziet Washington Israël van verenigbare diplomatieke
steun. Sinds 1982, hebben de Verenigde Staten 32 resoluties van de Veiligheidsraad
van de Verenigde Naties Die van Israël kritiek waren geweigerd, een aantal
groter dan het gecombineerde totaal van veto's die door al andere Veiligheidsraad
members.7 worden gegoten het ook Arabische staten blokkeert. inspanningen om kernarsenaal
Israel.s op de Internationale AtoomEnergie Agency.s agenda.8 te zetten
de Verenigde Staten ook aan redding Israel.s in oorlogstijd komen en zijn kant
wanneer het bespreken van vrede nemen. Het Nixon Beleid re.supplied Israël
tijdens de Oorlog van Oktober en beschermd Israël van de bedreiging van Sovjet
interventie. Washington werd diep geïmpliceerdc in de onderhandelingen die
die oorlog evenals lange .step.by.step beëindigden. verwerk gevolgd
dat, enkel aangezien het een belangrijke rol in de onderhandelingen speelde die voorafgingen
en volgden 1993 Oslo Accords.9 Er occasionele frictions tussen
de V.S. waren. en de Israëlische ambtenaren in beide gevallen, maar de Verenigde Staten
coördineerden dicht zijn posities met Israël en steunden constant de
Israëlische benadering van negotitions. Één Amerikaanse deelnemer bij
Kamp David (2000) zei namelijk later te vaak, .far, wij functioneerde. . . als
Israel.s lawyer..10
zoals hieronder besproken, heeft Washington Israël brede breedte in het behandelen
de bezette gebieden (Cisjordanië en de Gazastrook) gegeven, zelfs wanneer
zijn acties met de verklaarde V.S. het oneens waren. beleid. Voorts bedoelde de
ambitieuze strategie van Bush Administration.s om het Midden-Oosten .beginning
met de invasie van Iraq.is om te zetten minstens gedeeltelijk strategische situatie
te verbeteren Israel.s. Behalve allianties in oorlogstijd, is het moeilijk om te denken aan
een andere instantie waar één land een andere van een gelijkaardig niveau
van materiaal en diplomaticsupport voor zulk een uitgebreide periode heeft voorzien.
De steun van America.s voor Israël is, in het kort uniek.
Deze buitengewone grootmoedigheid zou begrijpelijk kunnen zijn als Israël essentiële
strategische activa was of als er een dwingend morageval voor de aanhoudende
V.S. was. steun. Maar geen van beide reden is overtuigend.
Een STRATEGISCHE AANSPRAKELIJKHEID
volgens de American.Israel website Openbare van Zaken Committee.s (AIPAC
heeft), .the Verenigde Staten en Israël een uniek vennootschap gevormd om
de groeiende strategische bedreigingen in het Midden-Oosten te ontmoeten. . . . Deze
behulpzame inspanning levert significante voordelen voor zowel de Verenigde
Staten als Israel..11 op Deze eis een geloofspunt onder verdedigers Israel.s
is en door Israëlische politici en pro uit routine aangehaald. Israël
Amerikanen.
3 Israël kan strategische activa geweest zijn tijdens Koude War.12 door als
volmacht America.s na de Zesdaagse Oorlog (1967), Israël te dienen geholpen Sovjet
uitbreiding in het gebied bevatten en legde vernederende nederlagen op Sovjet
cliënten zoals Egypte en Syrië op. Israël nu en dan geholpen de andere V.S.
beschermen. de bondgenoten (als Jordan.s Koning Hussein) en zijn militaire dapperheid dwongen
Moskou om meer te besteden die zijn verliezende cliënten steunen. Israël gaf de Verenigde Staten
ook nuttige intelligentie over Sovjetmogelijkheden.
Israel.s zou de strategische waarde tijdens deze periode niet moeten worden overdreven,
was however.13 die Israël steunt niet goedkoop, en het compliceerde relaties
America.s met de Arabische wereld. Bijvoorbeeld, de V.S. het besluit om Israël
$2.2 miljard in noodsituatie militaire financiële steun tijdens de Oorlog van Oktober te geven
bracht een de olieembargo teweeg van de OPEC dat aanzienlijke schadeo Westelijke economieën
oplegde. Voorts militaire kon Israel.s de geen V.S. beschermen. belangen in
het gebied. Bijvoorbeeld, konden de Verenigde Staten niet op Israël vertrouwen toen
de Iraanse Revolutie in 1979 zorgen over de veiligheid van Perzische
oliebevoorradingen Glf ophief, en moesten zijn creëren. De Kracht van de snelle
Plaatsing. in plaats daarvan.
Zelfs als Israël strategische activa tijdens de Koude Oorlog was, openbaarde de eerste
Oorlog van de Golf (1990.91) dat Israël een strategische last werd. De
Verenigde Staten konden geen Israëlische basissen tijdens de oorlog gebruiken zonder
anti te verbreken. Coalitie van Irak, en het moest middelen (b.v., de raketbatterijen
van de Patriot) afleiden om Tel Aviv te houden van het doen van om het even wat die de
alliantie tegen Saddam zou kunnen breken. De geschiedenis herhaalde zich in 2003:
hoewel Israël voor de Verenigde Staten enthousiast was om Saddam aan te vallen,
kon President Bush niet het vragen om te helpen zonder Arabische oppositie
teweeg te brengen. Zo bleef Israël op het sidelinesagain.14
Begin in de jaren '90, en vooral na 9/11, de V.S. de steun voor Israël is
gerechtvaardigd door de eis dat beide staten door terroristen
groepen uit de Moslimwereld Arabor, en door een reeks staten
.rogue worden bedreigd. dat achter streven deze groepen en naar WMD. Deze reden impliceert
dat Washington Israël zou moeten geven vrij het behandelen van de Palestijnen
en Israël t niet drukken doet concessies indient tot alle Palestijnse
terroristen of volkomen worden gevangengenomen. Het impliceert ook dat de Verenigde Staten
na landen zoals de Islamitische Republiek van Iran, Saddam al Hussein.s
Irak zouden moeten gaan, en Bashar. Assad.s Syrië. Israël wordt zo gezien als
essentiële bondgenoot in de oorlog op verschrikking, omdat zijn vijanden vijanden America.s
zijn.
Deze nieuwe reden schijnt overredend, maar Israël is in feite een aansprakelijkheid in
de oorlog op verschrikking en de bredere inspanning om schurkenstaten te behandelen.
4 om te beginnen met, .terrorism. is een tactiek die door een brede serie van politieke
groepen wordt aangewend; het is geen één enkele verenigde tegenstander. De terroristen
organisaties die Israël (b.v., Hamas of Hezbollah) bedreigen
bedreigen niet de Verenigde Staten, behalve wanneer het tegen hen (zoals in Libanon
in 1982) tussenbeide komt. Voorts is het Palestijnse terrorisme geen willekeurig geweld
dat tegen Israël wordt geleid of .the het Westen. ; het is grotendeels een reactie op
Israel.s verlengde campagne om Cisjordanië en de Gazastrook te koloniseren.
Wat nog belangrijker is, heeft het zeggen dat Israël en de Verenigde Staten door een
gedeelde terroristenbedreiging worden verenigd achteruit de oorzakelijke verhouding: eerder, hebben
de Verenigde Staten een terrorismeprobleem in goed deel omdat het zo
dicht met rond Israël, niet de andere manier wordt verenigd. De V.S. de steun voor
Israël is niet de enige bron van anti. Het Amerikaanse terrorisme, maar het is
belangrijke, en het maakt het winnen van de oorlog op verschrikking meer difficult.15
Er geen vraag, bijvoorbeeld is, dat vele al Qaeda leiders, met inbegrip van
ben Laden, door Israel.s aanwezigheid in Jeruzalem en de benarde toestand van
de Palestijnen worden gemotiveerd. Volgens de V.S. De 9/11 Commissie, ben Laden
wilde uitdrukkelijk de Verenigde Staten voor zijn beleid in het Midden-Oosten
, met inbegrip van zijn steun voor Israël straffen, en hij probeerde aan tijd zelfs
de aanvallen om dit issue.16 de even
belangrijke, onvoorwaardelijke V.S. te benadrukken. de steun voor Israël maakt het voor
extremisten zoals ben Laden gemakkelijker om populaire steun te verzamelen en rekruten
aan te trekken. De openbare opinieonderzoeken bevestigen dat de Arabische bevolking diep vijandig
aan Amerikaanse steun voor Israël, en de V.S. is. Vond de Adviserende
Groep van de staat Department.s op Openbare Diplomatie voor de Arabische en Moslimwereld
dat .citizens in deze landen bij de benarde toestand van de
Palestijnen echt verontrust zijn en bij de rol zij de Verenigde Staten om playing..17 zoals
voor
so.called schurkenstaten in het Midden-Oosten waarnemen te zijn, zijn zij geen ontzettende
bedreiging voor de essentiële V.S. belangen, behalve de V.S. verplichting aan Israël
zelf. Hoewel de Verenigde Staten een aantal meningsverschillen met
deze regimes hebben, zou Washington niet zoals die over Iran, Ba.thist Irak bijna
ongerust wordt gemaakt zijn, of Syrië was het niet zo dicht gebonden aan Israël. Zelfs als
deze staten verwerven is kernweapons.which duidelijk geen desirable.it
zou zijn geen strategische ramp voor de Verenigde Staten. Noch zou Amerika
noch Israël door een schurk kunnen worden gechanteerd nuclear.armed, omdat
blackmailer niet de bedreiging kon uitvoeren zonder overweldigende vergelding
te ontvangen. Het gevaar van een .nuclear handoff. aan terroristen is even ver
, omdat een schurkenstaat niet kon zeker zijn de overdracht undetected
zou zijn of dat het niet daarna zou beschuldigd worden en gestraft. 5
verder, de V.S. de verhouding met Israël maakt het eigenlijk harder om
deze staten te behandelen. Israel.s is het kernarsenaal één reden waarom sommige van
zijn buren kernwapens willen, en slechts het bedreigen van deze staten
met de verhogingen van de regimeverandering die wensen. Maar toch is Israël niet veel van
activa wanneer de Verenigde Staten overwegen gebruikend kracht tegen deze
regimes, omdat het aan de strijd niet kan deelnemen.
In het kort, negeert het behandelen van Israël als belangrijkste bondgenoot America.s in de
campagne tegen terrorisme en geassorteerde de dictaturen bothexaggerates
capaciteit Israel.s van het Midden-Oosten om op deze kwesties te helpen en de manieren dat
het beleid Israel.s de V.S. maakt. moeilijkere inspanningen.
De onbetwistbare steun voor Israël verzwakt ook de V.S. positie buiten het
Midden-Oosten. Buitenlandse elites bekijken constant de Verenigde Staten te
steunend van Israël, en denken zijn tolerantie van Israëlische onderdrukking op de
bezette gebieden moreel stomp is en een handicap in de oorlog op
terroism.18 in April 2004, bijvoorbeeld, 52 vroegere Britse diplomaten Eerste
Minister Tony Blair een brief zeggend dat het conflict Israel.Palestine
relaties .poisoned tussen het Westen en de Arabische en Islamitische werelden had
verzond. en de waarschuwing dat het beleid van Bush en Eerste Minister Ariel
Sharon .one.sided en illegal..19A
definitieve reden was om strategische waarde te vragen Israel.s is dat het niet
als een loyale bondgenoot handelt. De Israëlische ambtenaren negeren vaak de V.S. de verzoeken
en verloochenen op beloften die aan tot de hoogste V.S. worden gemaakt. leiders (met inbegrip van verledenbeloften om
regeling te stoppen geted de bouw en zich van .tar te onthouden moorden.
van Palestijnse leiders) .20 bovendien, heeft Israël de gevoelige V.S. verstrekt.
militaire technologie aan de potentiële V.S. de rivalen houden van China, in wat de V.S.
Afdeling van de staat Inspector.General riep .a systematisch en groeiend
patroon van onbevoegde transfers..21 volgens de V.S. Het algemene
Bureau van de Boekhouding, Israël ook .conducts de agressiefste spionage
verrichtingen tegen de V.S. van om het even welke ally..22 naast het geval van
de Wig van Jonathan, dat Israël grote hoeveelheden geclassificeerd materiaal in
de vroege jaren '80 (die Israël naar verluidt op de Sowjetunie overging om
meer uitgangsvisa voor SovjetJoden) te bereiken gaf, barstte een nieuwe controverse in
2004 los toen men dat openbaarde een zeer belangrijke ambtenaar van het Pentagoon (Larry Franklin)
geclassificeerde informatie tot een Israëlische diplomaat had overgegaan, naar verluidt geholpen
door twee AIPAC officials.23 Israël is nauwelijks het enige land dat de spionnen op
de Verenigde Staten, maar zijn bereidheid om op zijn belangrijkste patroon te spioneren
verdere twijfel op zijn strategische waarde gieten.
6 een AFNEMEND MOREEL COMPUTER-AIDED SOFTWARE ENGINEERING
behalve zijn zogenaamde strategische waarde, steunen Israel.s debatteert ook dat
het de ongeschikte V.S. verdient. steun omdat 1) het door vijanden zwak
en omringd is, 2) het is een democratie, die een moreel verkieslijke vorm van overheid
is; 3) the Jewish people have suffered from past crimes and
therefore deserve special treatment, and 4) Israel.s conduct has been
morally superior to its adversaries. behavior.
On close inspection, however, each of these arguments is unpersuasive.
There is a strong moral case for supporting Israel.s existence, but that
is not in jeopardy. Viewed objectively, Israel.s past and present conduct
offers no moral basis for privileging it over the Palestinians.
Backing the Underdog?
Israel is often portrayed as weak and besieged, a Jewish David surrounded
by a hostile Arab Goliath. This image has been carefully nurtured by
Israeli leaders and sympathetic writers, but the opposite image is closer
to the truth. Contrary to popular belief, the Zionists had larger,
better.equipped, and better.led forces during the 1947.49 War of
Independence and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) won quick and easy
victories against Egypt in 1956 and against Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in
1967.before large.scale U.S. aid began flowing to Israel.24 These
victories offer eloquent evidence of Israeli patriotism, organizational
ability, and military prowess, but they also reveal that Israel was far
from helpless even in its earliest years.
Today, Israel is the strongest military power in the Middle East. Its
conventional forces are far superior to its neighbors and it is the only
state in the region with nuclear weapons. Egypt and Jordan signed peace
treaties with Israel and Saudi Arabia has offered to do so as well. Syria
has lost its Soviet patron, Iraq has been decimated by three disastrous
wars, and Iran is hundreds of miles away. The Palestinians barely have
effective police, let alone a military that could threaten Israel.
According to a 2005 assessment by Tel Aviv University.s prestigious Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies, .the strategic balance decidedly favors
Israel, which has continued to widen the qualitative gap between its own
military capability and deterrence powers and those of its neghbors..25 If
backing the underdog were a compelling rationale, the United States would
be supporting Israel.s opponents.
7 Aiding a Fellow Democracy?
American backing is often justified by the claim that Israel is a
fellow.democracy surrounded by hostile dictatorships. This rationale
sounds convincing, but it cannot account for the current level of U.S.
support. After all, there are many democracies around the world, but none
receives the lavish support that Israel does. The United States has
overthrown democratic governments in the past and supported dictators when
this was thought to advance .S. interests, and it has good relations with
a number of dictatorships today. Thus, being democratic neither justifies
nor explains America.s support for Israel.
The .shared democracy. rationale is also weakened by aspects of Israeli
democracy that are at odds with core American values. The United States is
a liberal democracy where people of any race, religion, or ethnicity are
supposed to enjoy equal rights. By contrast, Israel was explicitly founded
as a Jewish state and citizenship is based on the principle of blood
kinship.26 Given this conception of citizenship, it is not surprising that
Israel.s 1.3 million Arabs are treated as second.class citizens, or that a
recent Israeli government commission found that Israel behaves in a
.neglectful and discriminatory. manner towards them.27
Similarly, Israel does not permit Palestinians who marry Israeli citizens
to become citizens themselves, and does not give these spouses the right
to live in Israel. The Israeli human rights organization B.tselem called
this restriction .a racist law that determines who can live here according
to racist criteria..28 Such laws may be understandable given Israel.s
founding principles, but they are not consistent with America.s image of
democracy.
Israel.s democratic status is also undermined by its refusal to grant the
Palestinians a viable state of their own. Israel controls the lives of
about 3.8 million Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, while colonizing
lands on which the Palestinians have long dwelt. Israel is formally
democratic, but the millions of Palestinians that it controls are denied
full political rights and the .shared democracy. rationale is
correspondingly weakened.
Compensation for Past Crimes
A third moral justification is the history of Jewish suffering in the
Christian West, especially the tragic episode of the Holocaust. Because
Jews were persecuted for 8 centuries and can only be safe in a Jewish
homeland, many believe that Israel deserves special treatment from the
United States.
There is no question that Jews suffered greatly from the despicable legacy
of anti.Semitism, and that Israel.s creation was an appropriate response
to a long record of crimes. This history, as noted, provides a strong
moral case for supporting Israel.s existence. But the creation of Israel
involved additional crimes against a largely innocent third party: the
Palestinians.
The history of these events is well.understood. When political Zionism
began in earnest in the late 19th century, there were only about 15,000
Jews in Palestine.29 In 1893, for example, the Arabs comprised roughly 95
percent of the population, and though under Ottoman control, they had been
in continuous possession of this territory for 1300 years.30 Even when
Israel was founded, Jews were only about 35 percent of Palestine.s
population and owned 7 percent of the land.31
The mainstream Zionist leadership was not interested in establishing a
bi.national state or accepting a permanent partition of Palestine. The
Zionist leadership was sometimes willing to accept partition as a first
step, but this was a tactical maneuver and not their real objective. As
David Ben.Gurion put it in the late 1930s, .After the formation of a large
army in the wake of the establishment of the state, we shall abolish
partition and expand to the whole of Palestine..32
To achieve this goal, the Zionists had to expel large numbers of Arabs
from the territory that would eventually become Israel. There was simply
no other way to accomplish their objective. Ben.Gurion saw the problem
clearly, writing in 1941 that .it is impossible to imagine general
evacuation [of the Arab population] without compulsion, and brutal
compulsion..33 Or as Israeli historian Benny Morris puts it, .the idea of
transfer is as old as modern Zionism and has accompanied its evolution and
praxis during the past century..34
This opportunity came in 1947.48, when Jewish forces drove up to 700,000
Palestinians into exile.35 Israeli officials have long claimed that the
Arabs fled because their leaders told them to, but careful scholarship
(much of it by Israeli historians like Morris) have demolished this myth.
In fact, most Arab leaders urged the Palestinian population to stay home,
but fear of violent death at the hands of Zionist forces led most of them
to flee.36 After the war, Israel barred the return of the Palestinian
exiles.
9 The fact that the creation of Israel entailed a moral crime against the
Palestinian people was well understood by Israel.s leadrs. As Ben.Gurion
told Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Jewish Congress, .If I were an
Arab leader I would never make terms with Israel. That is natural: we have
taken their country. . . . We come from Israel, but two thousand years
ago, and what is that to them? There has been anti.Semitism, the Nazis,
Hitler, Auschwitz, but was that their fault? They only see one thing: we
have come here and stolen their country. Why should they accept that?.37
Since then, Israeli leaders have repeatedly sought to deny the
Palestinians. national ambitions.38 Prime Minister Golda Meir famously
remarked that .there was no such thing as a Palestinian,. and even Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who signed the 1993 Oslo Accords, nonetheless
opposed creating a full.fledged Palestinian state.39 Pressure from
extremist violence and the growing Palestinian population has forced
subsequent Israeli leaders to disengage rom some of the occupied
territories and to explore territorial compromise, but no Israeli
government has been willing to offer the Palestinians a viable state of
their own. Even Prime Minister Ehud Barak.s purportedly generous offer at
Camp David in July 2000 would only have given the Palestiniansa disarmed
and dismembered set of .Bantustans. under de facto Israeli control.40
Europe.s crimes against the Jews provide a clear moral justification for
Israel.s right to exist. But Israel.s survival is not in doubt.even if
some Islamic extremists make outrageous and unrealistic references to
.wiping it off the map..and the tragic history of the Jewish people does
not obligate the United States to help Israel no matter what it does
today.
.Virtuous Israelis. versus .Evil Arabs.
The final moral argument portrays Israel as a country that has sought
peace at every turn and showed great restraint even when rovoked. The
Arabs, by contrast, are said to have acted with great wickedness. This
narrative.which is endlessly repeated by Israeli leaders and American
apologists such as Alan Dershowitz.is yet another myth.41 In terms of
actual behavior, Israel.s conduct is not morally distinguishable from the
actions of its opponents.
Israeli scholarship shows that the early Zionists were far from benevolent
towards the Palestinian Arabs.42 The Arab inhabitants did resist the
Zionists. encroachments, which is hardly surprising given that the
Zionists were trying to create their own state on Arab lands. The Zionists
responded vigorously, and 10 neither side owns the moral high ground
during this period. This same scholarship also reveals that the creation
of Israel in 1947.48 involved explicit acts of ethnic cleansing, including
executions, massacres, and rapes by Jews.43
Furthermore, Israel.s subsequent conduct towards its Arab adversaries and
its Palestinian subjects has often been brutal, belying any claim to
morally superior conduct. Between 1949 and 1956, for example, Israeli
security forces killed between 2,700 and 5000 Arab infiltrators, the
overwhelming majority of them unarmed.44 The IDF conducted numerous
cross.border raids against its neighbors in the early 1950s, and though
these actions were portrayed as defensive responses, they were actually
part of a broader effort to expand Israel.s borders. Israel.s expansionist
ambitions also led it to join Britain and France in attacking Egypt in
1956, and Israel withdrew from the lands it had conquered only in the face
of intense U.S. pressure. 45
The IDF also murdered hundreds of Egyptian prisoners.of.war in both the
1956 and 1967 wars.46 In 1967, it expelled between 100,000 and 260,000
Palestinians from the newly.conquered West Bank, and drove 80,000 Syrians
from the Golan Heights.47 It was also complicit in the massacre of 700
innocent Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps following its
invsion of Lebanon in 1982, and an Israeli investigatory commission found
then.Defence Minister Sharon .personally responsible. for these
atrocities.48
Israeli personnel have tortured numerous Palestinian prisoners,
systematically humiliated and inconvenienced Palestinian civilians, and
used force indiscriminately against them on numerous occasions. During the
First Intifida (1987.1991), for example, the IDF distributed truncheons to
its troops and encouraged them to break the bones of Palestinian
protestors. The Swedish .Save the Children. organization estimated that
.23,600 to 29,900 children required medical treatment for their beating
injuries in the first two years of the intifida,. with nearly one.third
sustaining broken bones. Nearly one.third of the beaten children were aged
ten and under..49
Israel.s response to the Second Intifida (2000.2005) has been even more
violent, leading Ha.aretz to declare that .the IDF . is turning into a
killing machine whose efficiency is awe.inspiring, yet shocking..50 The
IDF fired one million bullets in the first days of the uprising, which is
far from a measured response.51 Since then, Israel has killed 3.4
Palestinians for every Israeli lost, the majority of whom have been
innocent bystanders; the ratio of Palestinian to Israeli children killed
is even higher (5.7 to 1).52 Israeli forces have also killed several
foreign 11 peace activists, including a 23 year.old American woman crushed
by an Israeli bulldozer in March 2003.53
These facts about Israel.s conduct have been amply documented by numerous
human rights organizations.including prominent Israeli groups.and are not
disputed by fair.minded observers. And that is why four former officials
of Shin Bet (the Israeli domestic security organization) condemned
Israel.s conduct during the Second Intifada in November 2003. One of them
declared .we are behaving disgracefully,. and another termed Israel.s
conduct .patently immoral..54
But isn.t Israel entitled to do whatever it takes to protect its citizens?
Doesn.t the unique evil of terrorism justify continued U.S. support, even
if Israel often responds harshly?
In fact, this argument is not a compelling moral justification either.
Palestinians have used terrorism against their Israeli occupiers, and
their willingness to attack innocent civilians is wrong. This behavior is
not surprising, however, because the Palestinians believe they have no
other way to force Israeli concessions. As former Prime Minister Barak
once admitted, had he been born a Palestinian, he .would have joined a
terrorist organization..55
Finally, we should not forget that the Zionists used terrorism when they
were in a similarly weak position and trying to obtain their on state.
Between 1944 and 1947, several Zionist organizations used terrorist
bombings to drive the British from Palestine, and took the lives of many
innocent civilians along the way.56 Israeli terrorists also murdered U.N.
mediator Count Folke Bernadotte in 1948, because they opposed his proposal
to internationalize Jerusalem.57 Nor were the perpetrators of these acts
isolated extremists: the leaders of the murder plot were eventually
granted amnesty by the Israeli government and one of them was elected to
the Knsset. Another terrorist leader, who approved the murder but was not
tried, was future Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. Indeed, Shamir openly
argued that .neither Jewish ethics nor Jewish tradition can disqualify
terrorism as a means of combat.. Rather, terrorism had .a great part to
play . in our war against the occupier [Britain]..58 If the Palestinians.
use of terrorism is morally reprehensible today, so was Israel.s reliance
upon it in the past, and thus one cannot justify U.S. support for Israel
on the grounds that its past conduct was morally superior.59
12 Israel may not have acted worse than many other countries, but it
clearly has not acted any better. And if neither strategic nor moral
arguments can account for America.s support for Israel, how are we to
explain it?
THE ISRAEL LOBBY
The explanation lies in the unmatched power of the Israel Lobby. Were it
not for the Lobby.s ability to manipulate the American political system,
the relationship between Israel and the United States would be far less
intimate than it is today.
What Is The Lobby?
We use .the Lobby.as a convenient short.hand term for the loose coalition
of individuals and organizations who actively work to shape U.S. foreign
policy in a pro.Israel direction. Our use of this term is not meant to
suggest that .the Lobby.is a unified movement with a central leadership,
or that individuals within it do not disagree on certain issues
The core of the Lobby is comprised of American Jews who make a significant
effort in their daily lives to bend U.S. foreign policy so that it
advances Israel.s interests. Their activities go beyond merely voting for
candidates who are pro.Israel to include letter.writing, financial
contributions, and supporting pro.Israel organizations. But not all
Jewish.Americans are part of the Lobby, because Israel is not a salient
issue for many of them. In a 2004 survey, for example, roughly 36 percent
of Jewish.Americans said they were either .not very. or .not at all.
emotionally attached to Israel.60
Jewish.Americans also differ on specific Israeli policies. Many of the key
organizations in the Lobby, like AIPAC and the Conference of Presidents of
Major Jewish Organizations (CPMJO), are run by hardliners who generally
supported the expansionist policies of Israel.s Likud Party, including its
hostility to the Oslo Peace Process. The bulk of U.S. Jewry, on the other
hand, is more favorably disposed to making concessions to the
Palestinians, and a few groups.such as Jewish Voice for Peace.strongly
advocate such steps.61 Despite these differences, moderates and hardliners
both support steadfast U.S. support for Israel.
Not surprisingly, American Jewish leaders often consult with Israeli
officials, so that the former can maximize their influence in the United
States. As one activist with a major Jewish organization wrote, .it is
routine for us to say: .This is our 13 policy on a certain issue, but we
must check what the Israelis think.. We as a community do it all the
time..62 There is also a strong norm against criticizing Israeli policy,
and Jewish.American leaders rarely support putting pressure on Israel.
Thus, Edgar Bronfman Sr., the president of the World Jewish Congress, was
accused of .perfidy. when he wrote a letter to President Bush in mid.2003
urging Bush to pressure Israel to curb construction of its controversial
.security fence..63 Critics declared that, .It would be obscene at any
time for the president of the World Jewish Congress to lobby the president
of the United States to rsist policies being promoted by the government of
Israel..
Similarly, when Israel Policy Forum president Seymour Reich advised
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to pressure Israel to reopen a crtical
border crossing in the Gaza Strip in November 2005, critics denounced his
action as .irresponsible behavior,. and declared that, .There is
absolutely no room in the Jewish mainstream for actively canvassing
against the security.related policies . . . of Israel..64 Recoiling from
these attacks, Reich proclaimed that .the word pressure is not in my
vocabulary when it comes to Israel..
Jewish.Americans have formed an impressive array of organizations to
influence American foreign policy, of which AIPAC is the most powerful and
well.known. In 1997, Fortune magazine asked members of Congress and their
staffs to list the most powerful lobbies in Washington.65 AIPAC was ranked
second behind the American Association of Retired People (AARP), but ahead
of heavyweight lobbies like the AFL.CIO and the National Rifle
Association. A National Journal study in March 2005 reached a similar
conclusion, placing AIPAC in second place (tied with AARP) in the
Washington.s .muscle rankings..66
The Lobby also includes prominent Christian evangelicals like Gary Bauer,
Jerry Falwell, Ralph Reed, and Pat Robertson, as well as Dick Armey and
Tom DeLay, former majority leaders in the House of Representatives. They
believe Israel.s rebirth is part of Biblical prophecy, support its
expansionist agenda, and think pressuring Israel is contrary to God.s
will.67 In addition, the Lobby.s membership includes neoconservative
gentiles such as John Bolton, the late Wall Street Journal editor Robert
Bartley, former Secretary of Education William Bennett, former U.N.
Ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, and columnist George Will. 14
Sources of Power
The United States has a divided government that offers many ways to
influence the policy process. As a result, interest groups can shape
policy in many different ways.by lobbying elected representatives and
members of the executive branch, making campaign contributions, voting in
elections, molding public opinion, etc.
Furthermore, special interest groups enjoy disproportionate power when
they are committed to a particular issue and the bulk of the populaton is
indifferent. Policymakers will tend to accommodate those who care about
the issue in question, even if their numbers are small, confident that the
rest of the population will not penalize them.
The Israel Lobby.s power flows from its unmatched ability to play this
game of interest group politics. In its basic operations, it is no
different from interest groups like the Farm Lobby, steel and textile
workers, and other ethnic lobbies. What sets the Israel Lobby apart is its
extraordinary effectiveness. But there is nothing improper about American
Jews and their Christian allies attempting to sway U.S. policy towards
Israel. The Lobby.s activities are not the sort of conspiracy depicted in
anti.Semitic tracts like the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. For the most
part, the individuals and groups that comprise the Lobby are doing what
other special interest groups do, just much better. Moreover, pro.Arab
interest groups are weak to non.existent, which makes the Lobby.s task
even easier.68
Strategies for Success
The Lobby pursues two broad strategies to promote U.S. support for Israel.
First, it wields significant influence in Washington, pressuring both
Congress and the Executive branch to support Israel down the line.
Whatever an individual lawmaker or policymaker.s own views, the Lobby
tries to make supporting Israel the .smart. political choice.
Second, the Lobby strives to ensure that public discourse about Israel
portrays it in a positive light, by repeating myths about Israel and its
founding and by publicizing Israel.s side in the policy debates of the
day. The goal is to prevent critical commentary about Israel from getting
a fair hearing in the political arena. Controlling the debate is essential
to guaranteeing U.S. support, because a 15 candid discussion of
U.S..Israeli relations might lead Americans to favor a different policy.
Influencing Congress
A key pillar of the Lobby.s effectiveness is its influence in the U.S.
Congress, where Israel is virtually immune from criticism. This is in
itself a remarkable situation, because Congress almost never shies away
from contentious issues. Whether the issue is abortion, affirmative
action, health care, or welfare, there is certain to be a lively debate on
Capitol Hill. Where Israel is concerned, however, potential critics fall
silent and there is hardly any debate at all.
One reason for the Lobby.s success with Congress is that some key members
are Christian Zionists like Dick Armey, who said in September 2002 that
.My No. 1 priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel..69 One would
think that the number 1 priority for any congressman would be to .protect
America,. but that is not what Armey said. There are also Jewish senators
and congressmen who work to make U.S. foreign policy support Israel.s
interests.
Pro.Israel congressional staffers are another source of the Lobby.s power.
As Morris Amitay, a former head of AIPAC, once admitted, .There are a lot
of guys at the working level up here [on Capitol Hill] . who happen to be
Jewish, who are willing . to look at certain issues in terms of their
Jewishness .. These are all guys who are in a position to make the
decision in these areas for those senators .. You can get an awful lot
done just at the staff level..70
It is AIPAC itself, however, that forms the core of the Lobby.s influence
in Congress. AIPAC.s success is due to its ability to reward legislators
and congressional candidates who support its agenda, and to punish those
who challenge it. Money is critical to U.S. elections (as the recent
scandal over lobbyist Jack Abramoff.s various shady dealings reminds us),
and AIPAC makes sure that its friends get strong financial support from
the myriad pro.Israel political action committees. Those seen as hostile
to Israel, on the other hand, can be sure that AIPAC will direct campaign
contributions to their political opponents. AIPAC also organizes
letter.writing campaigns and encourages newspaper editors to endorse
pro.Israel candidates.
There is no doubt about the potency of these tactics. To take but one
example, in 1984 AIPAC helped defeat Senator Charles Percy from Illinois,
who, according to one prominent Lobby figure, had .displayed insensitivity
and even hostility to 16 our concerns.. Thomas Dine, the head of AIPAC at
the time, explained what happened: .All the Jews in America, from coast to
coast, gathered to oust Percy. And the American politicians ..those who
hold public positions now, and those who aspire ..got the message..71
AIPAC prizes its reputation as a formidable adversary, of course, because
it discourages anyone from questioning its agenda.
AIPAC.s influence on Capitol Hill goes even further, however. According to
Douglas Bloomfield, a former AIPAC staff member, .It is common for members
of Congress and their staffs to turn to AIPAC first when they need
information, before calling the Library of Congress, the Congressional
Research Service, committee staff or administration experts..72 More
importantly, he notes that AIPAC is .often called upon to draft speeches,
work on legislation, advise on tactics, perform research, collect
co.sponsors and marshal votes..
The bottom line is that AIPAC, which is a de facto agent for a foreign
government, has a stranglehold on the U.S. Congress.73 Open debate about
U.S. policy towards Israel does not occur there, even though that policy
has important consequences for the entire world. Thus, one of the three
main branches of the U.S. government is firmly committed to supporting
Israel. As former Senator Ernest Hollings (D.SC) noted as he was leaving
office, .You can.t have an Israeli policy other than what AIPAC gives you
around here..74 Small wonder that Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon once
told an American audience. .When people ask me how they can help Israel, I
tell them.Help AIPAC..75
Influencing the Executive
The Lobby also has significant leverage over the Executive branch. That
power derives in part from the influence Jewish voters have on
presidential elections. Despite their small numbers in the population
(less than 3 percent), they make large campaign donations to candidates
from both parties. The Washington Post once estimated that Democratic
presidential candidates .depend on Jewish supporters to supply as much as
60 percent of the money..76 Furthermore, Jewish voters have high turn.out
rates and are concentrated in key states like California, Florida,
Illinois, New York, and Pennsylvania. Because they matter in close
elections, Presidential candidates go to great lengths not to antagonize
Jewish voters.
Key organizations in the Lobby also directly target the administration in
power. For example, pro.Israel forces make sure that critics of the Jewish
state do not get important foreign.policy appointments. Jimmy Carter
wanted to make George 17 Ball his first secretary of state, but he knew
that Ball was perceived as critical of Israel and that the Lobby would
oppose the appointment.77 This litmus test forces any aspiring policymaker
to become an overt supporter of Israel, which is why public critics of
Israeli policy have become an endangered species in the U.S. foreign
policy establishment.
These constraints still operate today. When 2004 presidential candidate
Howard Dean called for the United States to take a more .even.handed role.
in the Arab.Israeli conflict, Senator Joseph Lieberman accused him of
selling Israel down the river and said his statement was
.irresponsible..78 Virtually all of the top Democrats in the House signed
a hard.hitting letter to Dean criticizing his comments, and the Chicago
Jewish Star reported that .anonymous attackers . are clogging the e.mail
inboxes of Jewish leaders around the country, warning ..without much
evidence ..that Dean would somehow be bad for Israel..79
This worry was absurd, however, because Dean is in fact quite hawkish on
Israel.80 His campaign co.chair was a former AIPAC president, and Dean
said his own views on the Middle East more closely reflected those of
AIPAC than the more moderate Americans for Peac Now. Dean had merely
suggested that to .bring the sides together,. Washington should act as an
honest broker. This is hardly a radical idea, but it is anathema to the
Lobby, which does not tolerate the idea of even.handedness when it comes
to the Arab.Israeli conflict.
The Lobby.s goals are also served when pro.Israel individuals occupy
important positions in the executive branch. During the Clinton
Administration, for example, Middle East policy was largely shaped by
officials with close ties to Israel or to prominent pro.Israel
organizations.including Martin Indyk, the former deputy director of
research at AIPAC and co.founder of the pro.Israel Washington Institute
for Near East Policy (WINEP); Dennis Ross, who joined WINEP after leaving
government in 2001; and Aaron Miller, who has lived in Israel and often
visits there.81
These men were among President Clinton.s closest advisors at the Camp
David summit in July 2000. Although all three supported the Oslo peace
process and favored creation of a Palestinian state, they did so only
within the limits of what would be acceptable to Israel.82 In particular,
the American delegation took its cues from Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak, coordinated negotiating positions in advance, and did not offer its
own independent proposals for settling the conflict. Not surprisingly,
Palestinian negotiators complained that they were 18 .negotiating with two
Israeli teams ..one displaying an Israeli flag, and one an American
flag..83
The situation is even more pronounced in the Bush Administration, whose
ranks include fervently pro.Israel individuals like Elliot Abrams, John
Bolton, Douglas Feith, I. Lewis (.Scooter.) Libby, Richard Perle, Paul
Wolfowitz, and David Wurmser. As we shall see, these officials
consistently pushed for policies favored by Israel and backed by
organizations in the Lobby.
Manipulating the Media
In addition to influencing government policy directly, the Lobby strives
to shape public perceptions about Israel and the Middle East. It does not
want an open debate on issues involving Israel, because an open debate
might cause Americans to question the level of support that they currently
provide. Accordingly, pro.Israel organizations work hard to influence the
media, think tanks, and academia, because these institutions are critical
in shaping popular opinion.
The Lobby.s perspective on Israel is widely reflected in the mainstream
media in good part because most American commentators ae pro.Israel. The
debate among Middle East pundits, journalist Eric Alterman writes, is
.dominated by people who cannot imagine criticizing Israel..84 He lists 61
.columnists and commentators who can be counted upon to support Israel
reflexively and without qualification.. Conversely, Alterman found just
five pundits who consistently criticize Israeli behavior or endorse
pro.Arab positions. Newspapers occasionally publish guest op.eds
challenging Israeli policy, but the balance of opinion clearly favors the
other side.
This pro.Israel bias is reflected in the editorials of major newspapers.
Robert Bartley, the late editor of the Wall Street Journal, once remarked
that, .Shamir, Sharon, Bibi . whatever those guys want is pretty much fine
by me..85 Not surprisingly, the Journal, along with other prominent
newspapers like The Chicago Sun.Times and The Washington Times regularly
run editorials that are strongly pro.Israel. Magazines like Commentary,
the New Republic, and the Weekly Standard also zealously defend Israel at
every turn.
Editorial bias is also found in papers like the New York Times. The Times
occasionally criticizes Israeli policies and sometimes concedes that the
Palestinians have legitimate grievances, but it is not even.handed. In his
memoirs, for example, former Times executive editor Max Frankel
acknowledged 19 the impact his own pro.Israel attitude had on his
editorial choices. In his words: .I was much more deeply devoted to Israel
than I dared to assert.. He goes on: .Fortified by my knowledge of Israel
and my friendships there, I myself wrote most of our Middle East
commentaries. As more Arab than Jewish readers recognized, I wrote them
from a pro.Israel perspective.. 86
The media.s reporting of news events involving Israel is somewhat more
even.handed than editorial commentary is, in part because reporters strive
to be objective, but also because it is difficult to cover events in the
occupied territories without acknowledging Israel.s actual behavior. To
discourage unfavorable reporting on Israel, the Lobby organizes letter
writing campaigns, demonstrations, and boycotts against news outlets whose
content it considers anti.Israel. One CNN executive has said that he
sometimes gets 6,000 e.mail messages in a single day complaining that a
story is anti.Israel.87 Similarly, the pro.Israel Committee for Accurate
Middle East Reporting in America (CAMERA) organized demonstrations outside
National Public Radio stations in 33 cities in May 2003, and it also tried
to convince contributors to withhold support from NPR until its Middle
East coverage became more sympatheticto Israel.88 Boston.s NPR station,
WBUR, reportedly lost more than $1 million in contributions as a result of
these efforts. Pressure on NPR has also come from Israel.s friends in
Congress, who have asked NPR for an internal audit as well as more
oversight of its Middle East coverage.
These factors help explain why the American media contains few criticisms
of Israeli policy, rarely questions Washington.s relationship with Israel,
and only occasionally discusses the Lobby.s profound influence on U.S.
policy.
Think Tanks That Think One Way
Pro.Israel forces predominate in U.S. think tanks, which play an important
role in shaping public debate as well as actual policy. The Lobby created
its own think tank in 1985, when Martin Indyk helped found WINEP.89
Although WINEP plays down its links to Israel and claims instead that it
provides a .balanced and realistic. perspective on Middle East issues,
this is not the case.90 In fact, WINEP is funded and run by individuals
who are deeply committed to advancing Israel.s agenda.
The Lobby.s influence in the think tank world extends well beyond WINEP.
Over the past 25 years, pro.Israel forces have established a commanding
presence at the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings Institution,
the 20 Center for Security Policy, the Foreign Policy Research Institute,
the Heritage Foundation, the Hudson Institute, the Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis, and the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs
(JINSA). These think tanks are decidedly pro.Israel, and include few, if
any, critics of U.S. support for the Jewish state.
A good indicator of the Lobby.s influence in the think tank world is the
evolution of the Brookings Institution. For many years, its senior expert
on Middle East issues was William B. Quandt, a distinguished academic and
former NSC official with a well.deserved reputation for evenhandedness
regarding the Arab.Israeli conflict. Today, however, Brookings.s work on
these issues is conducted through its Saban Center for Middle East
Studies, which is financed by Haim Saban, a wealthy Israeli.American
businessman and ardent Zionist.91 The director of the Saban Center is the
ubiquitous Martin Indyk. Thus, what was once a non.partisan policy
institute on Middle East matters is now part of the chorus of largely
pro.Israel think tanks.
Policing Academia
The Lobby has had the most difficulty stifling debate about Israel on
college campuses, because academic freedom is a core value and because
tenured professors are hard to threaten or silence. Even so, there was
only mild criticism of Israel in the 1990s, when the Oslo peace process
was underway. Criticism rose after that process collapsed and Ariel Sharon
came to power in early 2001, and it became especially intense when the IDF
re.occupied the West Bank in spring 2002 and employed massive force
against the Second Intifada.
The Lobby moved aggressively to .take back the campuses.. New groups
sprang up, like the Caravan for Democracy, which brought Israeli speakers
to U.S. colleges.92 Established groups like the Jewish Council for Public
Affairs and Hillel jumped into the fray, and a new group.the Israel on
Campus Coalition.was formed to coordinate the many groups that now sought
to make Israel.s case on campus. Finally, AIPAC more than tripled its
spending for programs to monitor university activities and to train young
advocates for Israel, in order to .vastly expand the number of students
involved on campus . . . in the national pro.Israel effort..93
The Lobby also monitors what professors write and teach. In September
2002, for example, Martin Kramer and Daniel Pipes, two passionately
pro.Israel neoconservatives, established a website (Campus Watch) that
posted dossiers on 21 suspect academics and encouraged students to report
comments or behavior that might be considered hostile to Israel.94 This
transparent attempt to blacklist and intimidate scholars prompted a harsh
reaction and Pipes and Kramer later removed he dossiers, but the website
still invites students to report alleged anti.Israel behavior at U.S.
colleges.
Groups in the Lobby also direct their fire at particular professors and
the universities that hire them. Columbia University, which had the late
Palestinian scholar Edward Said on its faculty, has been a frequent target
of pro.Israel forces. Jonathan Cole, the former Columbia provost, reported
that, .One can be sure that any public statement in support of the
Palestinian people by the preeminent literary critic Edward Said wil
elicit hundreds of e.mails, letters, and journalistic accounts that call
on us to denounce Said and to either sanction or fire him..95 When
Columbia recruited historian Rashid Khalidi from the University of
Chicago, Cole says that .the complaints started flowing in from people who
disagreed with the content of his political views.. Princeton faced the
same problem a few years later when it considered wooing Khalidi away from
Columbia.96
A classic illustration of the effort to police academia occurred in late
2004, when the .David Project. produced a propaganda film alleging that
faculty in Columbia University.s Middle East studies program were
anti.Semitic and were intimidating Jewish students who defended Israel.97
Columbia was raked over the coals in pro.Israel circles, but a faculty
committee assigned to investigate the charges found no evidence of
anti.Semitism and the only incident worth noting was the possibility that
one professor had .responded heatedly. to a student.s question.98 The
committee also discovered that the accused professors had been the target
of an overt intimidation campaign.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of this campaign to eliminate criticism
of Israel from college campuses is the effort by Jewsh groups to push
Congress to establish mechanisms that monitor what professors say about
Israel.99 Schools judged to have an anti.Israel bias would be denied
Federal funding. This effort to get the U.S. government to police campuses
have not yet succeeded, but the attempt illustrates the importance
pro.Israel groups place on controlling debate on these issues.
Finally, a number of Jewish philanthropists have established Israel
studies programs (in addition to the roughly 130 Jewish Studies programs
that already exist) so as to increase the number of Israel.friendly
scholars on campus.100 NYU 22 announced the establishment of the Taub
Center for Israel Studies on May 1, 2003, and similar programs have been
established at other schools like Berkeley, Brandeis, and Emory. Academic
administrators emphasize the pedagogical value of these programs, but the
truth is that they are intended in good part to promote Israel.s image on
campus. Fred Laffer, the head of the Taub Foundation, makes clear that his
foundation funded the NYU center to help counter the .Arabic [sic] point
of view. that he thinks is prevalent in NYU.s Middle East programs.101
In sum, the Lobby has gone to considerable lengths to insulate Israel from
criticism on college campuses. It has not been as successful in academia
as it has been on Capitol Hill, but it has worked hard to stifle criticism
of Israel by professors and students and there is much less of it on
campuses today102
The Great Silencer
No discussion of how the Lobby operates would be complete without
examining one of its most powerful weapons: the charge of anti.Semitism.
Anyone who criticizes Israeli actions or says that pro.Israel groups have
significant influence over U.S. Middle East policy.an influence that AIPAC
celebrates.stands a good chance of getting labeled an anti.Semite. In
fact, anyone who says that there is an Israel Lobby runs the risk of being
charged with anti.Semitism, even though the Israeli media themselves refer
to America.s .Jewish Lobby.. In effect, the Lobby boasts of its own power
and then attacks anyone who calls attention to it. This tactic is very
effective, because anti.Semitism is loathsome and no responsible person
wants to be accused of it.
Europeans have been more willing than Americans to criticize Israeli
policy in recent years, which some attribute to a resurgence of
anti.Semitism in Europe. We are .getting to a point,. the U.S. Ambassador
to the European Union said in early 2004, .where it is as bad as it was in
the 1930s..103 Measuring anti.Semitism is a complicated matter, but the
weight of evidence points in the opposite direction. For example, in the
spring of 2004, when accusations of European anti.Semitism filled the air
in America, separate surveys of European public opinion conducted by the
Anti.Defamation League and the Pew Research Center for the People and the
Press showed that it was actually declining.104
Consider France, which pro.Israel forces often portray as the most
anti.Semitic state in Europe. A poll of French citizens in 2002 found
that: 89 percent could envisage living with a Jew; 97 percent believe
making anti.Semitic graffiti is a 23 serious crime; 87 percent think
attacks on French synagogues are scandalous; and 85 percent of practicing
French Catholics reject the charge that Jews have too much influence in
business and finance.105 It is unsurprising that the head of the French
Jewish community declared in the summer of 2003 that .France is not more
anti.Semitic than America..106 According to a recent article in Ha.aretz,
the French police report that anti.Semitic incidents in France declined by
almost 50 per cent in 2005; and this despite the fact that France has the
largest Muslim population of any country in Europe.107
Finally, when a French Jew was brutally murdered last month by a Muslim
gang, tens of thousands of French demonstrators poured into the streets to
condemn anti.Semitism. Moreover, President Jacques Chirac and Prime
Minister Dominique de Villepin both attended the victim.s memorial service
in a public showof solidarity with French Jewry.108 It is also worth
noting that in 2002 more Jews immigrated to Germany than Israel, making it
.the fastest growing Jewish community in the world,. according to an
article in the Jewish newspaper Forward.109 If Europe were really heading
back to the 1930s, it is hard to imagine that Jews would be moving there
in large numbers.
We recognize, however, that Europe is not free of the scourge of
anti.Semitism. No one would deny that there are still some virulent
autochthonous anti.Semites in Europe (as there are in the United States)
but their numbers are small and their extreme views are rejected by the
vast majority of Europeans. Nor would one deny that there is anti.Semitism
among European Muslims, some of it provoked by Israel.s behavior towards
the Palestinians and some of it straightforwardly racist. 110 This problem
is worrisome, but it is hardly out of control. Muslims constitute less
than five percent of Europe.s total population, and European governments
are working hard to combat the problem. Why? Because most Europeans reject
such hateful views.111 In short, when it comes to anti.Semitism, Europe
today bears hardly any resemblance to Europe in the 1930s.
This is why pro.Israel forces, when pressed to go beyond assertion, claim
that there is a .new anti.Semitism., which they equate with criticism of
Israel.112 In other words criticize Israeli policy and you are by
definition an anti.Semite. When the synod of the Church of England
recently voted to divest from Caterpillar Inc on the grounds that
Caterpillar manufacures the bulldozers used to demolish Palestinian homes,
the Chief Rabbi complained that it would .have the most adverse
repercussions on ... Jewish.Christian relations in Britain., while Rabbi
Tony Bayfield, the head of the Reform movement, said: ..There is a clear
problem of anti.Zionist .verging on anti.Semitic .attitudes emerging in
the grass 24 roots, and even in the middle ranks of the Church..113
However, the Church was neither guilty of anti.Zionism nor anti.Semitism;
it was merely protesting Israeli policy.114
Critics are also accused of holding Israel to an unfair standard or
questioning its right to exist. But these are bogus charges too. Western
critics of Israel hardly ever question its right to exist. Instead, they
question its behavior towards the Palestinians, which is a legitimate
criticism: Israelis question it themselves. Nor is Israel being judged
unfairly. Rather, Israeli treatment of the Palestinians elicits criticism
because it is contrary to widely.accepted human rights norms and
international law, as well as the principle of national
self.determination. And it is hardly the only state that has faced sharp
criticism on these grounds.
In sum, other ethnic lobbies can only dream of having the political muscle
that pro.Israel organizations possess. The question, therefore, is what
effect does the Lobby have on U.S. foreign policy?
THE TAIL WAGGING THE DOG
If the Lobby.s impact were confined to U.S. economic aid to Israel, its
influence might not be that worrisome. Foreign aid is valuable, but not as
useful as having the world.s only superpower bring its vast capabilities
to bear on Israel.s behalf. Accordingly, the Lobby has also sought to
shape the core elements of U.S. Middle East policy. In particular, it has
worked successfully to convince American leaders to back Israel.s
continued repression of the Palestinians and to take im at Israel.s
primary re